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This dissertation takes issue with recent injunctions against mourning in contemporary 
trauma studies.  The critical turn to melancholic or “resistant mourning” is based on 
the idea that one normalizes and assimilates loss in ethically dubious ways, either 
denying the loss or denying the alterity of the lost other; as a result, this criticism 
positions melancholia as the only viable response against a totalizing mourning.  In 
tracing the parallels between this trend and a related valorization of anti-elegiac 
tendencies in twentieth and twenty-first century writing, I argue that the resurgent 
discourse of melancholia is based on a perceived breakdown of mourning which 
paradoxically conceals a desire for a time of perfect, totalizing mourning that this 
trend ostensibly refutes.  This thesis, which most centrally addresses recent trends in 
trauma studies, opens up to postcolonial studies by examining how contemporary 
Anglophone writers, shaped by a common traumatic history of English colonialism, 
attempt to articulate new modes of grief work rather than simply returning to old 
wounds.  Focusing on representations of individual loss and historical trauma in the 
work of Kamau Brathwaite, J. M. Coetzee, Zakes Mda, and Derek Walcott, I explore 
acts of literature as ways of working-through that do not actually foreclose a dialogic 
relationship with the past.  While all four writers initially seem to participate in a 
valorization of melancholia, they are actually attempting to work through loss in ways 
that challenge a reductive binary opposition between mourning as closure and 
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PREFACE 
 
This dissertation addresses the application of trauma studies to postcolonial 
literary and cultural contexts, a trend which in the past decade has become 
increasingly self-conscious about the risks of both effacing non-western modes of 
addressing loss and forcing into place a universalizing understanding of traumatic 
experience.  Of course, this intersection of trauma studies and postcolonial studies is 
not in itself a recent critical development; Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi first 
brought attention to the damaging psychology of colonization in the late 1950s and 
1960s, establishing the foundations for current work that asks how those psychological 
effects might be explored or perhaps mitigated.  Since decolonization, scholars have 
turned to trauma studies as a comparative framework that might inform historical 
apprehension of various instances of collective violence, asking, for instance, how 
work on historical trauma that came out of academic attention to the Holocaust might 
inform work on the Indian Partition or the transatlantic slave trade, or how insights 
into how social and legal institutions might initiate a process of collective 
reconciliation and forgiveness, as in the case of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa.  It is only recently, however, that concerns have been 
raised about the ways that trauma theory – a field based primarily in European and 
American analyses of historical events like the Holocaust or the Vietnam War – might 
elide cultural difference by promoting a universalizing understanding of psychological 
trauma.  Historicizing the discipline of trauma studies itself, recent work has focused 
on the field’s participation in “a discourse of memory that emerged at a specific time – 
in the late nineteenth century – and that is embedded in and inseparable from the 
particular concerns of western culture.”1  Substantiating or qualifying this assertion 
                                                
1 Anne Whitehead, “Journeying Through Hell: Wole Soyinka, Trauma, and 
Postcolonial Nigeria,” Studies in the Novel 40.1&2 (Spring & Summer 2008): 13. 
  x 
would require extensive historical and comparative work.  Still, looking at the post-
colonial as post-traumatic must involve an awareness of the dangers of effacing non-
western texts and methodologies and forcing on them a paradigm of memory that may 
not be universally applicable. 
This is not to say that the intersection of these two fields is not productive.   
Indeed, thinking about colonialism in terms of trauma is especially crucial because the 
postcolonial world continues to register its violence as ongoing.  One salient 
difference is that colonial violence does not simply reappear in the nightmares of its 
traumatized survivors as it does in Freud’s archetypal example of the train crash 
survivor who walks away, only to compulsively repeat the traumatic experience in his 
dreams and visions; rather, the “aftershocks” of colonialism are still present today, 
manifesting themselves in very real socio-political conditions, as well as in the lived 
experience of descendants of colonized people who deal with lingering discrimination 
and injustice. Anne Whitehead has emphasized this point, arguing that “[p]ostcolonial 
texts invite readings in terms of trauma because they are concerned with articulating 
the ongoing after-effects of colonial domination and violence in contemporary 
society.”2  Similarly, as Susan Najita writes in her book on trauma in Pacific Island 
literature, “[r]ather than appearing as foreclosed, the traumatic colonial past resurfaces 
in fragments precisely bacause they continue to constitute not only lived reality but 
also genealogical (dis)continuity.”3  In other words, colonial trauma does not just 
return in memories of violence, but is repeated in contemporary neocolonial practice 
that needs to be addressed with real social and political changes. 
Inasmuch as trauma theory has always been concerned with the articulation of 
traumatic experience and the restorative, communicative potential of that articulation, 
                                                
2 Ibid., 14. 
3 Susan Y. Najita, Decolonizing Cultures in the Pacific: Reading History and Trauma 
in Contemporary Fiction (New York: Routledge, 2006), 12. 
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I would suggest that it still has much to offer in non-western contexts.  In one sense, 
thinking about colonialism in terms of the western discourse of trauma might also 
prompt the west to continually acknowledge its complicity in these “ongoing after-
effects.”  This is one way in which it would be productive to highlight points of 
equivalence between colonial violence and important western reference points like the 
Holocaust.  By tracing these links, trauma studies can offer a potential comparative 
framework that might lead to a non-instrumental, relational understanding of different 
events, experiences, and identities.  Intimating this potentiality in her introduction to 
Trauma: Explorations in Memory, Cathy Caruth suggests that “in a catastrophic age… 
trauma itself may provide the very link between cultures.”  As a form of theoretical or 
thematic “area” studies (in which we study “sites” of trauma), trauma as a critical 
framework invites us to think of incommensurable experience as the unlikely basis for 
commensurability between cultures.  But the question still remains as to how we might 
more fully reconcile the application of trauma studies, which as a field is deeply 
rooted in European intellectual history and events, to non-western contexts.  If trauma 
studies purports to theorize individual and collective trauma, does it do so in ways that 
sufficiently account for cultural difference?  Or does its inflection with universalizing 
scientific accounts of psychological stress make it incompatible with accounts of 
cultural difference?   
These questions reiterate the same concern with trauma studies’ potential 
limits that Whitehead outlines when she argues that its theorists make the mistake of 
assuming that “the forms of mental disorder that are described by western psychiatry 
map unproblematically onto those found elsewhere.”  She argues that the discourse of 
trauma is problematically rooted in the west’s privileging of individualism, “with a 
marked emphasis on the disengaged self and in intrapsychic conflicts.”  This becomes 
problematic for Whitehead inasmuch as “this notion of the self may not be valid in 
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many non-western cultures which are predicated on alternative notions of the self and 
its relationship to others.”4  Taking these kinds of discrepancies into account, my 
project attempts to intersect the two fields productively while acknowledging the 
pitfalls of a thoughtless application of Eurocentric theory to the postcolonial.  I take as 
a starting point Whitehead’s inquiry in the same essay, in which she neatly outlines the 
kinds of questions one might ask of postcolonial literary representations of trauma – 
questions I will address in the following chapters: 
 
first, do postcolonial texts articulate the effects of 
trauma in terms of the individualist self, or do they 
emphasize alternative notions of the self and its relation 
to the wider community?  Secondly, does the category 
of trauma map straightforwardly onto the postcolonial 
text, or does something in that text itself remain resistant 
to it?  Finally, can we see the postcolonial text as a site 
for articulating local, non-western concepts of suffering, 
loss, and bereavement or alternatively of recovery and 
healing?5 
 
Focusing on four postcolonial authors – Derek Walcott, Kamau Brathwaite, Zakes 
Mda, and J. M. Coetzee – I hope to demonstrate the way that these kinds of 
alternatives to contemporary scholarship’s assumptions about trauma are deployed.  
Significantly, all four writers prompt and problematize this type of inquiry because 
they span and trouble the divide between west and non-west in various ways: 
biographically, generically, and stylistically.  Biographically, they have all spent large 
portions of their careers as part of the western academy and, as part of a global literary 
elite, have enjoyed a cosmopolitan mobility that separates them from the people they 
write about (something Walcott in particular dramatizes throughout his work).  
Generically and stylistically they rely on western canonical forms, even while all of 
                                                
4 Whitehead, 14. 
5 Ibid., 15. 
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them (with the exception of Coetzee) invoke nonwestern tropes and techniques.  As a 
result, they participate in a western dialogue about mourning and melancholia, 
demonstrating how the application of trauma studies to postcolonial studies can 
reframe understandings of local contexts, but also force us to ask how representations 
of violence and loss in non-western texts might challenge our institutionalized 
understandings of trauma.   
Stef Craps and Gert Buelens raise these types of questions more generally in 
their introduction to a special journal issue of Studies in the Novel (of which 
Whitehead’s essay is a part) which attempts to address ways that postcolonial “trauma 
novels” have challenged certain assumptions in trauma studies: 
 
Instead of promoting solidarity between different 
cultures, trauma studies risks producing the very 
opposite effect as a result of this one-sided focus: by 
ignoring or marginalizing non-Western traumatic events 
and histories and non-Western theoretical work, trauma 
studies may actually assist in the perpetuation of 
Eurocentric views and structures that maintain or widen 
the gap between the West and the rest of the world.6 
 
In response to the impediment of a “one-sided” theoretical emphasis that Craps and 
Buelens delineate here, this dissertation sets out to ask how attention to non-western 
responses to traumatic events (including mourning rituals) might challenge the 
Eurocentrism of trauma theory, ultimately compensating for this one-sidedness by 
bringing theory into dialogue with as yet disregarded modes of responding to violence 
and loss.  I look at literature as one type of  “mourning ritual” in which this one-sided 
view might be disputed, channeling Sam Durrant’s understanding of literary texts as 
instances of working through loss.  In his book, Postcolonial Narrative and the Work 
                                                
6 Stef Craps and Gert Buelens, “Introduction: Postcolonial Trauma Novels,” Studies in 
the Novel 40.1&2 (Spring & Summer 2008): 2. 
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of Mourning, Durrant justifies this correlation by explaining that “[p]ostcolonial 
narrative, structured by a tension between the oppressive memory of the past and the 
liberatory promise of the future, is necessarily involved in a work of mourning.”7  
Furthermore, he suggests, an understanding of “postcolonial literature as a work of 
mourning” is already grounded in the work of eminent postcolonial theorists who have 
previously framed the work of postcolonial theory and criticism as a “memorializing 
project.”8  My project maintains this understanding of postcolonial literature, but 
narrows the scope to elegiac fiction and poetry in order to focus more intensively on 
texts that overtly take on loss as their central theme.  
Reading postcolonial elegiac writing in its relationship to the specific traumatic 
histories in the Caribbean and South Africa, this project considers elegy as a problem 
both in and out of texts inasmuch as elegy is simultaneously a work of art and a work 
of mourning.  Elegy provides an especially rich area of investigation in this context 
because, rather than being vaguely based on a “memorializing project” as Durrant says 
of all postcolonial literature, elegy by definition has a performative element; it actually 
enacts a work of mourning.  Elegies are “about” loss, but they also iterate the very acts 
of lamentation and consolation that they describe.  Even elegies based entirely on 
fictional loss iterate a work of mourning which can be central in thinking about real 
ways of working through.  Furthermore, when we read elegies, we are often put 
directly in the position of the mourner addressing the dead; in some productive sense, 
the reader then re-iterates that work of mourning, effectively transferring the whole 
process of responding to loss and enacting grief from one speaker to another.  This 
                                                
7 Sam Durrant, Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2004), 1. 
8 Ibid., 8.  Durrant cites Leela Gandhi as his primary example, referring to “her 
description of postcolonialism in her Postcolonial Theory: a critical introduction as a 
‘therapeutic retrieval of the colonial past.’” 
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element of temporary participation is crucial for rethinking concepts like empathy and 
identification, enacting what Dominick LaCapra has called “a kind of virtual 
experience” in which one relates to the other without assuming his or her position.  As 
LaCapra explains: 
 
Historical trauma is specific, and not everyone is subject 
to it or entitled to the subject position associated with it.  
It is dubious to identify with the victim to the point of 
making oneself a surrogate victim who has a right to the 
victim’s voice or subject position.  The role of empathy 
and empathetic unsettlement does not entail this 
identity; it involves a kind of virtual experience through 
which one puts oneself in the other’s position while 
recognizing the difference of that position and hence not 
taking the other’s place.9 
 
With regard to the kind of elegiac participation to which I am referring, the fact that 
this potential for relating to another’s loss takes place in a controlled literary space 
means that the reader who temporarily participates in the work of mourning does so at 
a distance, never fully conflating self and other or secondary witness and victim.  It 
might, therefore, provide a way of relating to loss that preserves the specificity of 
individual experience but provides a stage for understanding between individuals and 
across cultures. 
 In thinking about the ways that readers might temporarily become “speakers,” 
as they arguably do when reciting a poem, I do not wish to overemphasize the 
poetry/prose divide because this project also looks at elegiac fiction, following in the 
wake of criticism which has reconceived elegy as a mode rather than a form.10  In 
                                                
9 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 2001), 78. 
10 See John B. Vickery, The Modern Elegiac Temper (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2006) and Karen E. Smythe, Figuring Grief: Gallant, Munro, and 
the Poetics of Elegy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992).  See my 
introduction for a further explication of this distinction.  
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conceiving of elegiac postcolonial literature as something that addresses a history of 
colonial violence and performs the same act of engaging with the past it describes, I 
argue that we might be able to better reevaluate the kinds of assumptions that recent 
trauma theory has made about historical trauma in a postcolonial context.  One of 
those assumptions is prevalent in both the study of the elegy and recent trauma theory 
and thus provides a perfect starting point from which to explore this larger problem.  
In the past decade, scholars in both fields have argued that a melancholic attachment 
to loss is non-pathological, even desirable, and that a deliberately melancholic stance 
is central to an ethically and politically viable work of mourning.  Original Skin: 
Melancholy Returns, Postcolonial Mourning shows how the work of these four 
postcolonial authors challenges this argument, forcing readers to reformulate ideas 
about the process of mourning loss and working through trauma. 
I have already briefly emphasized the importance of bringing trauma studies 
into conversation with postcolonial studies, particularly with regard to the necessity of 
working through loss as both a way of addressing the past and a way to confront very 
real repetitions of colonial trauma today.  But the central concern of this project is to 
examine how a look at these non-western contexts might also speak to problems and 
contradictions within trauma studies regarding the idea of working through.  Through 
this critique of the recent valorization of melancholia, the problem of working through 
provides the very entry point into the question of how to avoid a Eurocentric approach 
to postcolonial negotiations of trauma, while at the same time imagining new and 
productive ways to address traumatic losses.  I am interested in the ways that these 
four authors propose models of temporality and community that are not 
commensurable with the model of healing that some scholars have seen as the goal of 
working through, that is, an ill-conceived notion of “closure” based on a fantasy of 
what I call “original skin.”  The wound, or trauma, in this model, once “worked 
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through” leaves no mark, returning the subject to a sort of prelapsarian state in which 
there is no memory of the wound.  The idea of the reformation of original, unmarked 
skin invokes the figure and fantasy of the perfectly, impossibly healed body in 
contradistinction to a model in which working through is considerably more 
provisional.  While the play on original sin situates the myth of closure or complete 
healing as an iteration of a prelapsarian myth, I do not wish to invoke a universalizing 
sense of foundational violence or fall into woundedness as some psychoanalytic 
thought has figured the infant’s move from the semiotic into the symbolic.11  At the 
same time, I want to suggest that with regard to specific losses, the valorization of a 
melancholic attachment to the past (in which the inability to heal is recast as a 
deliberate refusal of a totalizing closure that forgets loss) problematically situates as 
its opposition a fantasy of healing that could never come to fruition.   
I come to these questions through literature, examining how the return of 
melancholia in theory might lead us to rethink its staging in postcolonial fiction and 
poetry, which simultaneously registers a kind of etiologic obsession with the wounds 
of history while posing new ways of working through them that have yet to be 
articulated in much western trauma scholarship.  Accordingly, the ultimate aim of this 
project is not simply to ask how the application of trauma studies to postcolonial 
studies can reframe literary, historical, and geopolitical understandings of the colonial 
violence, but also how representations of memory and catastrophe in non-western 
texts challenge our codified understandings of trauma.  In asking these questions I 
hope to instigate a dialogic relationship between trauma theory’s insights and local 
contexts onto which those insights might not be perfectly mapped. 
                                                
11 See Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) 





“[T]raumatic memory opens a certain epistemological 
crisis in the discursive regime of archival 
commemoration.  As wound, disaster, catastrophe, and 
so on, trauma breaches discursive representation and 
eclipses thought itself.  Just as trauma’s pathology poses 
limits to critical reason and disciplinary inquiry, it also 
ruptures archival memory.”12 
   -Walter Kalaidjian, The Edge of Modernism 
 
 
“While mourning abandons lost objects by laying their 
histories to rest, melancholia’s continued and open 
relation to the past finally allows us to gain new 
perspectives on and new understandings of lost 
objects.”13  
-David Eng and David Kazanjian, 
Loss: The Politics of Mourning 
 
 This project reads contemporary Anglophone literature across national 
boundaries, through its engagement with the traumatic historical and psychological 
ruptures occasioned by English colonialism.  In particular, it is concerned with the 
ways that recent work on historical trauma, particularly in a postcolonial context, has 
produced an injunction against mourning these losses, channeling Adorno’s 
suggestion that “coming to terms with the past” might involve “wishing to turn the 
                                                
12 Walter Kalaidjian, The Edge of Modernism: American Poetry and the Traumatic 
Past (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 3. 
13 David Eng and David Kazanjian, “Introduction: Mourning Remains” in Eng and 
Kazanjian, eds., Loss: The Politics of Mourning (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2003), p. 4. 
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page and, if possible, wiping it from memory.”14  This model of remembering-to-
forget is especially objectionable from the point of view of the burgeoning sub-field of 
postcolonial trauma studies15 because colonialism’s traumatic histories are more often 
than not already elided by the dominating narratives of imperial, economic, and 
civilizational progress.  If postcolonial literature bears witness to the traumas of 
colonialism – including, but not limited to, the centuries-long histories of violence 
perpetuated by the transatlantic slave trade, the erasure of indigenous ways of life, the 
desecration of land inscribed indelibly in each locale, and the general psychological 
damage caused by racism, dispossession, exclusion, exile – the central problem 
involves first recognizing and recuperating these losses as losses, and writing into 
global public memory a story which has been effaced.  Furthermore, the imperative to 
‘never forget’ becomes especially pressing as colonial losses are perpetuated in 
contemporary neocolonial political, economic, and touristic practice; the existence of 
these practices today lends a sense of urgency to the project of keeping the originary 
wounds of colonialism open, refusing to ‘turn the page’ of history and instead opting 
to participate in a melancholic relationship with the past in which a traumatic history 
is never put to rest. 
 Despite the appeal and potential necessity of this approach, the central concern 
of this dissertation is to interrogate this recent trend of valorizing a melancholic 
                                                
14 Theodor Adorno, “What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?” in Bitburg in 
Moral and Political Perspective, edited by Geoffrey Hartman (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1986), 115.  
15 See Stef Craps and Gert Buelens, “Introduction: Postcolonial Trauma Novels,” 
Studies in the Novel 40.1&2 (Spring & Summer 2008).  In this special journal issue on 
postcolonial novels and trauma studies, Craps and Buelens refer to a group of scholars, 
including Kamran Aghaie, Jill Bennett, Victoria Burrows, Sam Durrant, Leela Ganhdi, 
Linda Hutcheon, Rosanne Kennedy, David Lloyd, and Rebecca Saunders, who have in 
recent years figured the postcolonial as posttraumatic by “theorizing colonization in 
terms of the infliction of a collective trauma and reconceptualizing postcolonialism as 
a post-traumatic cultural formation”(2). 
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attachment to the past, and to critique the way in which endless grieving has been 
recently recast as a community-building force, an ethical imperative, and a site of 
creative potential.  The critics who adopt this stance borrow Freud’s early distinction 
in “Mourning and Melancholia” between “normal mourning” – a finite process of 
recollection culminating in an act of substitution, in which the mourner eventually 
comes to sever his/her attachments to the lost other and redirect libidinal ties to new 
others and objects – and melancholia, in which the process of redirection and 
reattachment misfires, and fixes on the ego itself.16  The melancholic internalizes the 
loss, misidentifying his/her very self with the lost other, which in turn leads to the self-
criticism and self-berating that accompany melancholia and endlessly perpetuates the 
process of grieving.17  However, in these recent recuperations of melancholia, Freud’s 
initial pathological designation has been undercut by a critical tendency either to 
resuscitate melancholia as normative or to valorize its pathological aspects as such.  In 
                                                
16 See Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia” in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 14 , ed. by James Strachey 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1914-1916), pp. 243-258.  While Freud implies in this 
essay that mourning is the normative reaction to loss and melancholia the pathological, 
the distinction is made murky by Freud’s claim that one of the few things really 
delineating mourning from melancholia is the prescribed length of time the subject 
spends grieving.  While critics have fixated on the apparently clear distinction between 
“healthy” and “unhealthy” attachment to loss, Freud implies in this essay that 
melancholic attachment actually precedes the process of “normal” mourning, 
rendering the distinction even more open-ended. 
17 In The Ego and the Id, Freud rethinks the distinction he makes in his earlier essay.  
In this later text, Freud suggests that in all cases loss irreparably changes the ego, not 
simply in melancholic identification.  Contrary to the distinction he draws in 
“Mourning and Melancholia,” the psyche does not heal by forming new libidinal 
investments; rather, identification occurs in all cases of loss.  The ego, in this model, is 
“constituted” by the loss of its objects of desire which re-form inside the ego and 
become crucial to the very formation of subjectivity.  Most importantly, in this model, 
any possibility of complete psychic healing is rescinded.  However, since the critics 
who reject a “pathologized” version of melancholy borrow predominantly from 
“Mourning and Melancholia,” I will focus on Freud’s earlier understanding of these 
concepts. 
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the latter case in particular, critics affirm the pathological on the grounds that it has the 
capacity to produce new and inventive – even experimental – modes of expression, to 
produce legitimate and rare opportunities for an ethical interaction with the other (an 
aspect which has an obvious import for postcolonial studies), and, finally, to become a 
condition for contemporary existence, necessary because it delineates the communities 
with which we identify ourselves.  For diasporic groups with no cogent sense of 
national belonging, for instance, a common sense of identity might emerge from a 
common experience of loss or trauma – a bond that might dissipate were that 
community ever to sever attachments to that common loss; as Judith Butler claims, 
“[loss] becomes the condition and necessity for a certain sense of community, where 
community does not overcome the loss, where community cannot overcome the loss 
without losing the very sense of itself as a community.”18  Ethically speaking, 
depathologizing a melancholic attachment to the past might create a space in which 
“the seemingly pathological and unrealistic response of the mourner who refuses to 
accept the other’s death” might, as R. Clifton Spargo suggests, “stand for an ethical 
protest against a dominant cultural pathology that trivializes death.”19  Taking these 
kinds of argument into account, I want to question whether an open relationship with 
loss or trauma is really productive or ethically desirable.  Rather than privileging an 
                                                
18 Judith Butler, “Afterword: After Loss, What Then?” in Loss: The Politics of 
Mourning, 468. 
19 R. Clifton Spargo, The Ethics of Mourning: Grief and Responsibility in Elegiac 
Literature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2004), 21. Spargo’s book deals with the 
relationship between mourning, ethics, and politics, showing how (Western) elegiac 
literature has continuously pitted a refusal to mourn against a “status quo of cultural 
memory”(6). Using Antigone and Hamlet as archetypal characters who rebel against a 
sovereign decree to stop mourning, Spargo argues that “it is precisely because our 
cultural modes of memory so often neglect the other whom they would remember that 
unsolved mourning becomes a dissenting act, a sign of an irremissible ethical 
meaning”(6).    
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unqualified openness to past wounds, I am interested in investigating what modes of 
language we might imagine that could allow both individuals and communities to 
move beyond trauma and loss without foreclosing it.  If literature is one mode of such 
a language, how does it offer options for remembering the past in ways that don’t lead 
to dead end perpetuations of grief, the inability to move into the future, and the endless 
repetition of traumatization? 
Throughout this dissertation, I will be referring to both trauma and 
melancholia; without wishing to conflate them, I want to point out how the trend of 
valorizing a melancholic attachment to the past relates to a fetishization of originary 
loss or traumatic experience.  I would suggest that thinking about a melancholic 
attachment to the past is particularly useful for thinking about collective or 
intergenerational trauma, in which the victims might not have experienced a specific 
traumatic event but still feel as if they are living in the aftermath of something that 
haunts their present.  Melancholia, while conceptually and experientially different 
from the state of being traumatized, has similar components: like the trauma victim, 
the melancholic, who experiences a perceived past loss as central to contemporary 
existence, is similarly unable to engage with present life.  This is just one pitfall of the 
turn to melancholia as a productive possibility for political agency; if the melancholic 
incorporates the lost other, the melancholic consumption of loss, and the 
identification/conflation of the ego with lost object may result in a complete 
effacement of agency and, subsequently, a complete withdrawal from history.  Surely, 
this withdrawal is categorically futile in terms of a move into the future, both for 
individuals and for groups “coming to terms” with historical trauma. 
Despite this obvious drawback, critics have seen a certain potential in 
valorizing a melancholic attachment to a traumatic past, or even traumatic memory 
itself, as Walter Kalaidjian does in the passage cited at the beginning of this chapter.  
  6 
Recasting trauma as something positive, even politically progressive in its potential to 
“rupture archival memory,” Kalaidjian implies that just as trauma represents for the 
victim a breach in knowledge and experience, its symptoms (which are manifested 
predominantly in belated repetition) might also belatedly and repeatedly breach 
monologic historical accounts of the past in which the victors’ histories dominate.  
Privileging trauma for its alleged capacity to rupture narratives in which the wounds of 
history have been “wiped from memory” might, according to this viewpoint, allow 
memory to surface even in the face of repression and denial – a claim which has 
obvious appeal to postcolonial writers interested in broader public recognition of 
unacknowledged losses.  While Kalaidjian’s book focuses exclusively on American 
poetry, particularly work by Armenian, diasporic Jewish, and African American 
writers, the way he recasts an ethics of memory in favor of an anti-reparative refusal to 
work through trauma and loss echoes much recent work on historical memory.  
Indeed, it forms part of the same trend in literary and cultural studies of re-coding a 
melancholic attachment to the past as productive rather than pathological.20 
 By reframing melancholia as “a deliberate decision about how not to respond 
to loss”21 these critics claim to be concerned with developing new ways of relating to 
and engaging with past events.  This trend is exemplified in David Eng and David 
Kazanjian’s collection of essays, Loss: The Politics of Mourning, in which a 
melancholic attachment to the past is refigured as ultimately dynamic and productive 
                                                
20 See Jahan Ramazani, Poetry of Mourning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994); David Eng & David Kazanjian, eds., Loss: The Politics of Mourning (2003); 
Ranjana Khanna, Dark Continents (2003); Sam Durrant, Postcolonial Narrative and 
the Work of Mourning (2004); R. Clifton Spargo, The Ethics of Mourning (2004); 
Walter Kalaidjian, The Edge of Modernism (2006); Patricia Rae, ed., Modernism and 
Mourning (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2007); Jonathan Flatley, Affective 
Mapping (2008); Tammy Clewell, Mourning, Modernism, Postmodernism (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
21 Patricia Rae, “Introduction: Modernist Mourning” in Modernism and Mourning, 16. 
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inasmuch as it is affiliated with Benjamin’s historical materialism.22  Where 
historicism misappropriates loss, looking at it from the victor’s point of view only, 
historical materialism “establishes a continuing dialogue with loss and its remains” 
and resists the historicist’s “desire to ‘grasp’ and to ‘hold’ on to the fleeting images of 
the past – to create fixed and totalizing narratives,” partaking instead in a continuous 
engagement with loss and its remains.  Taking a cue from the “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” Eng and Kazanjian claim to take up “the precarious struggle 
of a hopeful historical materialism against a hopeless historicism, of an active 
mourning against a reactive acedia,”23 rejecting a pathological understanding of 
melancholia in favor of a valorized version of endless grieving that ostensibly does not 
allow the past to be closed down.  Rather, they are concerned with the ways in which 
mourning, which they link to “the historicist propensity to relive the past as intolerable 
fixity,” might staunch the creative, ethical and political potentialities in our 
understanding of the past.  In this Benjaminian formulation, where “[h]istoricism 
rightly culminates in universal history,”24 the language of mourning domesticates loss 
just as the language of historicism domesticates the past.  For Eng and Kazanjian, 
“Benjamin’s historical materialism establishes a continuing dialogue with loss and its 
remains – a flash of emergence, an instant of emergency, and most important a 
moment of production”25 that might perpetuate a continuous dialogic relationship with 
a past that, for the sake of politics or power, would otherwise be forgotten.  In a 
                                                
22 Eng and Kazanjian’s collection turns its focus on traumatic histories away from 
Holocaust studies and towards other fields, especially postcolonial and queer studies.  
23 Eng and Kazanjian, 2. 
24 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in Illuminations, trans. by 
Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1968), 262.  Also see Paget Henry’s Caliban’s 
Reason for an analysis of the way Caribbean writer, Sylvia Wynter, intimates 
Benjamin’s view of history not as ordered progress but “a maelstrom in which we 
struggle with our backs to the future”(Henry, 124).   
25 Eng and Kazanjian, 1. 
  8 
similar vein, Ranjana Khanna validates not only melancholia, but trauma as such, for 
its potential to disrupt “totalizing” master narratives.  Melancholia in this instance 
becomes a kind of interpretive framework for a “critique of postcoloniality and 
neocolonialism;”26 trauma is figured as “a spectral presence interrupting the fiction of 
mastery and questioning the transparency of the prose that informs it.”27 
 At stake here is the critical negotiation of writing back.  If literature produced 
in the former colonies over the past decades has “written back” against colonization, it 
has done so in a way that risks re-inscribing colonial difference.28  Not unlike 
Kalaidjian’s move to privilege traumatic breaches to thought (and the archive), Eng 
and Kazanjian’s collection represents a critical attempt to remember colonial atrocities 
outside the cultural bounds of Eurocentric thought.  Faced with what Douglas Crimp 
figures as the “incommensurability of experiences,”29 advocates of the move to 
                                                
26 Khanna, x. Khanna coins this framework “critical melancholia.” 
27 Ibid., xi. 
28 I refer here, of course, to the influential book, The Emperor Writes Back, edited by 
Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin.  Originally published in 1989 and 
now in its second edition, the book argues for the importance of continued 
engagement with the experience of imperialism on the part of post-colonial societies.  
Addressing the “question of why the empire needs to write back to a centre once the 
imperial structure has been dismantled in political terms”(6), the authors argue that the 
literary canon has perpetuated imperial hegemony, even after Britain has historically 
and politically been “relegated to a relatively minor place in international affairs”(6).  
The English canon, taught around the English-speaking world and accepted “as a 
touchstone of taste and value” perpetuates colonialist assumptions about the world 
inasmuch as it “asserts the English of south-east England as a universal norm”(7), 
among other things.  Despite the political independence of countries formerly 
colonized by the British Empire, post-colonial literatures are to this day identified as 
“national off-shoots of English literature, and which therefore relegate them to 
marginal and subordinate positions”(7).  See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and 
Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial 
Literatures, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2002).   
29 Cathy Caruth and Thomas Keenan, “’The AIDS Crisis Is Not Over’:  A 
Conversation with Gregg Bordowitz, Douglas Crimp, and Laura Pinsky” in Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory, ed. by Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995), pp. 256-272.  Crimp refers to the ways in which “certain people are 
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“depathologize” melancholia are in search of a revolutionary mode of acknowledging 
trauma against the weight of neocolonial forces that do not register the losses of 
colonialism as “mournable” lives.30   
As appealing as this potentiality might be, my project questions the validity of 
this anti-reparative ethics of memory, asking whether or not it truly represents an 
ethically and politically viable option for engaging with alternative histories of loss.  
As I will argue, those who privilege a refusal to mourn problematically misunderstand 
mourning or “working through” trauma as a closing down of the past (and by 
extension, a closing down of future possibilities).  Ultimately, I too am interested in 
this potential for resistance in continuous recognition, but I am reticent to adopt the 
overly simplistic understanding of mourning as “closure” which prompts trauma 
theorists to valorize melancholic attachment to loss without taking into account the 
potential pitfalls of such a position. 
One such pitfall, as Dominick LaCapra has pointed out, is the conflation of 
loss with absence and the failure to address the specificity of a particular experience of 
loss when endless melancholy renders it “enveloped in an overly generalized discourse 
of absence.”31  Fixating on a specific loss, even recasting it as foundational might, as 
Eng and Kazanjian suggest, lead to new forms of creativity, politics, and community. 
Alternatively, however, it might also result in an inability to break out of cycles of 
violence and traumatization and an eschewal of truly future-oriented thinking in favor 
of an impossible fantasy of what LaCapra calls a “new totality:” 
                                                                                                                                       
experiencing the AIDS crisis while the society as a whole doesn’t appear to be 
experiencing it at all”(256); there is a discrepancy between what people regard as 
mournable and what they experience as traumatic. 
30 See Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 
2004) for an analysis of “grievable” versus “ungrievable” lives, particularly Chapter 2, 
“Violence, Mourning, Politics.” 
31 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), 45-6. 
  10 
 
When absence is converted into loss, one increases the 
likelihood of misplaced nostalgia or utopian politics in 
quest of a new totality or fully unified community.  
When loss is converted into (or encrypted in an 
indiscriminately generalized rhetoric of) absence, one 
faces the impasse of endless melancholy, impossible 
mourning, and interminable aporia in which any process 
of working through the past and its historical losses is 
foreclosed or prematurely aborted.32 
 
Further, the conflation of absence and loss, particularly the transposition of a specific, 
historical loss into structural lack can lead to what LaCapra calls a “melancholic 
paralysis or manic agitation” in which “the significance or force of particular historical 
losses (for example, those of apartheid or the Shoah) may be obfuscated or rashly 
generalized”33  
 Rather than focus on an overly generalized sense of lack (disguised as a 
specific loss), in which a melancholic fixation on a traumatic past shuts down 
possibilities for mitigating the effects of both traumatization and depression, I want to 
look at the ways in which mourning, not melancholia, might lead to the same kinds of 
creative, ethical and politically viable engagements with the past.  Despite the way that 
postcolonial criticism has been quick to participate in this valorization of melancholy, 
the elegiac postcolonial fiction and poetry I examine in the following chapters 
provides a challenge to this same critical posture.  Recent elegiac postcolonial 
literature’s multivalent approaches to the aftermath of colonialism has revealed how, 
in LaCapra’s words, “processes of working through may counteract the force of acting 
out and the repetition compulsion.”34   
In an effort to better articulate these processes, this dissertation, which most 
                                                
32 Ibid., 46.   
33 Ibid., 64. 
34 Ibid., 22. 
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centrally addresses a recent trend in trauma studies, opens up to questions of the 
postcolonial by examining how contemporary Anglophone writers, who are at least 
superficially bound by the common traumatic history of English colonialism, attempt 
to articulate new modes of grief-work rather than simply returning to old wounds.  
Focusing on representations of individual loss and historical trauma in the work of 
Derek Walcott, Kamau Brathwaite, Zakes Mda, and J. M. Coetzee, I examine how acts 
of literature enact processes of “working through” in ways that don’t actually 
foreclose a dialogic relationship with the past.  As I will show, while all four writers 
initially seem to participate in a privileging of melancholy, they are actually 
attempting to work through loss in ways that are not prescribed by theory.  Instead 
they focus on a new ethics of relational mourning which establishes lines of 
connectivity between individuals and cultures without slipping into what LaCapra has 
criticized as a decontextualized “discourse of absence” in which loss is misconstrued 
as lack and the possibility of working through specific historical losses is closed down. 
 I turn to contemporary postcolonial elegiac literature because of the ways it 
constellates historical questions about individual and collective trauma with 
psychologically oriented questions about ways that loss might be worked through.  As 
I mentioned in the preface, my reading is informed by an understanding of elegiac 
literature as something that enacts a work of mourning as much as it describes a 
response to loss.  While an anthropological analysis of mourning rituals is beyond the 
scope of this project, I will be considering elegy as one such cultural iteration of 
mourning practice.  As such, I will also be asking how these literary enactments of the 
process of working through stage a tension between a sense of mourning as 
provisional, and a mode of mourning that is politically or socially regulated.   
It is worth mentioning that a central concern of postcolonial nation-building 
has been not only how to remember the trauma of the past, but also how to transition 
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from a state of woundedness to one of reconciliation, something which the critics 
mentioned above claim to resist through their embrace of melancholia.  The case of 
post-apartheid South Africa best exemplifies this concern for commemorating past 
losses in a way that would enable the country to instantiate a new, functional 
government and avoid any retributive violence that might pose a threat to national 
unity.  This nationally stated aim is precisely what critics of mourning as closure fear.  
Despite the Commission’s acknowledgement that reconciliation “is not about 
forgetting” but is instead “about seeking to forego bitterness, renouncing resentment, 
moving past old hurt, and becoming a survivor rather than a passive victim,”35 there 
still exists a skepticism in both literature and criticism toward the idea of nationally 
prescribed mourning because it does seem to set up limits to what constitutes 
acceptable grieving and resists the fact that working through a desire for retribution 
might form part of that very process of grieving.  In terms of Spargo’s argument, 
national projects of mourning are precisely what literary figures like Hamlet and 
Antigone protest against with their refusal to address their grief in a sanctioned way.  
Echoing the parallel arguments in trauma theory, Jahan Ramazani, Patricia Rae, and 
Tammy Clewell link a refusal of “rationalizing consolations” to an ethics and politics, 
particularly a progressive politics that resists a historicizing “[preservation of] the 
status quo.”36  Clewell in particular reiterates claims made by those theorists when she 
valorizes a kind of modernist anti-elegiac writing that “spurns consolation and the 
conventional aim of closure” and consequently “establishe[s] a politically progressive 
politics of mourning for the culture of modernity.”37  
This resistance to closure, which permeates the studies of cultural trauma and 
collective mourning mentioned earlier, has a not unexpected overlap with literary 
                                                
35 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, Vol 1, 116. 
36 Rae, 18.  
37 Clewell, 2. 
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criticism on the elegy, which in recent studies has also advocated an injunction against 
mourning.  Since Sacks’s psychoanalytically inflected understanding of the genre 
recast elegy as a performative work of mourning,38 it has invited critics to think of 
elegies that appear to resist consolation, rather than promote and enact it, as 
melancholic. Ramazani’s Poetry of Mourning represents the first major study of 
“melancholic mourning” as “protracted grief” in the modern elegy in English.39  
Historicizing the turn to a melancholy poetics by situating the resistance to mourning 
as a response to the escalation of death and loss during the early twentieth century, 
Ramazani argues that the modern poet “reanimates” the elegy as a form by making it 
anti-elegiac and attacking the conventional elegiac tendency to find consolation in loss 
and grief.  This argument amplifies the resistance to “closure” by suggesting that the 
recuperative gestures of conventional elegy amount to anachronistic attempts at 
emotional and psychological comfort that do not fit with the trauma of death after the 
experience of new, modern horrors; as Ramazani claims, “modern elegy is not a 
refuge for outworn nostalgias and consolations.  The characteristic elegy of our time 
evinces the astringency of modern death and bereavement.” 40  According to this view, 
which has recently informed Clewell’s book, Mourning, Modernism, and 
Postmodernism, and the essays in Rae’s Mourning and Modernism, the gross violence 
of “our time,” exemplified by the scale of modern warfare and the severity of modern 
                                                
38 Peter M. Sacks, The English Elegy: Studies in the Genre from Spenser to Yeats 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) 
39 See also Spargo’s The Ethics of Mourning and Kalaidjian’s The Edge of Modernism, 
along with Susan Gubar’s Poetry After Auschwitz: Remembering What One Never 
Knew (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), which discusses modern post-
Holocaust poetry’s resistance to “narrative closure”(11); while Gubar does not appeal 
to the logic of mourning vs. melancholia, she parallels Ramazani by advocating “a 
resistance to closure with respect to consideration or judgment of the events that 
transpired during the Shoah”(20). 
40 Jahan Ramazani, Poetry of Mourning: The Modern Elegy from Hardy to Heaney 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. ix. 
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ways of dying, renders the very genre of elegy suspect because it risks “redeeming 
loss as poetic gain.”41  
Central to this type of critique is an understanding of the anti-elegiac or the 
melancholic as that which “refuse[s] a facile poetic therapy.”42  For Ramazani, the 
modern elegy undermines “the psychological propensity of the genre to translate grief 
into consolation” while the modern elegist changes the elegy’s “psychic basis from the 
rationalizing consolations of normative grief to the more intense self-criticisms and 
vexations of melancholic mourning”43  Similarly, for Rae, whose edited volume traces 
anti-elegiac trends in modern fiction, melancholy connotes “a resistance to 
reconciliation, full stop: a refusal to accept the acceptance of loss, whether through the 
severing and transference of libidinal ties or through the successful expansion of 
identity through introjection, or through any other kind of compensatory process.”44  
Rae’s phrasing – her description of melancholia as “a refusal to accept the acceptance 
                                                
41 Ibid, 7.  Also see Tammy Clewell, Mourning, Modernism, Postmodernism (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).  Clewell echoes both Ramazani’s understanding of 
melancholic mourning as a refusal of elegiac consolation and Eng and Kazanjian’s 
equation of the concept of “closure” with historicism’s imposition of fixity when she 
suggests that “the ability of mourning to forge new constellations for psychic and 
social life has been best served over the course of the twentieth century by the 
adamant refusal of consolation, as well as the resolve to confront the loss without the 
expectation of closure or the imposition of fixed meanings”(10). 
42 Ibid., 7. 
43 Ibid., 5.  It is important to note here that while Ramazani turns against “traditional” 
elegiac conventions, he locates some sense of resolution in the anti-elegiac, inasmuch 
as the modern elegy’s form reflects the brokenness and oppositional nature of the 
modern experience.  In other words, he suggests that from the modern period onward, 
we lack the colloquial language to convey grief.  He goes on to argue, however, that 
even as it conveys that lack of a grieving vocabulary, modern elegy gives us a new 
language with which to mourn.  In this sense, Ramazani can’t be described as 
completely anti-elegiac.  If he valorizes melancholia it is because he affiliates the so-
called anti-elegiac form of modern elegy with a pathological resistance to normative 
or “compensatory mourning.”  However some form of consolation is still the end 
product.   
44 Patricia Rae, Modernism and Mourning, 16-7. 
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of loss” – resonates with an idea of mourning not simply as a process of grieving in 
which one comes to accept the lost other as lost (or, with regard to traumatic 
experience, a process which works through trauma in a way that counteracts 
compulsions to repeat it); rather, it figures mourning as a capitulation to the idea that 
loss can and should be accepted.  It is this assumption that I would like to challenge.  
At the heart of the injunctions against mourning is the notion that mourning 
assimilates, normalizes and makes normative our relationships with lost others.  
According to this model, melancholia becomes the only ethical response to loss 
inasmuch as mourning has been tainted by a historicist impulse to fix and totalize.  
Similarly, the valorization of the modernist anti-elegy stems from a refusal of 
“compensatory mourning” or “normative explanations of the genre as psychic 
remedy.”45  In both cases, melancholia becomes the critical framework which replaces 
a politically, ethically, or even spiritually defunct work of mourning.   
Critics who have noted melancholic shifts toward the modern anti-elegiac, in 
particular, suggest that the modern poet experiences a crisis with regard to mourning 
when faced with the “abbreviation, objectification, and bureaucratic regulation of 
mortuary rites”46 one begins to witness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  World War I initiates a further breakdown in conventional elegy; as 
Ramazani claims, “slaughter and suffering on such a scale was not readily amenable to 
traditional mortuary codes or recuperative mourning, which were permanently 
altered”(288).  Finally, as Sandra Gilbert suggests, throughout the twentieth century, 
“the crises bred by the disappearance of a traditional God, the traumas of global 
                                                
45 Ramazani, 69. 
46 Ramazani, “Afterword: When There Are So Many We Shall Have To Mourn” in 
Modernism and Mourning, ed. Patricia Rae (Lewisburg: Buckness University Press, 
2007), 291.  
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warfare, the privatization of death, the medicalization of dying”47 ultimately contribute 
to the seeming inadequacy of available modes of mourning.48 
In contradistinction to this argument I suggest the following: the recent 
discourse on melancholia is ultimately implicated in a fantasy of a lost plentitude of 
mourning, a nostalgia for a time when mourning somehow succeeded.  All of these 
claims presuppose some break that occurs in the twentieth century and, more 
importantly, unwittingly opposes modern “impossible” mourning with a pre-modern 
instance in which now exhausted modes of mourning worked.  If we look at the ways 
in which these critics have interpreted Freud’s work on mourning (which actually 
provides a much more nuanced and provisional differentiation between mourning and 
melancholia), we can see that the tendency to extricate a binary opposition between 
mourning-as-closure and melancholia-as-openness problematically presupposes that 
mourning actually ever accomplishes something like “closure.”  The point of this 
project, then, is not to recuperate a mode of mourning that “worked” but to show how 
current writing about loss is actually interested in articulating new modes of grief 
work that contest the presumed opposition between mourning and melancholia. 
Rather than vainly attempting to recuperate rites that once worked through loss 
in a way that is now seen as undesirable, I am interested in the ways in which 
contemporary postcolonial writing – faced with the problem of loss inasmuch as it has 
                                                
47 Sandra M. Gilbert, Death’s Door: Modern Dying and the Ways We Grieve (New 
York: Norton, 2006), xx. 
48 Also see Clewell, Mourning, Modernism, Postmodernism.  Focusing on the modern 
British and American novel, Clewell makes many similar points, arguing that writers 
like Virginia Woolf and William Faulkner “recognized the need to mourn a range of 
cataclysmic social events, including the slaughter of war, modernization of culture, 
and the disappearance of God and tradition.  They also understood, however, the 
impossibility of this mourning, finding its terms utterly outmoded”(1).   
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been theorized as a “memorializing project”49 – has imagined modes of mourning that 
challenge the stereotypical understanding of mourning as closure and, as such, has 
problematized the recent critical advocacy of a melancholic relationship to the past.  
Most importantly, I want to suggest that a simple theoretical reversal of the 
pathological into the productive cannot account for the ways in which recent 
postcolonial writing contends with the wounds of colonial history.  All four authors I 
analyze in this project concentrate on intense personal and collective traumas in their 
writing, lingering on past loss in such a way that might suggest a melancholic 
propensity.  But a close examination of their work reveals that they never simply 
render the pathological productive when they “linger” on the wounds of the past; 
rather, their writing points to the potential for imagining or improvising new ways to 
conceive of the process of working through loss.  
I proceed by examining what we might call four different “facets” of the 
critical move to recuperate melancholia that I examine separately in each of the four 
following chapters.  The first is the assumption of a clichéd idea of mourning-as-
closure which fully recuperates an assumed pre-loss wholeness.  I address this notion 
by examining Derek Walcott’s shift from a refusal of melancholia in texts like “The 
Muse of History” to an apparent embrace of unhealable woundedness in Omeros.  I 
argue that Omeros fundamentally questions the curative efficacy of a return to pre-
colonial Africa for the West Indian subject “wounded” by his colonial history when its 
characters, who have ostensibly been cured by a figurative return to African roots, are 
still overcome by anguish at the end of the poem.  Tracing the ways in which the 
poem’s wounds are simultaneously attenuated and perpetuated, I suggest that 
Walcott’s poetics undermine a simplistic framework of mourning-as-closure by 
producing a new model of mourning based on a fusion of influences.  Centrally 
                                                
49 Durrant, 8. 
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concerned with the trope, act, and problem of “return,” I focus on two figures of 
repetition in the poem – the circle and the spiral.  These figures are integrally related 
to what Paget Henry has described as the poetcist response to history in the Caribbean, 
represented by writers like Walcott, Wilson Harris, and Sylvia Wynter, who “make the 
recovery of the postcolonial self an important precondition for institutional 
recovery.”50  My analysis of Walcott draws on Henry’s response to the poeticist 
historiography of Wilson Harris, for whom “recovery through the creative affirmation 
of colonial trauma and its existential deviations”51 is a necessary step to the self-
regeneration that must precede historical or institutional recovery. 
Critics have commented at length about Walcott’s embrace of a circular model 
of history as a replacement for the teleological; however, I argue that the trope of the 
snail-shell in Omeros serves as both a model for the natural world as a catalyst for 
buried memory and a visual marker of repetition with a difference, employing the 
same circular movement while marking the impossibility of complete return.  While 
Omeros’s ultimate failure to heal might be construed as a melancholic lingering on the 
wounds of the past, the poem’s model of time problematizes a conception of 
successful mourning as totalizing in the first place, revealing the ways that recent 
criticism has been caught up in a flawed opposition between mourning and 
melancholia.  Ultimately, I suggest that Walcott proposes a model of return that is 
incompatible with the stereotypical notion of closure and thus opens up new ways of 
thinking about non-totalizing mourning practice. 
The second facet of the valorization of melancholia that I address is the 
conflation of absence and loss that tends to accompany this trend, with a focus on the 
related problem of an unassimilable, undifferentiated transhistorical “lack” that 
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precludes working through.  Reading Kamau Brathwaite as an anti-elegist, I focus on 
his transition from a regionally oriented interest in ‘nation-language’ to his recent 
‘transboundary’ aesthetic – officially inaugurated in his collection, Born to Slow 
Horses (2005) – which depicts a globalized, transhistorical sense of atrocity and loss 
as the basis for contemporary life.52  Brathwaite’s refusal to mourn comes across in 
this new focus on a world where all wounds are generalized, transhistorical, and 
unhealed; as a result, specific losses become disembodied, and risk appearing like a 
foundational absence.  However, it is precisely by toying with the conflation of 
absence and loss that Brathwaite opens up a space for reading outside of the 
boundaries of an essentializing identity politics, and ultimately posits cross-cultural 
Relation as a new possibility for working through.  Picking up on Édouard Glissant’s 
concept of a poetics of relation as a suggestive model of cross-cultural interaction – a 
model which Durrant has already referred to as “an anti-foundational foundation for 
cross-cultural community”53 – I relate the question of mourning to the problem of 
identity formation.  Because Brathwaite portrays the Caribbean as a synchdoche for a 
sense of global community, when the “wounds” of his poetry become all-
encompassing and not readily attributable to one individual, nation, or race, they don’t 
merely become a universalized condition of existence.  It is not that the wound is 
disembodied and becomes an absence; rather, it becomes something marked on the 
region because the model of community is rhizomatic and connected instead of 
definitively rooted.  Rather than being melancholic, this rhizomatic extension of the 
wound is precisely the mechanism by which individuals and cultures can heal, while at 
                                                
52 By claiming that Brathwaite’s “transboundary” aesthetic is officially inauguerated in 
Born to Slow Horses, I am referring to his footnote at the end of the collection that 
claims it is part of a new phase.  Arguably, the formal innovations of this collection 
are identical to those in his earlier work, particularly his “Sycorax Video Style” 
poems.  See Chapter 3 for further discussion of this point. 
53 Durrant, 12. 
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the same time resisting the tendency to classify everyone as a victim, including 
perpetrators.  Importantly, Brathwaite’s poetry still registers models of differentiation 
that are necessary, both in relation to the past and in relation to present ways of 
engaging it, but gestures to new relations between individuals and communities that 
require continual streams of acknowledgement and engagement. 
In the next chapter, I continue to explore how grief might become relational by 
turning to Zakes Mda’s Ways of Dying (1995), a novel that attempts to articulate rites 
of mourning in a world where all modes of coping with loss have been cut off.  This 
chapter examines a third facet of the critical move to privilege melancholia – the 
troubling transformation of melancholic “acting out” into the basis for a type of rite or 
ritualistic honoring of the dead.  By focusing on the way the novel imagines mourning 
rites, this chapter implicitly asks: what are the stakes of valorizing melancholia for 
actual mourning practice?  The fact that mourning, not melancholia, is tied to rites 
means it is implicitly dedicated to formulating a present-oriented response to loss in a 
way that a past-oriented melancholia is not.  Accordingly, this chapter continues to 
question the assumption that mourning rites are now exhausted and can only result in 
either a totalizing, superficial closure, or a radically open, melancholic refusal to 
mourn.  In response to this perceived opposition, I argue that the novel problematizes 
an idea of superficial closure while at the same time revealing the dangers of 
valorizing a refusal or inability to mourn.  My reading reveals that the novel’s two 
protagonists, Toloki and Noria, ultimately break out of a melancholic cycle of 
violence when they forge a community bond based on the shared improvisation and 
performance of mortuary rites rather than simply a common experience of loss.  By 
focusing on the way the novel attempts to articulate new modes of grief work, rather 
than recuperate old ones, I show how its suggestion of improvised modes of working 
through might open up a space for a more mutable sense of collective consciousness. 
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In all three of these chapters, the notion of foundational trauma figures 
prominently in my critique of the turn to melancholia, particularly the way in which it 
has become central to certain understandings of what we might call “post-traumatic” 
collective identity.  A secondary concern of these chapters involves the argument that 
collective melancholy might serve as the basis for a new community, united by the 
traumatizing experience of foundational violence, which I have already briefly 
mentioned.  While I acknowledge the appeal such a model might offer as a unifying 
force for diasporic populations who may have been violently stripped of other 
categories of connectivity, the pragmatic question of what this type of community 
would actually look like is of equal importance.  In valorizing a community that 
cannot mourn loss, does one valorize trauma itself, or privilege acting out as a 
politically productive way of engaging with the world?  In addition to these questions, 
I am also interested in the way that this ostensibly mutable basis for community might 
end up establishing rigidly exclusionary categories of belonging.  LaCapra has already 
pointed out this potential pitfall, describing “founding traumas” as “traumas that 
paradoxically become the valorized or intensely cathected basis of identity for an 
individual or a group rather than events that pose the problematic question of 
identity.”54  Charles Maier poses a similar counterargument to those who would 
privilege a melancholic fixation on loss, suggesting that an excess of memory in the 
social domain is a symptom of a “new focus on narrow ethnicity” instead of inclusive 
modes of community.  Maier claims that a “surfeit of memory is a sign not of 
historical confidence but of a retreat from transformative politics.  It testifies to the 
loss of a future orientation, of progress toward civic enfranchisement and growing 
equality.”55  Group melancholia may be a community-building force, but in Maier’s 
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55 Charles S. Maier, ‘A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholia and 
Denial’, History and Memory 5.2 (Fall/Winter 1993), 150. 
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formation it is a fundamentally exclusive one that closes down all other categories of 
citizenship.  For this reason, the stakes are high for theorizing collective processes of 
mourning, particularly regarding the need to rethink mourning rituals as events that 
produce community, but in a way that counteracts use of “a founding trauma that may 
attempt to establish identity rather than to pose the question of identity 
problematically.”56   
Michael Rothberg’s recent comparative study of Holocaust memory and its 
relation to memories of the colonial legacy in North Africa, North America, and the 
Caribbean has already performed a useful critique of the problematic ways in which 
memory has been aligned with identity.  Rejecting the assumptions “that a straight line 
runs from memory to identity and that the only kinds of memories and identities that 
are therefore possible are ones that exclude elements of alterity and forms of 
commonality,”57  Rothberg proposes an “intercultural dynamic of multidirectional 
memory” to account for the ways in which the “boundaries of memory” often spill 
over, break through, or make permeable the “boundaries of group identity.”58  
Rothberg’s project insinuates the possibility of a comparative memory studies, or 
comparative trauma studies, that attempts to understand, firstly, how different 
memories of traumatic events inflect one another, and secondly, how a focus on 
memory’s portability, flow, and relationality might allow theory to conceive of the 
public sphere differently.  As he suggests, 
 
pursuing memory’s multidirectionality encourages us to 
think of the public sphere as a malleable discursive 
space in which groups do not simply articulate 
established positions but actually come into being 
                                                
56 LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998), 15. fn 8. 
57 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the 
Age of Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 4-5. 
58 Ibid., 5. 
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through their dialogical interactions with others; both 
the subjects and spaces of the public are open to 
continual reconstruction.59 
 
Rothberg’s model serves as a challenge to thinkers who believe in a rigid causal 
relationship between memory of an event and the individual or group’s self perception 
– an assumption which has also led, in Rothberg’s view, to a misleading “zero-sum” 
understanding of memory’s place in the public sphere in which there exists a constant 
“struggle for recognition in which there can only be winners and losers, a struggle that 
is thus closely allied with the potential for deadly violence.”60  Against this “zero-sum” 
model of memory, Rothberg posits the concept of multidirectionality to account for 
the way that memories often exist in a metaphoric relationship where one might 
elucidate but also displace the other.  For Rothberg, however, an acknowledgement of 
the way remembrance often unavoidably involves processes of “displacement and 
substitution” emphasizes “the need both to acknowledge the conflicts that subtend 
memory and work toward a rearticulation of historical relatedness beyond paradigms 
of uniqueness.”61 This is not to deny the specificity of individual events or contexts 
                                                
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 3. 
61 Ibid.  A related aspect of Rothberg’s argument is the reconceptualization of Freudian 
“screen memory” not as something which obscures and supplants other events, but 
something that “approximates the multidirectional model” because “the displacement 
that takes place in screen memory (indeed, in all memory) functions as much to open 
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and might be resuscitated at any time.  This understanding of memory would directly 
contradict the idea that even a screen memory could ever fully displace its antecedent.  
The formation of screen memories, Rothberg argues, also clues us in to the ways in 
which meaning is produced and links between memories are formed.  Ultimately, 
Rothberg uses this renewed understanding of screen memory, which he represents as 
something that operates “at the level of the individual,” to elucidate the concept of 
multidirectional memory, which operates in much the same way “at the level of the 
collective”(14). 
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but, rather, constitutes an attempt to make the inevitable processes of displacement 
that accompany comparison more visible.  As such, it becomes one way to negotiate 
the links and envision a space between what Rothberg elsewhere calls a 
“homogenizing universalism and nominalist particularism”62 – an overly zealous focus 
on specificity that, in an attempt to declare an event totally “unique” makes it totally 
incomparable and unrelatable.  
In focusing on just two regional frameworks, I am potentially undermining my 
own interest in a “multidirectional memory.”  However, I chose to structure the project 
this way (which might risk reaffirming the national or regional boundaries that this 
type of project would potentially contest) in order to focus on two different “sites” of 
collective memory which differ fundamentally in their spacing in time.  The first – 
which is best exemplified by the Middle Passage, but also the more general 
accompanying context of New World slavery in the Caribbean – is an extended event 
with no living witnesses.  The second – the recent history of Apartheid in South Africa 
– is a history that includes living witnesses who can and have testified to first hand 
experience.  In the case of the Caribbean, I am interested in understanding collective 
trauma as it has both attenuated and reverberated over time, particularly how the 
“memory” of distant events works to influence the ways in which present and future 
generations relate to the past.  In the case of South Africa, I am concerned with tracing 
the links between collective memory as it has unfolded in the present day, including 
the consciousness of the vast majority of people who do have a memory of these 
events, and the way that the state has made the management of traumatic memory a 
central concern to its wellbeing.  In both cases, scholars have read the presence of 
resistant mourning as a repudiation of the familiarizing processes of memorialization 
                                                
62 Rothberg, “Decolonizing Trauma Studies: a response,” Studies in the Novel 40.1&2 
(Spring & Summer 2008): 230. 
  25 
that take place in and around “memorializing projects,” whether those projects are the 
production of a monument, or the representation of events in historical or literary 
texts.  My primary concern involves the ways in which anxiety over these 
familiarizing processes of mourning converts into advocacy of a melancholic 
attachment to loss which ostensibly makes its wounds impossible to forget or to 
appropriate for national purposes.  If, as Spargo has suggested, “[t]he death registered 
by the anti-elegiac mourner has provided insight into the injustice on which the world 
is founded, initiating the reader into the rigors of absence by which we are 
constituted,”63 at what point does a fixation on the resistance to mourning slip into a 
generalized discourse of absence which elides the specificity of actual historical 
injustices and focuses instead on a universalizing condition of woundedness or 
foundational lack?  Thinking of memory in terms of its “multidirectionality” or 
relationality might involve an appeal to the general over the specific inasmuch as it 
traces the similarities between specific memories and memory practices, but 
significantly, it does not involve this kind of generalization that renders it just another 
echo of a vague human condition.   
In the final chapter, I turn back to these and other theoretical questions, taking 
issue with the way that a generalized “ethics of otherness” has seemed to motivate the 
turn toward melancholia.  This concern marks the fourth and final facet of the 
valorization of melancholia that I will address in this project – a pseudo-
deconstructive emphasis on the alterity of loss and lost others.  In addition to 
analyzing the work of mourning as it is staged in J. M. Coetzee’s later novels, 
Disgrace and Summertime, this chapter focuses predominantly on readings of 
Coetzee’s representation of “unreadable” sites of trauma and loss.  In particular, I take 
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issue with Sam Durrant’s adoption of a “deconstructive ethics of remembrance” which 
reads Coetzee’s work in the context of a Derridean notion “impossible mourning” that 
preserves the alterity of the other.  Rather than lingering on the undecidabiliy of 
Ceotzee’s characters who, Durrant argues, bear witness to a history that defies 
understanding, I argue that Coetzee stages moments of potential empathy which 
always slip into identification as a way to problematize a certain way of relating to 
otherness.  At the same time, I am interested in a shift that I see from Coetzee’s early 
work to his most recent novels, in which the objects of mourning become more and 
more disembodied and abstracted.  This move, I argue, is central to Coetzee’s 
interrogation of what constitutes a mournable life, particularly to his attempts to 
identify and negotiate the conceptual limits that govern the mourner’s ability to 
recognize both the lost object and another’s loss.  It is also central to the way in which 
Coetzee’s work problematizes a rigid binary opposition between melancholia as 
radical openness and mourning as total closure.  Coetzee dismantles this perceived 
opposition, I suggest, through his novels’ acts of care, acts that ultimately enable a 
suspension of mourning that offers new ways of theorizing trauma theory’s archetypal 
trope of belatedness. 
In addition to a multi-regional focus, this dissertation also crosses generic 
boundaries between poetry and prose by positing “the elegiac” as a category that 
unifies the vastly different genres I discuss.  Walcott’s Omeros is a long, 
predominantly narrative poem entirely in verse with elements of dialogue; 
Brathwaite’s Born to Slow Horses is an experimental intermingling of verse and prose; 
Mda’s Ways of Dying is a novel that gestures to the author’s origins in theatre; finally, 
Coetzee’s Summertime is a compilation of diary entries and interviews that loosely 
contribute to his fictionalized autobiography.  Each of these texts, I will argue, 
constitutes a work of mourning and, as such, employs elements traditionally associated 
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with elegies in the way they stage or play upon the movement from lament to 
consolation.  While the shifting definition of elegy has come to include both “mode” 
and “motive,”64  one relatively consistent trend has been the poetic attempt to at least 
temporarily recuperate the lost object the elegy describes.  Gray’s “Elegy Written in a 
Country Churchyard” represents an archetypal example of this, not just in its attempt 
to achieve a poetic substitution for the lost object, but in the poem’s own 
acknowledgement that language generally fails in this task and, ultimately, doesn’t 
replace anything.  In a similar vein, all of the texts I discuss frame this dilemma – the 
desire to recuperate loss coupled with the awareness of the futility of complete 
recovery – in similar ways.  
This project could have just as easily been a genre-based study of mourning-
poems, but I chose to look at both “elegiac” poetry and prose fiction in order to 
emphasize a more expansive understanding of elegy as a literary response to loss; in 
focusing on the “elegiac” I am also implicitly framing elegy as an intellectual and 
affective category rather than a formal one.  Rather than understanding it as a poetic 
form, I use it to describe a literary formation of different modes of mourning or the 
articulation of mourning processes.  Although Sacks’s well known book on the 
English elegy employs a blatant generic classification by only focusing on poetry, he 
also thinks of the elegy in terms of affect and the initiation of a work of mourning.65  
Focusing on the modern period, John Vickery picks up on this expansion out of genre 
                                                
64 See The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Alex Preminger 
and T. V. F. Brogan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 322. 
65 Also see John Hollander, Vision and Resonance: Two Senses of Poetic Form (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1975). While Sacks makes explicit the psychological 
element based on Freudian insights, the distinction between form versus mood or 
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eighteenth century there has been a focus within poetry on “the elegiac tone as a mood 
rather than as a formal mode,”(200) a move which expands in the nineteenth century 
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(anagnorosis) of feeling, to revelations and illuminations”(207). 
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in The Modern Elegiac Temper, which charts the way that “elegiac attitudes” permeate 
the work of both novelists and poets who figure the personal, cultural, and 
philosophical senses of loss,66 while Karen Smythe coins “the fictional sub-genre” of 
“fiction-elegy” in order to make a distinction between “fiction written in an elegiac 
form” and “the broader thematic category of ‘elegiac fiction.”67  Most recently, 
Patricia Rae’s Modernism and Mourning, which I have already mentioned, expands 
the scope of “elegy” by focusing on a shared anti-elegiac impulse in which the 
predominantly modernist refusal of mourning is a unifying factor.  Rae describes the 
collection of essays as a follow-up to Ramazani’s Poetry of Mourning inasmuch as it 
addresses the modern “anti-elegy,” but explains that it also attempts to “dissolve the 
boundaries” between the elegy and other formal manifestations of the elegiac such as 
fictional and nonfictional prose, visual art, and so on.   
In this vein, my critical framework is based on the transnational quality of 
what Ramazani refers to as “structures of feeling” which are not limited to the poetic 
genre of elegy as much as to a broader literary space in which mourning is both 
depicted and performed.  These spaces, as Ramazani implies here, might make 
possible a collective remembrance that would, in LaCapra’s formulation, “pose the 
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question of identity problematically”: 
 
Constructing transnational cultural spaces of mourning, 
spilling grief across boundaries of race, ethnicity, and 
nation, they build structures of feeling that represent 
alternatives to modern nationalist efforts to bind 
mourning with the imagined communities of 
compatriots.68 
 
Most importantly, a process of looking at texts transnationally might constitute part of 
the very fabric of a “non-isolation” remembrance.  It permits a movement against a 
mourning that solidifies exclusionary bonds, and towards one that is relatable, 
relational, and which ultimately leaves the borders of community more permeable. 
 In closing, I offer a note on the title of this dissertation.  The notion of Original 
Skin derives most directly from the figure of the scar that features so prominently in 
Walcott’s Omeros, a figure that first awakened my interest in memory studies.  In 
Walcott’s poem, of course, there are two significantly different versions of non-
healing.  The first is Philoctete’s open wound, which is constantly demanding 
memory.  The second is scratched into the poem as an overarching metaphor for the 
passage of time, the progression of history, and the syncretic permutations of culture 
and religion; it surfaces as smoke-writing, or writing in the sand of a beach that is 
constantly pummeled by surf.  This type of ephemeral inscription cannot heal because 
it is the figure of forgetting, erased moments after it is marked.  This dissertation 
interrogates those links between forgetting and healing; time and wounding; 
disembodied, transhistorical wounds and stories of individual suffering and 
remembrance.   It attempts to do so by reformulating ideas about mourning processes 
that have become unjustifiably codified.  The figure of the scar – as opposed to the 
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original, undamaged skin – registers the imperfect, incompletable nature of the healing 
process and therefore serves as an embodied critique of the fantasy of perfect closure, 
repudiating what I referred to earlier as the myth of the impossibly healed body.  I 
chose this title because of its resonance with my claim that recent theories of 
melancholia unwittingly construct a myth of “successful” mourning’s plentitude in 
which melancholia stands opposed to a fantasy of healing that could never possibly 
come to pass.  The relation between the “skin” of this metaphor and race, however, 
adds another resonance, but one that is beyond the scope of this current project.69   
Given the integral role of racism as a dimension of historical trauma, an examination 
of the way race is vital to fully understanding postcolonial trauma studies is an 
important next step in demonstrating the potential of trauma studies for postcolonial 
texts and contexts.  This will undoubtedly be the subject of future inquiry, but for now 
I will merely draw attention to Ann Anlin Cheng’s caveat regarding obsession over 
“the ‘melancholia’ of racialized peoples” that “seems to reinscribe a white history of 
affliction or run the risk of neutralizing that pain.”70  Central to Cheng’s work on 
melancholia, as well as my own, is the question of how to talk about loss, pain, or 
traumatic experience without reiterating the institutional structures that caused it in the 
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first place, and without codifying it into an easily digestible narrative that renders loss 
completely forgettable.  These concerns regarding how to talk about melancholia 
without affirming or nullifying loss motivate my own desire to destabilize an 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
‘THE CURE THAT PRECEDES EVERY WOUND’: DEREK WALCOTT’S 
OMEROS 
 
As Derek Walcott has memorably described in his Nobel lecture, the history of 
the Caribbean is plagued by the memories of a traumatic passage from native land to 
New World, and a decimation of both local and transplanted populations – memories 
that are continually registered in the very noise of ocean waves that evokes a 
catastrophic genocide at the heart of the Caribbean present: “The sea sighs with the 
drowned from the Middle Passage, the butchery of its aborigines, Carib and Aruac and 
Taino, bleeds in the scarlet of the immortelle, and even the actions of surf on sand 
cannot erase the African memory.”71  Not unlike Jahan Ramazani’s archetypal modern 
elegist, Walcott portrays the Caribbean here as a disjointed “shipwreck of fragments,” 
“shattered histories,” and “shards of vocabulary,”72 a vision which extends to the 
world of his long poem, Omeros (1990), and its portrayal of the damaging 
psychological and historical legacies constituting the aftermath of the various stages of 
European colonization and the transatlantic slave trade.73  Indeed, Omeros is a poem 
obsessed with wounding.  There are few characters in the poem, in fact, who do not 
bear the mark of some ancestral violence; indicative of Walcott’s comment on New 
World literature in his essay, “The Muse of History,” that “in the New World 
servitude to the muse of history has produced a literature of recrimination and despair, 
a literature of revenge written by the descendants of slaves or a literature of remorse 
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72 Ibid.,  69-70. 
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written by the descendants of masters.”74  The world of Omeros appears stained on all 
sides with the trauma of colonization.  Marked, injured, and scarred, its characters are 
engulfed in past atrocities; whether they are descended from colonizers or slaves, the 
physical pains inflicted by or upon their ancestors materializes in physical and 
psychological wounds.  The white Englishman Plunkett’s second generational guilt, 
for example, becomes tangible in the form of a wound he received fighting in North 
Africa during World War II; the black fisherman Philoctete’s “tribal sorrow”75 is 
embodied by the unhealing lesion on his shin; the Antillean Achille’s obsession with 
the trauma inflicted upon his ancestors as they are uprooted from Africa and brought 
in slave ships to the Caribbean manifests itself in his own mental anguish.  This 
chapter examines Walcott’s shift from a refusal of despair-driven politics in texts like 
“The Muse of History” to an apparent embrace of woundedness in Omeros, evinced 
by the ubiquity of the poem’s unhealable traumas.  In the former, Walcott is outwardly 
hostile towards representations of the Caribbean preoccupied with such suffering and 
victimization.  Yet his declaration in Omeros that “affliction is one theme / of this 
work”(O, 28) is at odds with his own plea to the West Indian poet to abandon Caliban, 
the suffering victim of colonial domination, as a metaphor for self-realization in 
literature.  The question remains as to why, after denouncing literatures of 
recrimination and despair, Walcott adopts the trope of the wound as a signifier for the 
trauma of the colonial experience and upholds in Omeros the same authorial fixation 
on the past that he reprimands in his critical work.   
From early in his career, Walcott has resisted essentialist ideas about looking 
to Africa to articulate black West Indian identity on the grounds that, firstly, this 
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history is already latent in Caribbean identity and does not need to be actively sought 
out, and secondly, that such a turn is part of a nostalgic “longing, even a slave longing, 
for another master”76 which leads to the neglect of contemporary, local realities.  
While violence of forced migration means that cultural identity in the Caribbean 
contains a history of splitting from its “originary” sources, Walcott has consistently 
suggested that an obsession with those origins amounts to a potentially dangerous 
escapist fantasy which precludes a focus on a Caribbean future.  As he explains in an 
interview, “[t]he fact is that every West Indian has been severed from a continent, 
whether he is Indian, Chinese, Portuguese, or black.  To have the population induced 
into mass nostalgia to be somewhere else seemed to me to be about as ennobling as 
wishing that the whole population was in Brooklyn, or Brickston [sic].”77   
In what seems like a break from earlier work, like Dream on Monkey 
Mountain, in which Walcott mocks the trope of the restorative return to pre-colonial 
Africa as nostalgic and unproductive, Omeros appears to stage two instances of such 
return.  The first occurs when Ma Kilman, the poem’s Obeah-woman, brews a healing 
broth from a West African plant which finally heals the continuously open wound on 
Philoctete’s shin, a wound which comes to represent the trauma of colonialism’s 
violent iterations.  The second occurs when Achille experiences something like a 
flashback (‘something like’ because it is not his actual memory) to a slave ship bound 
for the Caribbean from Africa.  Through the flashback, “a light inside him wakes, / 
skipping centuries, ocean and river, and Time itself”(O, 134); a hallucination 
transports him back in time to Africa where he meets his ancestors, learns about their 
culture, and eventually comes to witness the raid that turned them into slaves, seeing 
first hand the radical break from his ancestral past that has haunted him in the present.  
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In both this symbolic return, and the overdramatized recuperation of African “roots” 
that takes place during the ritual that heals Philoctete, Walcott’s poem resonates with 
the concept that a return to origins is necessary to assuage the trauma of dispossession.  
It seems, as Paul Breslin had noted, that “Philoctete has been severed from his past, 
and his cure requires Ma Kilman to recover its African component.”78  For Achille, 
too, Africa is positioned as the site of symbolic wounding, the location in which the 
first atrocities of colonialism committed against his ancestors take place; 
consequently, only a symbolic return to that site can heal the wound of its legacy.  
As this chapter will argue, however, close attention to the poem’s ending 
reveals that this symbolic return fails to heal those wounds, and ultimately, Omeros 
never fulfills the promise of return and the resolution of complete healing.  While this 
failure of symbolic return stays in line with Walcott’s critical position regarding the 
need to focus on a Caribbean present and future rather manifest nostalgia for an 
African past, the fact that his characters remain wounded throughout the poem still 
seems to position Omeros firmly in the realm of the “literature of despair.”  Even as 
the poem repudiates a nostalgic longing for Africa, it risks remaining stuck repeating 
the wound of separation that it seems unable to mourn and move on from.  The poem’s 
ostensible perpetuation of a melancholic attachment to past wounds will be the 
predominant focus of this chapter.  It is possible to argue that by rejecting the promise 
of a curative return to African origins, Walcott is merely launching another critique of 
nostalgia, consistent with one of his well known critical positions.  However, if this is 
the case, and the poem provides no alternative cure for the wounds at its heart, what 
can we make of the fact that it must then continuously wallow in an unhealable grief 
for irrecuperable past losses?  Using this question as a departure point, this chapter 
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will examine whether or not the poem is ultimately melancholic in its refusal of 
consolation, suggesting that, in the end, it problematizes the very distinction between 
closure and openness, finitely mourning or endlessly grieving old wounds. 
I argue against readings of the poem that have attempted to recuperate its 
contradictions into a conventional elegiac narrative in which a lament for the losses of 
colonialism is followed by a consolatory gesture that somehow heals the wound of 
loss.  Critics have made claims that “[t]he cure of Philoctete’s wound figuratively 
reverses the Middle Passage,”79 or that Ma Kilman’s healing ritual “suggests an easing 
of the wounds caused by imperialism” and “asks us to read Omeros as an optimistic 
poem, as a chronicle of the passing away of a dark period of history for the island”80 
despite the fact that, in the end, these wounds ultimately remain very much open and 
painful.  I will begin this chapter by refuting these kinds of claims, examining closely 
the nature of Achille’s and Philoctete’s wounds and showing how, though they at first 
seem to heal very much in accordance with a psychoanalytically-influenced notion 
that one must psychically return to the site of wounding to recover from a traumatic 
experience, the return to Africa in the end fails to cure the traumatic legacy of 
colonialism which haunts both characters.   
The chapter will then go on to examine the reasons why this potentially 
curative return must fail, linking that failure both to Walcott’s critique of a nostalgic 
and essentializing story of origins, his understanding of cultural hybridity and 
creativity in the Caribbean, and finally, to his advocacy of a non-linear narrative 
model where there is no origin and no ultimate aim or endpoint.  Throughout his work, 
Walcott has consistently criticized a linear, sequential understanding of time on the 
grounds that it perpetuates a world view in which the history of the Caribbean is seen 
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as a product of and supplement to the history of European colonialism; for Walcott, 
“[t]he vision of progress is the rational madness of history seen as sequential time, of a 
dominated future”81 in which a narrative of historical progress renders former colonies 
endlessly subordinate.  In order to break out of this subordinating model of 
temporality, Walcott has often employed non-linear models.  Many critics have 
pointed to the way that Walcott continues this trend in Omeros, suggesting that a 
circular model of history is a mode of resistance against a linear progress narrative that 
produced (and was produced by) colonial discourse.  In Epic of the Dispossessed, for 
instance, Robert D. Hamner makes a similar claim that the poem’s nonlinear structure 
testifies to Walcott’s lack of “faith in the rigidly logical dictates of historians:” 
 
Reacting against the inhibitions of linear interpretation, 
[Walcott] offers an open pattern of variations on 
underlying themes (such as the relationships between 
fathers and sons) and interconnected imagery (such as 
birds and nests) so that meanings build incrementally 
without immediate closure. 82 
 
This critique of linearity is deeply engrained in Caribbean criticism, notably in 
Brathwaite’s adoption of the term “tidalectics” as a model of creative interaction that 
repudiates the linear model of the Hegelian dialectic.  Indeed, Walcott’s concern with 
disrupting what Hamner calls the “logical dictates of historians” has been central to his 
own formulation of the continually cycling sea as a nonlinear figure for history, a 
trope that Walcott employs in the last lines of Omeros.   
This refusal of immediate closure is the focus of this chapter’s conclusion, 
which investigates how a different model of time might challenge assumptions about 
the possibility of working-through-as-closure which so many critics see as inherent to 
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the psychoanalytic model of mourning.  Walcott invites understandings of the poem’s 
time and history as circular when the speaker of Omeros claims that Ma Kilman 
“aimed to carry the cure / that precedes every wound; the reversible Bight of Benin 
was her bow, her target the ringed haze / of a circling horizon.”(O, 239).  Though they 
toy with a linear model of the forced departure from the Bight of Benin as reversible, 
these lines end up positing a cyclic model where a cure might precede the wound, and 
where the past that one targets is also always a future circling around.  As Breslin 
suggests:  
 
If the cure precedes the wound, then it is always latently 
available once the wound has been given.  To history’s 
timeline, drawn by a determinism of cause and effect, 
Walcott answers with a vision of an oceanic eternal 
present to which temporal movement always returns, 
cyclical rather than linear.83 
 
Understanding the poem in terms of a circular model of time and history (which 
Walcott constantly figures as the churning movements of the ocean), in which a return 
to Africa is not a nostalgic return to the past but a move forward, it becomes clear that 
all wounds must in some regard remain open because they do not exist within a linear 
model which registers the possibilities of rupture and closure.   
As a medium of lament, Omeros forces its readers to problematize a 
stereotypical notion of mourning as closure.  Packed with grief and open wounds, the 
poem ultimately deviates from elegiac convention as it fails to offer consolation. 
Ultimately, however, this chapter asks whether or not Walcott’s poem is 
fundamentally melancholic in this final refusal to console.  In the end, it suggests that 
the poem’s model of time and history, which is not figured in terms of a teleological 
model, opens up space for a non-pathological melancholia in which ceaseless return 
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isn’t simply a symptom of failed working through or static acedia, but a movement 
that permits a different kind of working through – one that is not reducible to a simple, 
therapeutic model of closure. 
* * * 
Walcott’s use of the wound as a marker of inherited loss in Omeros surfaces 
most prominently in the form of the physical wound Philoctete bears on his shin, the 
continuously open wound he gets by scraping his leg against an anchor while wading 
in the sea.  Rather than gradually healing on its own, Philoctete’s wound remains open 
and untreatable; it festers, gives off an intolerable odor, and is apparently incurable for 
much of the action of the poem.  The persistence of the wound is a phenomenon that 
Philoctete attributes to unresolved ancestral violence: “He believed the swelling came 
from the chained ankles / of his grandfathers.  Or else why was there no cure?”(O, 19).  
While it is the physicality of the anchor in the sea that has inflicted the wound on his 
shin, Walcott insinuates that it is Philoctete’s endless grief for his enslaved ancestors 
that scars him mentally, creating an open wound of the psyche allegorized by the 
physical lesion.  For Jahan Ramazani, who has also explored the duality of 
Philoctete’s wound as both physical and psychological trauma, the unhealing wound 
not only embodies his lament over the tribulations of his ancestors, but is the result of 
the physical sensation of their actual pain, passed on to subsequent generations as part 
of “the inherited wound of European colonialism.”84  He writes: “Early on in Omeros, 
Walcott uses one of Philoctete’s seizures to suggest that the inexpressible physical 
suffering of enslaved Africans is retained in the bodies of their descendants and that 
the pain still presses urgently for an impossible verbal release.”85  
Picking up on the psychological woundedness of the poem’s other characters, 
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Philoctete’s double wound – that of the actual injury inflicted on his body and the 
metaphorical trauma of bearing the wounds of a colonial past – testifies to a pain 
universally experienced by victims of the Middle Passage and their descendents; its 
uncontainable hurt is transmitted through generational lines as collective trauma 
where, as Omeros implies, “The son’s grief was the father’s, the father’s his son’s”(O, 
146).  These physical and psychological wounds are related to the trauma of 
dispossession, a trauma that Philoctete acts out in the beginning of the poem when he 
viciously hacks away at the roots of yams in his garden.  For Philoctete, whose own 
body is figured as a prison restraining a grief-induced rage (O, 21), the history of 
transatlantic slavery is encapsulated by the sugar plantation ruins in which he grows 
his yams.  When a thorn pricks the wound on his shin, exacerbating the physical pain, 
the sting triggers a violent outburst in which Philoctete reproduces his own sense of 
figurative rootlessness: 
 
He stretched out the foot.  He edged the razor-sharp steel 
through pleading finger and thumb.  The yam leaves recoiled 
in a cold sweat.  He hacked every root at the heel. 
 
He hacked them at the heel, noticing how they curled,  
head-down without their roots.  He cursed the yams:  
“Salope!  
You all see what it’s like without roots in this world?”  
 
Then sobbed, his face down in the slaughtered leaves.  A sap 
trickled from their gaping stems like his own sorrow.                  (O, 21) 
 
Here, the wilted “curled, head-down” yams echo what is later called the “homesick 
shame” of the poem’s characters of African descent.  For Philoctete, who here acts out 
his own trauma of being severed at the figurative root of his ancestral culture, the 
collective memory of dislocation represents the predominant source of his 
woundedness. 
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If Philoctete’s unhealed shin embodies the mental wounding of a universal 
black West Indian consciousness, then Achille, the poem’s other prominent 
traumatized West Indian character, is undoubtedly a victim of that affliction.  
However, Achille’s mental anguish also derives from the fact that his knowledge of 
the history of his ancestors is limited to the point that they exist for him only as an 
absence.  What he does know comes predominantly from information provided by 
others: 
 
There were others  
whom Achille had heard of, mainly through Philoctete,  
and, of course, the nameless bones of all his brothers  
 
drowned in the crossing     (O, 128) 
 
Notably, Philoctete functions here as a story-teller who informs Achille of their shared 
heritage.  The past does not exist intrinsically for Achille as it seems to for Philoctete, 
and although they descend from the same history, Achille is a figure who, while he 
may have been taught the facts of his past, is not aware yet that he is subject to its 
haunting.  In this particular stanza, Achille’s estrangement from that ancestral past is 
heightened by Walcott’s rhyme which phonetically links the word “others” to 
“brothers” in an gesture that establishes Achille’s ancestors as “brothers” – related and 
therefore inexorably linked to him through heritage.  But at the same time, these 
“brothers” remain unknown or Other in that Achille has not been made completely 
aware of his history, or rather, it has not made itself known to him.  
The past eventually makes itself known, however, as Achille handles a bundled 
sail made from an empty flour sack on his fishing boat, and is shocked into the 
recollection of an event that is not of his own experience, but comes to the foreground 
of his consciousness as such: 
 
The tied bundle 
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huddles like a corpse.  Oui, Bon Dieu! I go hurl 
it overside.  Out of the depths of his ritual 
baptism something was rising, some white memory 
 
of a midshipman coming up close to the hull,  
a white turning body, and this water go fill 
with them, turning tied canvases, not sharks, but all 
 
corpses wrapped like the sail, and ice-sweating Achille 
in the stasis of his sunstroke looked as each swell 
disgorged them, in tens, in hundreds, and his soul 
 
sickened and was ill.  His jaw slackened.  A gull 
screeched whirling backwards, and it was the tribal  
sorrow that Philoctete could not drown in alcohol. 
 
It was not forgetful as the sea-mist or the crash 
of breakers on the crisp beaches of Senegal 
or the Guinea coast.       (O, 129) 
 
When Achille lifts the boat’s folded sail – a “bundle” which “huddles like a 
corpse”(O, 129) – on his fishing boat, he experiences a flashback to a slave ship bound 
for the Caribbean from Africa, on which the not unusual act of discarding the dead 
bodies of prisoners into the Atlantic is taking place.  Achille’s role in all of this is 
muddled by the shift from his point of view (“Oui Bon Dieu! I go hurl / it overside”) 
to the speaker’s description of a ritual baptism that religiously figures Achille’s 
submersion in memory and somewhat perversely refers to the bundle/corpse plunging 
into the ocean water, figuring death and dismemberment as the corpse’s baptismal 
naming.  We might recall Édouard Glissant’s description of the open boat in Poetics of 
Relation, in which the hull of the slave ship is figured as a “womb abyss… pregnant 
with as many dead as living under the sentence of death.”86  Here, the memory-
inducing sea, which paradoxically forgets those bodies in its mist and “crash / of 
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breakers,” becomes a conduit through which the horrors of the past return. 
So the atrocities of the Middle Passage materialize for Achille and are 
distinguished as the causes of an incurable “tribal sorrow.”  Yet it is not the memory 
of atrocities done against the living that forces Achille into an “ice-sweating” state of 
hysteria.  In fact, of all scenes of suffering portrayed in the poem, only a scattered few 
are concerned with either the initial imprisonment or the abjection of forced labor in 
the Caribbean plantations.  Although the absence of such characteristic acts of 
violence could perhaps be thought of as an indication of the unspeakability of those 
events, the most obsessively referenced trauma appears to lie in the horrific desertion 
of the dead bodies of individuals torn from their native land.  In this passage, it is the 
trauma of dislocation, figured in the abandonment of their corpses into an ocean that 
disgorges them, swallows and empties them of individuality only to cast them into a 
permanent state of collectivity that returns to traumatize Achille. 
Both Achille and Philoctete are traumatized in a way that resembles the 
victims of what Freud characterizes as traumatic neuroses.  Reading Walcott’s 
portrayal of trauma in Omeros in the context of psychoanalysis, it becomes apparent 
that the method by which Walcott portrays the persistence of the figure of the wound 
shares a common ground with Freud’s demonstration of the ways in which appalling 
occurrences are repeated in the minds of the victim.  Freud provides a literary example 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle of what he defines as the compulsion to repeat, a 
tendency of the psyche to defy what Freud calls the pleasure principle and continually 
linger on memories of characteristically unpleasurable events: 
 
The most moving poetic picture of a fate such as this is 
given by Tasso in his romantic epic Gerusalemme 
Liberata.  Its hero, Tancred, unwittingly kills his 
beloved Clorinda in a duel while she is disguised in the 
armour of an enemy knight.  After her burial he makes 
his way into a strange magic forest which strikes the 
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Crusaders’ army with terror.  He slashes with his sword 
at a tall tree; but blood streams from the cut and the 
voice of Clorinda, whose soul is imprisoned in the tree, 
is heard complaining that he has wounded his beloved 
once again.87  
 
Tancred, for Freud, is a subject who has a passive experience rather than an active 
one; that is to say, Tancred does not deliberately set out to repeat his first mistake but 
it comes to him as if by accident.  The voice of Clorinda functions in the metaphor as 
the involuntary reemergence of the memory of the trauma, a memory whose surfacing 
is beyond Tancred’s control. 
Cathy Caruth emphasizes this analysis of the paradigm of Tancred and 
Clorinda as she explores the ways in which “the experience of a trauma repeats itself, 
exactly and unremittingly, through the unknowing acts of the survivor and against his 
very will.”88  According to Caruth, it is possible “to understand that other voice, the 
voice of Clorinda, within the parable of the example, to represent the other within the 
self that retains the memory of the ‘unwitting’ traumatic events of one’s past.”89  So 
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while the figure of Tancred comes to embody the unaware victim of the trauma, the 
figure of Clorinda takes on the role of the unconscious where the experience of that 
trauma is retained and repressed.  For Caruth, the experience of a trauma proves so 
devastating to the psyche because it is not fully integrated at the time of its infliction.  
Accordingly, Freud’s parable exemplifies the ways in which the force of the trauma is 
not known at the moment of its occurrence but returns to haunt the victim in dreams, 
visions, or the unwitting compulsion of the survivor to repeat the incident.  Not fully 
understood as it occurs, trauma can only be wholly realized in its association with 
another experience or place or time.  Furthermore, it cannot be approached directly but 
must be mediated through another language.  In the early stages of psychoanalysis, 
that other medium was a form of narrative, what Freud and Breuer’s patient, Anna O. 
deemed “the talking cure” as she was cured from her hysteria by returning to the past 
in recollection and putting her trauma into words.  
When viewed in the context of psychoanalysis, Achille’s metaphorical wound 
of the psyche may be interpreted as the result of a trauma inflicted upon him.  Like 
Freud’s trauma victim, Achille is unaware of the force of the event at the moment of 
its infliction and the fact that the trauma is not fully integrated at the time of its 
occurrence is what leads to his psychosis.  However, Walcott takes Freud’s paradigm 
one step further into the realm of collective memory as he transforms the figure of 
Clorinda into the voice of a communal and absent Other within Achille.  If the voice 
of Clorinda in Freud’s parable represents the unconscious Other within the self, then 
in Omeros it is made into the voice of a universal ancestry.  Like Clorinda, Achille’s 
ancestors are witnesses to the traumatic event of the past; like Clorinda, they come to 
represent the part of the self that is incapable of ever letting go of that event.  
However, Walcott’s voice of otherness within the self is a model for a second, third, 
and forth generational trauma.  The Other who witnesses and unknowingly represses 
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the experience of a trauma is not a product of Achille’s own consciousness, but of the 
implied collective consciousness of the descendants of African slaves.  While Achille 
himself may not witness the trauma, the fact that these images return to him suggests 
that he is indeed the heir to the psychoses of his ancestors.  In effect, he inherits the 
psychological ramifications of an unspoken past horror.90      
The visceral experience of tribal sorrow on the fishing boat invokes within 
Achille a vision in which he is compelled to feel “the homesick shame / and pain of 
his Africa”(O, 134); immediately after the insurrection of tribal memory, Achille finds 
himself in Africa, three hundred years in the past, a hallucination that Walcott – before 
he evokes too great a tone of magic realism – credits to sunstroke.  As Achille slips 
into his vision, “a light inside him wakes, / skipping centuries, ocean and river, and 
Time itself”(O, 134).  He is transported back into his ancestral past where he meets 
“himself in his father”(O, 136), the West African native, Afolabe – Achille’s 
namesake before his name was changed by slavers.  It is here that Achille begins to 
live the past of his ancestors, partaking in their rituals, comprehending their language, 
relating to their culture.  
The interaction that takes place between Achille and his ancestral tribe 
highlights the nature of the dislocation that proves to be the root of Achille’s pain.  
Africa is set up, not merely as the site of an inherited trauma, but Achille’s originary 
home.  This raises the question of why Africa is still perceived as the place of origin 
for Achille, whose lineage has been a product of the Caribbean for three hundred 
years.  At the onset of his vision, Achille hears the voice of God telling him, “Look, I 
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giving you permission / to come home”(O, 134); once again, a statement that 
constructs Africa as Achille’s home and confirms the fact that it is not merely the 
ensuing displacement of his ancestors from that locale that constitutes his own trauma, 
but his own displacement and forced alienation from Africa.  Achille’s trauma is that 
of a dislocation portrayed in the poem as “one pain that is inconsolable, the loss of 
one’s shore”(O, 151) against one’s will, a loss that comes to a climax during Achille’s 
interaction with Afolabe as he shares the pronunciation of his name with his ancestral 
“father.”  When Afolabe asks Achille, “What does that name mean? I have forgotten / 
the one that I gave you”(O, 137), Achille links his own personal forgetfulness with a 
process of universalizing erasure: 
 
Well, I too have forgotten. 
 
Everything was forgotten.  You also.  I do not know. 
The deaf sea has changed around every name that you gave us;  
trees, men, we yearn for a sound that is missing.  (O, 137) 
 
Here, Achille establishes the descendents of slaves in the Caribbean as a collective 
“us” that shares a universal craving for the sounds of the other African world; yet 
simultaneously have become victims of a collective forgetting of what those sounds 
are and what they signify.  They are the victims of the diaspora that is relived in 
Achille’s vision after he witnesses the raid that turned his ancestors into slaves: 
 
So there went the Ashanti one way, the Mandingo another,  
the Ibo another, the Guinea.  Now each man was a nation  
in himself, without mother, father, brother.                  (O, 150) 
 
Achille’s vision may be characterized as a parable of the return to the homeland in 
order to heal the trauma of dislocation. The raid that Achille witnesses constitutes the 
radical break from his ancestral past that has haunted him in the present.  It is in this 
symbolic return that Walcott’s poem resonates the simple and foundational mode of 
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the therapeutic power of psychoanalysis’s cure.  Africa is positioned as the site of 
symbolic wounding, the location in which the first atrocities of colonialism committed 
against Achille’s ancestors take place.  Consequently, it is set up as a site of healing on 
the same pretext of the talking cure –  that a return to the trauma in the psyche can 
alleviate the suffering of the victim. 
Similarly, Philoctete undergoes a version of such a return during the climactic 
healing of his lesion.  The perpetuation of Philoctete’s wound dwindles finally as the 
obeah-woman Ma Kilman turns to Africa only to discover that it is not really 
forgotten; rather, it is waiting to be invoked:   
 
so the deities swarmed in the thicket  
 
of the grove, waiting to be known by name; but she   
never learned them, though their sounds were within her,  
subdued in the rivers of her blood        (O, 242)  
 
Conjuring up the spirits of her African past and a seemingly implicit knowledge of 
herbs and remedies literally transplanted in the Caribbean from African soil, Ma 
Kilman  mixes a broth to bathe the wound in and utters incantations in a language she 
has never been taught.  As in the case of Achille, there is the suggestion that her 
ancestral language is lost and forgotten, but at the same time contained in her blood, 
transmitting through generations both the wound and its cure. The deities of the west 
African artistic tradition, lost through generations of forced forgetting appear latent 
within Ma Kilman, simply because she is the descendent of an African obeah-woman.  
However, as indicated by the following passage, the presence of this Yoruban tradition 
exists in an external force, the flower transplanted from Africa that possesses the 




Shango, and Ogun; their outlines fading, thinner   
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as belief in them thinned, so that all their power,   
their roots, and their rituals were concentrated  
 
in the whorled corolla of that stinking flower.  
All the unburied gods, for three deep centuries dead,  
but from whose lineage, as if her veins were their roots,  
 
her arms ululated, uplifting the branches  
of a tree carried across the Atlantic that shoots  
fresh leaves as its dead trunk wallows on our beaches                (O, 243) 
 
Though the presence of African deities fades continually with each generation 
consumed by forgetting, they seem to exist paradoxically for Ma Kilman, latent within 
her very blood, once again reaffirming the persistence of collective memory.  Yet it is 
the external force which, like what psychoanalysis would call a retrieval cue, acts 
upon Ma Kilman, triggering the surfacing of a tribal memory.   
In the cases of both Philoctete and Achille, it is the return to Africa that 
appears necessary to heal wounds.  Consequently it is possible to deduce that if the 
wound of Walcott’s West Indian characters is that of dislocation, then it is possible to 
view Africa as both the wound itself and a site of wounding, and therefore, to perceive 
the return to Africa as necessary for the healing of the trauma.  The occurrences in 
Omeros would seem to suggest that this is the case as Achille is ushered by a vision 
back to his ancestors’ African past and the pain of Philoctete’s wound is assuaged by 
Ma Kilman’s invocation of the African deities who have themselves remained latent in 
her consciousness.  Upon being possessed by this tribal memory, Ma Kilman gains the 
power to heal and “Philoctete shook himself up from the bed of his grave, / and felt 
the pain draining, as surf-flowers sink through sand”(O, 245).  
However, the poem ultimately questions the curative efficacy of the return to 
the homeland and its traditions.  During a Boxing Day celebration after this healing 
ritual, Philoctete cuts up yams for the party and is overcome with anguish that 
undermines his, and the poem’s, faith in this cure: 
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All the pain 
 
re-entered Philoctete, of the hacked yams, the hold  
closing over their heads, the blot-closing iron,  
over eyes that never saw the light of this world,  
 
their memory still there although all the pain was gone       (O, 277)  
 
Although the physical wound on his shin has been healed, the injury Philoctete inflicts 
upon the yams somehow becomes a cue, summoning him back to his memory, and the 
ancient trauma previously embodied in the open wound ultimately remains incurable. 
Although Philoctete’s pain drains away temporarily with the advent of the cure, he is 
still pained after Ma Kilman heals him.  Similarly, Achille still suffers from “that 
obvious wound / made from loving the sea over their own country”(O, 302).  He still 
partakes in “the laugh of a wounded race”(O, 299).  The prototypical return to the site 
of wounding appears not to have worked for either character; though both have been 
made aware of their reasons for suffering, even a re-visitation to that site of wounding 
can not seem to halt the ceaseless appearance of those traumatic images associated 
with imprisonment and dislocation. 
One solution to this contradiction lies in the consideration of Africa as home.  
Ultimately, the poem leaves it unclear whether or not Africa can still be a homeland 
for a people who have existed for three hundred years away from that land of origin.  
Africa is not the soil of Achille’s birth, but the birth of his ancestors.  It is in this sense 
that the Africa to which Achille returns in his vision is the Africa of Afolabe.  It is not 
after all, Achille’s continent to return to.  Walcott subtly inscribes this difference into 
his poem during Ma Kilman’s invocation of Shango, Ogún, Erzulie, and Damballah as 
the gods she turns to are not entirely derived from the African tradition, but represent a 
combination of New World and West African beliefs  ruptured, corrupted, and 
reformed by the mass migrations of the slave trade.  While Shango and Ogún feature 
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prominently in pre-colonial Yoruban religious and cultural history, Erzulie and 
Damballah only emerged in the Caribbean as a result of the mixing of multiple 
religions and cultures.  Walcott’s references are almost exclusively examples of sub-
Saharan African art and culture which found their way to the Americas on slave ships, 
but were distorted and syncretized during the journey.  The invocation to Shango, the 
Yoruban thunder god associated with moral action is therefore not an invocation of the 
original deity but of the many transformations of Shango/Xangô/Changó that appeared 
in the Caribbean and South America with the mixing of tribes and their slow 
adaptation of Christianity over time.91  Even Ogun, the Yoruban “deity of war and 
iron”92 who nominally survives the journey across the Middle Passage, seems out of 
place in Omeros, transplanted to the paradoxical idleness of former St. Lucian 
battlefields where lizards crouch on inactive cannon.  Finally, the references to 
Erzulie, the “Dahomean-derived goddess of lovers”93 further embodies the effects of 
diaspora of religion as the goddess, as art historian Robert Farris Thompson points 
out, is not actually an African deity at all, but is derived from a hybridization of 
African tradition with the New World.  
Walcott’s effort to enrich and enliven the text of Omeros with references to the 
black Atlantic origins is, then, significantly complicated by the fact that he draws 
largely on an African tradition not as it appears in Africa, but as it surfaces in the 
Caribbean.  The deities, traditions, and fragments of culture that one becomes privy to 
in Omeros are the already hybridized versions of the sources as they existed in Africa 
prior to the slave trade.  It is only through the persistent use of references to African 
art that we become subject to the illusion that the continent lost to the descendents of 
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slaves resurfaces in artifice.  Though the names may have survived, the meanings of 
particular deities inevitably shifted as a result of their relocation across the Atlantic. 
Notably, the West African tradition bears the mark of transplantation from the 
very beginning of the poem in Walcott’s depiction of a hurricane in an early scene that 
brings about the ostensibly incompatible fraternization of African deities with Greek 
gods: 
 
all the village could do was listen to the gods in session, 
 
playing any instruments that came into their craniums, 
the harp-sighing ripple of a hither-and-zithering sea, 
the knucklebone pebbles, the abrupt Shango drums  
 
made Neptune rock in the caves.  Fête start!  Erzulie   
rattling her ra-ra; Ogun, the blacksmith, feeling  
No Pain; Damballa winding like a zandoli  
lizard        (O, 52) 
 
This juxtaposition of deities from Greek and African tradition in a scene “where Ogun 
can fire one with his partner Zeus,”(O, 53) serves as a gesture in which Walcott as 
writer pays homage to both his sources – African and Greek – while simultaneously 
bringing to the foreground the hybridization of African religions as they encountered 
the religions of the west. 
 A similar juxtaposition of deities occurs when Achille returns home to Africa 
in his vision and listens to the tales told by the council of elders: 
 
But he learned to chew 
in the ritual of the kola nut, drain gourds of palm-wine,  
to listen to the moan of the tribe’s triumphal sorrow 
 
in a white-eyed storyteller to a balaphon’s whine 
who perished in what batter, who was swift with the arrow, 
who mated with a crocodile, who entered a river-horse 
 
and lived in its belly, who was the thunder’s favourite, 
who the serpent-god conducted miles off his course 
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for some blasphemous offence and how he would pay for it 
 
by forgetting his parents, his tribe, and his own spirit  
for an albino god      (O, 140) 
 
In this passage, one can again recognize the concurrence of myths of Greek and 
African culture, as well as key references to both the Classical and African literary 
canon.  The white-eyed storyteller appears to be telling a hybrid variation of The 
Odyssey in which the role of thunder god can be either Shango or Zeus, and the 
serpent-god Damballah of the Afro-Caribbean tradition is mirrored in Poseidon 
interrupting Odysseus’s voyage home.  Most importantly, Walcott appears to be 
imagining a Caribbean Odysseus, doomed to the perpetual curse of a lotus eater who 
pays a horrible price for forgetting the ways of the past and adopting the divinity of 
the West.  Walcott picks up this train of thought at a later point in the poem as he 
implies that the link between Greek and African deities is that they have both been 
forsaken by the descendents of their following.  In this particular scene, as the narrator 
follows Omeros/Seven Seas into the volcanic part of the island, he hears “the deep 
indignation / of Hephaestus or Ogun grumbling at the sins / of souls who had sold out 
their race”(O, 289), a castigation by the gods of all nations who are engulfed by the act 
of forgetting.94 
 To read Walcott’s text in the context of psychoanalysis is to understand his use 
of the wound as a trope that intimates the fact that, like psychoanalysis’s talking cure, 
the vocalization of pain in narrative both brings the past into the foreground of the 
present and simultaneously facilitates healing.  Of course, the return to the place of 
wounding does not succeed in ridding either Philoctete or Achille of their shared 
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  54 
affliction.  In a sense, the intention of a “curative plot of return to a precolonial 
Africa”95 does not work.  Why then, portray an ineffectual healing?  Why does a writer 
who criticizes the stereotypical reduction of West Indian writing to “phonetic pain, the 
groan of suffering”96 linger on the incurability of his West Indian characters?  One 
answer lies in Walcott’s fundamental critique of a myth of origin, exemplified by its 
hybrid deities mistaken for original sources.  For Walcott as the self-proclaimed figure 
of Crusoe, the wounds of the West Indian characters in Omeros become hybrid 
wounds.  The fact that the West Indian derives only part of his image from Africa and 
the other part from his English colonial education complicates the matter of locating a 
source to return to.  In this sense, Africa becomes only a portion of that place of 
origin.  Herein the poem registers the difficulty in formulating a cohesive definition of 
Caribbean trauma.97   Descended from both colonizers and colonized, Walcott’s West 
Indian characters are subsequently denied a definitive location where the trauma of 
dislocation was inflicted.  
 In his poems and critical work, Walcott often dramatizes his own personal 
subject position as a descendent of both colonizer and slave.  Much of his work 
thematizes the act of coming to terms with the ambivalence of such a position, be it 
how to reconcile his relation to two seemingly distinct and opposing heritages or to 
resolve his forced (but not unloved) appropriation of standard English as his ancestral 
language.  Walcott stages this dynamic in the last few lines of his most canonized 
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poem, “Far Cry from Africa”: 
 
I who am poisoned with the blood of both, 
Where shall I turn, divided to the vein? 
I who have cursed 
The drunken officer of British rule, how choose 
Between this Africa and the English tongue I love? 
Betray them both, or give back what they give? 
How can I face such slaughter and be cool? 
How can I turn from Africa and live?98     
 
These lines highlight, again, Walcott’s ambivalence towards his linguistic and cultural 
inheritance.  Bringing to mind Caliban’s infamous repudiation of Prospero – “You 
taught me language, and my profit on’t / Is, I know how to curse” – the poem’s 
anxiety rests somewhere between the West Indian poet’s acceptance and refusal.  In 
other words, his stated conflict of being caught between an English and an African 
tradition manifests itself in the linguistic tension.  While the speaker of the poem is 
“divided to the vein” – a statement that functions doubly as a reference to his mixed 
blood and as an idiomatic phrase that figures the extent to which this character is 
divided – the fact that he expresses this anxiety in English indicates that, in a sense, 
the choice has already been made.  As the poem dramatizes the anxiety of writing in 
the colonizer’s tongue, it also portrays the resolution: this poet has chosen to express 
himself in standard English (a move that implies his irrevocable severance from 
Africa).  The fact that the final three questions are posed in unmistakable pentameter 
troubles their line of inquiry from the start.  If the speaker is posing a genuine question 
– “How can I turn from Africa and live?” – it is telling that he does so by adopting a 
traditional English metrical scheme, answering his rhetorical question in the same 
instant he poses it.   
I highlight this poem here because it subtly registers the same trauma as 
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Omeros.  Inasmuch as the use of English in the Caribbean connotes and re-inscribes an 
originary trauma of linguistic colonization, Walcott’s poem comes face to face with 
the guilt of assimilating standard English – language which has been revealed as a 
means of enslavement and, paradoxically, one available tool for resistance.  But if the 
more recently adopted language itself is a wound that always betrays the trace of 
dislocation from the original, the very language that one uses to cure is one that 
simultaneously re-wounds.  At the same time, as Fred D’Aguiar has argued, 
“adaptation of the language is akin to a possession of it.  Where language ‘is the 
empire’ the subjects of that empire can strike back by making that language their 
own.”99  That “A Far Cry from Africa” dramatizes an impossible choice between 
Africa and England is further evidence of a perceived split (divided to the vein?  
divided in the vein?) that positions African on one end of the spectrum and England on 
the other.  In this sense, Africa and England are erected as two separate cultural 
monoliths.  The choice Walcott figures in the poem is rhetorically reduced to either/or.  
Ultimately, as Omeros shows with its adaptation of multiple sources, either/or is an 
impossible choice because those two ostensibly “pure” origins are already creatively 
adapted and altered. 
Walcott’s interest in inherited language also begs the question of the inherited 
verse forms he employs in Omeros.  In edition to the language of English colonization, 
Walcott’s use of hexametric meter evokes the Latin and Greek literature from which it 
also draws its tropes, while terza rima evokes Dante’s Divine Comedy.  While Omeros 
draws heavily from the Homeric epic in almost every way, Walcott himself is hesitant 
to see the poem as part of the genre due to the large role the narrator plays.  The 
poem’s use of elements lyric elements like apostrophe, as well as passages of dialogue 
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make clear-cut generic classification difficult.  At the same time, the its relation to the 
elegiac tradition is marked simultaneously by its apparent move from sorrow to 
consolation as well as its constant meditation on loss.  Walcott has suggested 
elsewhere that poetry as a form “moves off the page and goes into the memory.  It 
goes into the collective memory of the entire race.”100  In its cross-generic technique, 
Walcott’s poem traverses the spaces of literary history and cultural memory as much 
as it negotiates the historical trauma of colonization that paradoxically made these 
creatively hybrid forms possible. 
In Omeros, the cure for the Antillean anguish is originally set up as a function 
of a return to the forgotten African past.  Yet implied by Walcott’s figure of a wound 
that contains both the poison and the anecdote, the scalpel and the suture, is the fact 
that no return is sufficient to heal the trauma of dislocation, and that the past that is 
never forgotten but remains latent in the form of a hereditary ache.  And just as 
Walcott’s poem testifies to a phenomenon of healing and non-healing, it becomes a 
place of simultaneous forgetting and not forgetting; even memories that appear to be 
lost as a result of a collective repression, surface unwittingly for his characters.  While 
the critique of falsely homogenous origins is central to the characters’ failure to heal, I 
want to deviate from a focus on nation and homeland here to examine the way that the 
poem also frames the ocean as a wound, a wounded voice, and perpetrator of the 
wounds of others.  If Walcott insinuates that Africa is not the place of healing by the 
fact that neither of his characters is healed by their return, then perhaps it is the ocean 
in Omeros that must be returned to – the literal Middle Passage that embodies the 
ancestry of the West Indian writer; that “ancestral swell / of the ocean”(O, 127) which 
joins Africa and St. Lucia, St. Lucia and England.  Both the imperial past and the pre-
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history of the New World, for Walcott, meet on the very ocean which separates the 
Empire from the Caribbean and Africa from those colonized islands which are 
characterized as fragments broken off from the original continent.  Accordingly, the 
sea itself is given an important voice in Omeros, elicited from the literal location 
where countless traumas were inflicted.  It emits “a cry / from the small parted 
break”(O, 127), a cry indicative of the story of the countless atrocities committed 
against the prisoners of slave ships, “the story of trauma… inescapably bound to a 
referential return.”101  It is a cry that evokes Freud’s Clorinda – the cry of the 
unconscious that has inadvertently witnessed the wounding; the cry of the voice of 
otherness within the self that testifies to the repetition of the accident.  The ocean 
therefore, in this context, becomes a kind of metaphor for the psyche.  It is the place of 
forgetting in that fragments of memory are lost in its vastness.  It is the place of 
remembering in that those fragments are consistently surfacing – if only briefly – long 
enough to cry out and vanish into latency once more.  
 This complex and continuously moving site of wounding is especially 
important when we consider the poem’s skepticism about its return to originary 
African roots.  If the Middle Passage represents the most forceful cultural trauma for 
the poem’s black West Indian characters, what might we make of the fact that it takes 
place on an expanse of water where roots could not possibly take hold?  The figure of 
the ocean as the primary site of wounding, which repeatedly conjures and re-
submerges the memories of the dead, complicates the linear model of rupture and 
return because there is no rupture immediately distinguishable from regeneration.  
Paul Breslin has argued that in Omeros, “the ocean is the central trope of memory-as-
forgetting, hoarding the past in its depths, but erasing with each surge of generative 
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energy, the marks of human presence on the shore.”102  Indeed, the ocean is often 
represented as a force that disintegrates memory and history:  
 
The ocean had  
 
no memory of the wanderings of Gilgamesh,  
or whose sword severed whose head in the Iliad.  
It was an epic where every line was erased  
 
yet freshly written in sheets of exploding surf  
in that blind violence with which one crest replaced 
another with a trench and that heart-heaving sough  (O, 296) 
 
In this image of destruction and rebuilding, one crest replaces another, yet constantly 
builds upon the previous day’s work in a way that evokes, for Breslin, the figure of 
memory-as-forgetting.  However, the same ocean that erases and replaces memory is 
also constantly “disgorging” it, as it does during Achille’s flashback.   
 Taking this into account, I want to argue that the ocean is not a model for 
memory-as-forgetting as much as it is a model for memory in which complete 
forgetting (and complete healing) is never completely possible.  This model begins to 
answer the question I posed at the beginning of this chapter regarding the potentially 
melancholic outlook engendered by the persistence of the poem’s unhealable wounds.  
By rethinking the poem’s model of temporality, we can see again why the attempt to 
recuperate the poem as something like a conventional elegiac narrative of consolation 
must necessarily fail.  This failure has to do with the cyclic narrative structure of 
Omeros to which to which many of the poem’s other readers allude.  If Omeros is 
centrally concerned with the trope, act, and problem of “return” we must ask what 
mode of return is possible in a non-linear narrative.  As I have already mentioned, a 
critique of linear historical time is central to Walcott’s work and ultimately provides 
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an alternative a model of psychic rupture and closure.  In a sense, one might argue that 
the fact that the wounds fail to heal could never testify to an anti-elegiac refusal of 
consolation because, from the outset, Omeros refuses to subscribe to a model in which 
that consolation or closure would be possible.   
 This continuous, non-linear model also comes across in one of Walcott’s more 
memorable examples of the way that cultural growth might be produced by loss.  In 
one of the closing sections of Omeros, the narrator asks: 
 
Why waste lines on Achille, a shade on the sea floor? 
Because strong as self-healing coral, a quiet culture 
is branching from the white ribs of each ancestor, 
 
deeper than it seems on the surface; slowly but sure. 
it will change us with the fluent sculpture of Time. 
it will grip like the polyp, soldered by the slime 
 
of the sea-slug.                (O, 296) 
 
This section of verse, which appears in the last of Omeros’s seven books, seems at 
first glance like the poem’s climactic moment of consolation, in which Walcott 
employs the image of self-healing coral as a metaphor for cultural growth.  Recasting 
the foundational myth of Eve branching from Adam’s “white ribs,” Walcott’s 
amorphous “culture” branches from lost ancestral currents and springs from a wasted 
“shade on the sea floor.”  The fact that this cultural formation is “soldered by the slime 
/ of the sea slug” evokes an outmoded medical use of the term “solder,” “to cause 
(wounds) to close up and become whole; to reunite (tissues or bones),”103 further 
evincing the suggestion of wholeness and re-established unity.  As such, it registers 
the potential for regrowth as a compensatory gesture that might enable one to procure 
something productive out of historical trauma.  But crucially, while Walcott seems to 
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locate the potential for cultural formation in death and decimation, thus positioning 
cultural formation as a compensatory aftermath to loss, loss here is rendered 
temporally indistinguishable from production; the verse continues, “where coral died / 
it feeds on its death, and the bones branch into more coral, / and contradiction 
begins”(O, 297).  The contradiction, of course, is the simultaneity of destruction and 
regeneration; in this rhizomatic model where newness branches from ancestors who, 
in the forced rhyme, are paralleled with the amorphous, ephemeral image of a “shade 
on the sea floor,” there is no discernable origin.  This image of self-healing coral, then, 
echoes Walcott’s alternative model of temporality in which there is no distinct origin, 
and no complete progress that might lead to closure, in the case of the wounded 
psyche.  
 Significantly, the obsessive reiteration of the characters’ attempt to return to 
the origin of their trauma poignantly echoes a reference to West African symbolism 
that Walcott adopts, perhaps unwittingly.  It is the Yoruban word omeiro which refers, 
according to Art Historian Robert Farris Thompson, to the fluid inside the shell of the 
lakoshe, or white snail, which is “patient, slow moving, teaching deliberation in [its] 
careful motion.”104  When cut open, the liquid from the interior oozes from the shell in 
a thick white fluid, and is thought to have the power to heal all who drink it. Most 
importantly for Thompson, the spiraling of the shell that contains this fluid is 
emblematic of temporality itself.  It grows with passing time and that passage is 
marked visibly on the pattern of the shell.  Any damage done to the shell becomes 
marked in an eternal imperfection of its surface.  The shell itself becomes what 
Thompson calls, “Time: Corporealized.”105  I bring this up here not to suggest that the 
snail shell represents some kind of African cultural recovery in the poem, but to posit 
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it as a suggestive model for the new modes of memory and memorialization the poem 
is suggesting.  Walcott alludes to the snail early in Omeros, in another instance where 
the word “time” is rhymed with “slime” as it is in the passage above: 
 
a red sail entered the  
drifting tree of a rainspout, and the faint pirogue 
slow as a snail whose fingers untie the reef-knots 
 
of a common horizon left a silvery slime 
in its wake; yesterday, in that sea without time, 
the golden moss of the reef fleeced the Argonauts.                       (O, 36) 
 
Here, the reference to Greek myth of the Argonauts and the search for the Golden 
Fleece (all words recapitulated in the last line of this stanza) doubly references the 
argonaut, or Paper Nautilus, a species of octopus that also has a spiral shell, which 
hides, or is “fleeced” in the “golden moss of the reef.”  While it is “without time,” the 
sea temporarily registers the traces left by the wake of the boat that the speaker 
watches in this passage, the trail of slime left by the snail, the traces of Greek 
mythology evoked by the natural world.  The snail-shell, or nautilus shell evoked here, 
serves as a marker from that natural world, which throughout the poem is the ultimate 
catalyst for buried memory – memory prompted by the sound of the waves or the 
movement of the sea-swift, or the seed of a transplanted plant.  The spiral shell, in this 
sense, evokes and modes the different repetitions of memory left in traces and wakes, 
but registering repetition with a difference, employing the same circular movement 
I’ve discussed while marking the impossibility of complete return.  
Reading Omeros with this emblem of the spiral in mind, we might consider 
Walcott’s construction of the text as a “fluent sculpture of Time”(O, 296).  As the 
passage of time is corporeal in the form of the snail shell, so the infliction of trauma 
becomes corporeal in the form of the wound or scar.  In Omeros, bodily wounds 
become markers of the past, of a past trauma, the physical marker of the passage of an 
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event in history, tangible evidence of the passage of time.  And while the form of the 
spiral demands re-visitation to the site of the wound, it does so in a way that never 
allows a moment of complete convergence with the past.  The spiral, then, becomes a 
subtle marker of the different kind of traumatic temporality Walcott’s poem produces 
– one in which a complete fullness of return is impossible, but one which still enables 
a productive engagement with the future.  Though other critics of the poem have 
already pointed out the centrality of a cyclical model of time in Omeros, I offer the 
mode of the spiral as a corrective precisely because it cannot accommodate any sense 
of completion.  Focusing on the figure of the circle as the manifestation of the poem’s 
non-linear narrative, for instance, Breslin has noted that “since Philoctete is already 
healed at the time of [the poem’s opening],” that the action of the poem takes place 
“between the ritual of communal wholeness, about to be shattered, and the restoration 
of wholeness through the cure of the wound.”106  So while Breslin upholds a non-linear 
understanding for the poem’s narrative structure, he still understands that circle as 
somehow punctuated by a “restoration of wholeness.” Arguably, a cyclic model 
presupposes some kind of complete return, even if it is a continuous one; the spiral, on 
the other hand, figures a temporality in which that restoration is unthinkable.  
At first glace, Omeros stages these instances of a restorative return to the past based 
on what I described earlier in this dissertation as the false promise of “original skin,” 
which would be figured, ostensibly, by the perfect, impossibly restorative closure of 
Philoctete’s wound.   
Taking into account the way that this new, spiral-based model of time might 
problematize the idea of closure, and thus the critique of closure central to the 
movement to depathologize melancholia, I suggest that the poem finally discards a 
model of return completely, tantalizing its readers with a dream of ‘original skin’ but 
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giving us only the concrete reality of the scar.  An appropriate metaphor for this model 
of time can be seen in the examination of a wound in itself.  The victim 
characteristically returns to the place of wounding only to find a scar which has healed 
his wound and concealed the force of its trauma. While an exemplary method of 
healing would be the re-formation of the original skin that was peeled back, the 
actuality of healing includes the formation of a scar.  Even the successful healing of a 
lesion therefore implies a continual manifestation of the wound itself.  That is, once a 
wound is inflicted, it can never be truly healed because the scar remains as a trace of 
its former presence. In the case of Philoctete, “[so] an anchor / had hooked its rust in 
one sufferer, and the scar shows / on the slit bone still”(O, 298), and while by the end 
of the poem, Philoctete’s wound is healed, the scar stays behind as a vestige.  Like the 
unhealed wound itself, the scar is a constant marker of the infliction of the trauma.  
While it carries with it all of the connotations of the cure, it is fundamentally 
inseparable from the wound itself.  It is indicative of both cure and wound, 
permanently written on the body – hence the paradox of “the stitched, sutured wound 
that Philoctete / was given by the sea”(O, 242).  The wound is at once sutured and 
open, cured and incurable.  It is cured as the suture closes the cut and it is incurable as 
it never rids itself of the mark of the initial trauma.  Crucially, as Ramazani has also 
noted, “[e]ven though the wound has scarified in these descriptions, Walcott never 
reduces the bitterness or pain to a condition that can be repaired completely; rather, it 
is constitutive of the new synthesis.”107  For Ramazani, that new synthesis extends to 
the new hybridized cultural developments that Walcott also figures with the scar: 
“More somber than Walcott’s tropes of webbing and weaving, let alone popular 
metaphors like melting pot, tossed salad, or callaloo, the scar signifies cultural 
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convergence in the Americas without effacing its violent genesis.”108  Though it 
embodies a site of healing, the scar, not unlike the incurable lesion, maintains the 
memory of the wounding. 
The scar as a marker for memory’s wound amalgamates the question of time 
and the question of place.  The oceanic Middle Passage marks (in its inability to be 
marked) what Elizabeth DeLoughrey refers to as an “impossibility of spatial return.”109  
Crucially, this represents a shift in thinking about the inability to represent trauma.  
Throughout the poem, Walcott toys with the conventional connection established 
between wound and writing as both are a form of inscription – wound upon flesh and 
writing upon parchment.  This connection serves as a foundation for Walcott’s 
portrayal of language as the wound as it is forced upon colonial subjects.  However, 
the association simultaneously connotes Walcott’s implied question of what kind of 
language, if any, is capable of portraying suffering.  As in the case of the wound itself, 
language offers no ideal healing.  While there is an implied catharsis in the mediation 
and subsequent release of the trauma through language, an ideal healing is impossible 
simply because language offers no true return to origin.  The scar, in this model, 
becomes a signifier for language.  However, the inability to return to the unmarkable 
oceanic space has less to do with some kind of aporia or undecidability of the 
traumatic (and some intrinsic lack accompanying language) than it has to do with the 
kinds of movements and shifts Walcott outlines, both in terms of the changes a culture 
undergoes over time, and the changing motions of the sea which figure those 
fluctuations.  Trauma in this new model is not something abstractly unknowable, and 
as such becomes something that might be addressed in ways that do not merely 
recapitulate the silence of some unsymbolizable “abyss of sorrow, a noncommunicable 
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grief.”110  When DeLoughrey alerts our attention to the question of “how to mark – 
and thus materially make meaningful – ocean spaces that were traversed by slave ships 
when one cannot locate the exact coordinates of the places where, for instance, 
Africans died in the passage or drowned at sea,”111 she implicitly raises the question of 
how to mourn or commemorate the losses that took place in those spaces – losses that 
are “unrepresentable” in a sense that there is no definitive way of marking exactly 
where or when they took place, and no distinct trace left behind, only a wake that 
flows and dissipates into the larger body of water. 
The fact that the question of how to mark or represent those losses in this 
context departs from a model of unrepresentability based on unknowability is crucial 
to thinking about the way modes of responding to loss according to a “deconstructive 
ethics of remembrance” are rendered problematic.  In this model, the otherness of loss 
is consumed and entombed within the self in what theorists have described as an 
ethical gesture in which the otherness of that lost other is preserved rather than 
assimilated.  While proponents of melancholia have attempted to frame this 
consumption as the basis for a kind of communication where the otherness of the 
revenant communicates that trauma through compulsive return and acting out, I would 
argue that this kind of “communication” is ultimately hopeless in that it seeks to 
transmit that wound to others through silence or through a collapse of understanding 
that completely precludes working through.112   
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By avoiding this paralytic appeal to silence, Omeros raises the important 
question of how to talk about trauma without becoming trapped in a repetitive 
obsession with origin.  In the same Boxing Day ritual in which Philoctete’s pain 
returns, the poem suggests that while the trauma of the Middle Passage cannot be 
“marked,” it can be iterated in controlled scenes of performance in a way that enables 
their communication to others.  Crucially, when “[a]ll the pain / re-enter[s] 
Philoctete”(O, 277), it does so during a performance that he and Achille stage every 
year, not to celebrate Christmas, but “for something older; something that he had seen 
in Africa”(O, 275).  When the pain of Philoctete’s wound returns, the poem recounts 
how 
 
He swallowed his nausea, and spun his arms faster, 
like a goblet on a potter’s wheel, its brown blur 
 
soothed by his palms, as the bamboo fifes grew shriller 
to the slitted eyes of the fifers.  The drummer’s wrists 
whirred like a hummingbird’s wings, and, to Achille, the 
 
faster they flew, the more he remembered, blent 
to his rite; then suddenly the music ceased.         (O, 277) 
 
While the scene ends with Philoctete weeping, it is important to consider how the 
reappearance of the wound here takes place during a performed rite to which that 
memory is “blent” or fused.  The fact that the return of Philoctete's pain happens in the 
context of a public performance (even if that performance isn't ever explicitly aimed at 
vocalizing that pain) means that it happens in a way that counters melancholic 
isolation, in a venue where the very process of countering isolation is what is 
communicated to others.  While the loss is never fully worked through, the somewhat 
ritualized process of grappling with it represents a way out of the isolation of 
                                                                                                                                       
understanding”(111) there is no available mode of “communicating” a traumatic event 
to an audience, except in a sense in which victim and witness are conflated.   
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melancholia.  Re-performing the pain (as opposed to compulsively repeating it in 
isolation) becomes a way of communicating the pain to Achille and others.113 
 In the debilitating isolation of melancholia, where one consumes the loss 
whole, loss is totally cut off from history.  The re-entry into a community, the 
participation in a shared language, becomes a way of putting that pain back into a 
historical context.  In Omeros, the suggestive way in which trauma cannot be marked 
on the fluctuating oceanic body evokes another important sit of mutability – that of the 
newly formed community itself.  If a melancholic fixation on origin stories might 
serve as the basis for new types of community, as Butler and others have suggested, 
the continuous processes of working-through that take place in Walcott’s poem 
destabilize a potentially problematic sense of fixed identity that those origin stories 
presuppose and produce.  Taking this into account, these same processes of working 
through might also enable a way of relating to loss across rigidly delineated national 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
KAMAU BRATHWAITE’S POETICS OF MELANCHOLIA 
 
 
 Derek Walcott’s unhealing anchor-wound; Édouard Glissant’s open boat; 
Aimé Césaire’s “demasted hulls, old sores, rotten bones” and “suppurating syzygy of 
blisters;”114 Kamau Brathwaite’s middle passages: all are part of a lexicon of wounds 
inscribed again and again into the canonical texts of Caribbean poetry.  Given that 
postcolonial literature generally positions colonial violence – physical, epistemic, 
historical, linguistic – as its condition of possibility, it is unsurprising that these 
preeminent examples of Caribbean poetics seem so incurably wounded.  Indeed, 
Caribbean poetry is ultimately tied up in the politics and poetics of trauma.  It is 
precisely this saturating of wounds, however, that Walcott condemns in “The Muse of 
History” when he insists that Caribbean writers abandon the melancholic reiteration of 
colonial violence and opt instead for a literature that eschews the “servitude to the 
muse of history” – a mode of writing which has in Walcott’s view “produced a 
literature of recrimination and despair, a literature of revenge written by the 
descendants of slaves or a literature of remorse written by the descendants of 
masters.”115  Postcolonial poetry – undeniably wounded, markedly elegiac – should 
offer some conciliatory relief from the pain of its subject matter.  At one point, 
towards the end of Walcott’s lauded epic poem, Omeros, we bear witness to and 
partake in the conventional compensatory strategies of the elegy when his obeah-
woman, Ma Kilman, declares “We shall all heal.”116  Of course, contrary to his critical 
denouncement of despair, Walcott’s characters do not heal; all the pain that reenters 
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his poem testifies to the incommensurable wounds at its heart: the colonial trauma of 
“one pain / that is inconsolable, the loss of one’s shore / with its crooked footpath”(O, 
151) and, more generally, “[t]he incurable / wound of time”(O, 319).  
This tension between the call to heal and the wound’s apparent resistance to 
healing speaks to the critical arguments about collective trauma that I have described 
in the previous chapters.  Recent scholarly attention to twentieth century elegiac 
writing has taken issue with modes of mourning traumatic events in the modern and 
postmodern era, affirming a lingering fixation on incurable wounds as an ethically 
preferable mode of engaging with the past.  As a result, and despite the all too 
common cry to come to terms with the past, we are currently witnessing a proliferation 
of discourses which privilege the irreparability of loss and the inability to heal.  From 
the Derridean valorization of “impossible mourning” to Butler’s later assertion that 
working through traumatic events might undercut the foundations of those 
communities situated around an originary trauma, much attention across literary and 
cultural studies has been devoted to both the ethical and creative potential of a 
melancholic attachment to the past.  As I have already shown, it is not loss which is 
valorized as such; rather it is a melancholic attachment to the past which has been 
infused with political, ethical, and creative potential, and reframed as a mode of 
resistance to any fixity or mastery, whether it be over loss, or the knowledge of past 
events.  In this model, Ma Kilman’s promise that “we shall all heal” is tantamount to a 
decision to move on from loss in a way that forecloses opportunities for continual, 
productive attention to the past that melancholia would ostensibly permit.  For critics 
like Sam Durrant, David Eng, David Kazanjian, and Ranjana Khanna, a melancholic 
relationship with past events allows one to engage in an anti-historicist “persistent 
struggle with its lost objects”117 that mourning closes down.  The failure to heal, then, 
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marks a commitment to keep loss open in a way that resists the “totalizing” master 
narratives of history and the historicist’s impulse “to ‘grasp’ and to ‘hold’ on to the 
fleeting images of the past.”118   
In this chapter, I turn my attention to the Barbadian poet, Kamau Brathwaite, 
to examine how the woundedness and incommensurability deployed in his work might 
allow readers to rethink this recent critical advocacy of an anti-historicist ethics of 
remembrance, as well as the imaginative rendering of traumatic experience.  As I have 
already shown, scholars who understand mourning as a disavowal of the past 
subscribe to a stereotypical notion of mourning as closure rather than a productive, 
performative process in which the past might be worked through in ways that enable a 
real interest in the present and future.  While the previous chapter aimed to debunk the 
problematic, simplistic notion of closure attributed to mourning, this chapter examines 
another aspect of the critical valorization of melancholia: the troubling conflation of 
absence and loss that LaCapra has already outlined as another product of this critical 
move.  In Writing History, Writing Trauma, LaCapra alerts us to the pitfalls of 
generalizing specific historical loss as transhistorical on the grounds that conflating 
absence with loss produces a decontextualized “discourse of absence” in which “one 
faces the impasse of endless melancholy, impossible mourning, and interminable 
aporia”119 which shuts down any real possibility of working through the traumatic past.  
Furthermore, due to the fact that this conflation “typically involves the tendency to 
avoid addressing historical problems, including losses, in sufficiently specific 
terms,”120 events are rendered into simple iterations of a pre-defined trauma narrative, 
with no way to tend to the specificity of individual contexts.  When losses (whether 
                                                
118 Ibid., 2. 
119 LaCapra, “Trauma, Absence, Loss” in Writing History, Writing Trauma 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 46. 
120 Ibid., 48. 
  72 
they are individually or socially experienced) are reframed as an insuperable, 
universalized condition of existence, it becomes especially difficult to address not only 
the specificity of each loss, but also the specific historical conditions that made those 
losses possible in the first place.  This facet of the argument has particular relevance 
for the study of colonial trauma since, as I have already pointed out, many of those 
historical conditions are ongoing in neocolonial practice, so the inability to address 
them has contemporary repercussions.   
Keeping in mind recent trauma culture’s tendency to render productive the 
pathological aspects of melancholia, I address these problems by focusing on 
Brathwaite’s shift from a nationally oriented poetics of “nation-language” (rooted in a 
distinctly Caribbean experience of transgenerational historical trauma) to his more 
recent, “transboundary” aesthetic, which instead depicts a globalized, transhistorical 
sense of atrocity and loss at the heart of contemporary political life.  Arguably, 
Brathwaite’s recurring attention to the persistent wounds of colonial history in the 
Caribbean expands in his more recent work to embody exactly the kind of generalized, 
unmournable absence LaCapra describes above.  The poet’s refusal to mourn comes 
across in his new focus on a “transboundary” world – paradoxically fragmented and 
fused – in which all wounds are generalized, transhistorical, unhealable.  Ultimately, 
however, this expansion has less to do with the disembodied condition of 
woundedness I have discussed so far than it does with figuring a model of 
transnational community where suturing together different wounds might allow for a 
continuous, collective process of working through historical trauma.  As I will argue in 
this chapter, Brathwaite’s new frame opens up a space for reading outside of the 
boundaries of an essentializing identity politics to which his work, and postcolonial 
literature in general, is often subjected, and posits cross-cultural relation as a possible 
locus of working through. 
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Admittedly though, it is through this same move that Brathwaite also risks 
conflating absence and loss, obscuring specific losses and participating in a discourse 
of foundational absence.  While this comes across most obviously in the 
transboundary move I will discuss in the following pages, it is important to note that 
Brathwaite frequently blurs the distinction between loss and absence throughout his 
work, adopting a seemingly melancholic agency of the kind that the above scholars 
have described.  As a trained historian, Brathwaite is no stranger to obsessing over the 
past, nor is he exempt from accusations that his work is either fundamentally nostalgic 
or implicated in a poetics of “recrimination and despair,” in Walcott’s terms.  This is a 
fair enough charge, it seems, when we take into account the violent myth of origins he 
puts forth in a dialogue with Glissant: 
 
[The Caribbean’s] tips are a sunken range of mountains 
which a million years ago angled a great eastward spiral 
from the Americas, from the Rockies to the cordillera of 
Central America and into the awesome Andes.  We are 
at right angles to this, and because we were at right 
angles we were weaker, more subject to the pressures of 
the sliding curve of movement.  And so we collapsed 
into the ocean, creating a catastrophe of sunken memory 
and leaving only the sunken tips of these volcanic 
memories, the islands of the Caribbean.  It is my 
impression that even now, a million years later, we still 
hear the echo of that catastrophe, and much of our work 
relates to that memory.  We somehow lost the sense of 
the mainland, the sense of wholeness and we became 
holes in the ocean.121 
 
Brathwaite’s claim here that the Caribbean subject has lost a sense of wholeness 
deliberately plays into a prelapsarian discourse where a geographical split with the 
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mainland substitutes for the Fall of the Old Testament.  So, in addition to the frequent 
references to the trauma of colonialism and slavery in Brathwaite’s poems we have a 
parallel creation myth – a specifically Caribbean one – which situates catastrophe at its 
center.  This catastrophe is marked, however, by the unity of the same oceanic space 
into which the collapse takes place – a perceived unity which is again ruptured in 
waves of colonial invasions which carved up the Caribbean into different nations.  
From the beginning, then, there is a tension between the need to tend to specific 
iterations of colonial violence in each island context, and the need to re-establish a 
regional connectivity against the fragments imposed by colonization.  
 Ultimately, as I will show in this chapter, Brathwaite’s transboundary phase is 
not an ahistorical turn to structural trauma, but an attempt to historicize the effect of 
globalization in the Caribbean and across the world.  In this sense, LaCapra’s 
opposition between historically specific and transhistorical trauma fails to map easily 
onto Brathwaite’s work.  While the increasing permeability of boundaries between 
temporal and spatial locations might appear to participate in a generalizing 
melancholia, Brathwaite’s work implicitly disturbs the binary logic of local/global and 
instead offers a picture of the Caribbean as synechdochically global.  Accordingly, 
when the “wounds” of his poetry become all-encompassing and not readily 
attributable to one individual, nation, or race, they are not depicting a universalized 
condition of existence.  Fundamentally, Brathwaite’s poetry begs the question of how 
art aesthetically captures catastrophe, be it geological in the example above, or socio-
politically orchestrated.  His interest in a “tidalectic” model of history necessitates a 
focus on interconnected disasters whose repercussions are felt all the more closely due 
to the effects of globalization.  His transboundary turn, therefore, is not just about 
establishing some kind of equivalence between disasters, but highlighting the very 
question of how to represent events that are simultaneously historically specific and 
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undeniably intertwined. 
Brathwaite’s self-professed poetic project involves conveying a distinctly 
Caribbean experience (one punctuated by trauma) through new modes of linguistic 
and metaphorical experimentation – blending canonical English rhythms with African 
ones, evoking Christian and Rastafarian cosmologies, foregrounding the orality of his 
poems and manipulating syntax.122  According to Brathwaite, the inherited poetics of 
English colonialism lack the raw materials necessary to convey the often painful 
specifics of everyday experience:  “The hurricane which cuts into the Caribbean every 
year does not howl in pentameters.  And for the slave-girl whose back is harshed by 
the whip of the slave-master when she shrieks in pain there is no English metric.”123  
But at the same time, at the heart of this project is the idea that the history of the 
Caribbean leaves its inhabitants with genocide in place of genesis.  As he explains, 
 
I recognized that the history that I had inherited did not 
permit me to inherit any natural genesis.  It permitted me 
to inherit a sense of genocide, which is quite different 
from genesis, fundamentally the opposite, because the 
people that inherited that landscape picking up the echo 
of that catastrophe had been exterminated by the 
Spanish, by the conquistadores of Columbus… So that 
when the Caribbean was inherited by what has been 
called the New World, the modern world, we had no 
original native ancestors.124 
 
Arguably, Brathwaite’s deeply melancholic conflation of genocide and genesis runs 
the risk of confusing the specific traumatic losses his poetry enacts with a 
universalizing sense of absence.  Surely if the generalized valorization of melancholia 
apparent in the work of critics like Butler and Eng risks effacing the specificity of 
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individual losses, the totalizing narrative of catastrophe Brathwaite employs here does 
the same.  We might recall LaCapra’s claim that if we ignore “the difference (or 
nonidentity between) absence and loss,” we risk “[converting] subsequent accounts 
into displacements of a story of original sin wherein a prelapsarian state of unity or 
identity, whether real or fictive, is understood as giving way to a fall of difference and 
conflict.”125  In this sense, specific traumatic events risk slipping into a master-
narrative of their own; Brathwaite’s poetics become reducible to the foundational 
myth of geographical upset, colonial encounter, or middle passage as they become lost 
in a series of generalizing elegies for the loss of culture which we so frequently 
encounter.   
 The simultaneity of genocide and genesis culminates with Brathwaite’s 
portrayal of the Middle Passage, where “birth was not breath // but gaping wound,”126 
echoing Walcott’s well-known poem, “Laventille,” in which the wounds of 
dispossession are also very much open and raw: 
 
Something inside is laid wide like a wound, 
 
some open passage that has cleft the brain, 
some deep, amnesiac blow. We left 
somewhere a life we never found, 
 
customs and gods that are not born again, 
some crib, some grille of light 
clanged shut on us in bondage, and withheld 
 
us from that world below us and beyond, 
and in its swaddling cerements we’re still bound.127 
 
The morbidity of these last stanzas of “Laventille” is heightened by the interplay of 
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birth and burial.  The paradox of “swaddling cerements,” a combination of an infant’s 
swaddling clothes and the wax material used to wrap corpses, brings to mind Édouard 
Glissant’s haunting image of a slave ship as a belly “pregnant with as many dead as 
living under sentence of death.”128 This compendium of grief  is punctuated by the 
overdetermined metaphor of an “open passage” – a suggestive image that doubles as a 
figure of the Middle Passage, and finally testifies to a wound or split in the Caribbean 
psyche often thematized in Walcott’s poems and constantly enacted in Brathwaite’s 
through the juxtaposition of found language from a multitude of cultural inheritances.   
 In these two brief examples, we can get a sense of the extent to which these 
images stop being singular and start functioning as a place-holder for absence.  
Crucially, however, the unhealable wounds portrayed here – the inability to 
distinguish between genesis and genocide, birth and death – are taken up by both poets 
as the impetus for poesy.  The trauma of dislocation is the condition of possibility for 
a vibrant, hybridized mode of art-making.  We might recall here Butler’s notion that 
loss has a deeply productive capacity when she affirms the post-traumatic space of “no 
belonging” as a place which advocates belonging and figures loss as “oddly fecund, 
paradoxically productive”:  “Loss becomes the condition and necessity for a certain 
sense of community, where community does not overcome the loss, where community 
cannot overcome the loss without losing the very sense of itself as a community.”129  
This claim is especially seductive inasmuch as it provides a means for marginalized 
communities to achieve political agency.  In the first place, loss permits the newly-
formed community to have a sense of itself as such.  As Butler explains, “newness 
itself, is founded upon the loss of original place, and so it is a newness that has within 
it a sense of belatedness, of coming after, and of being thus fundamentally determined 
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by a past that continues to inform it.”  In the wake of this insurmountable loss, Butler 
argues that “a fractured horizon looms in which to make one’s way as a spectral 
agency, one for whom a full “recovery” is impossible, one for whom the irrecoverable 
becomes, paradoxically, the condition of a new political agency.”130 
 As in Walcott, the Middle Passage surfaces in Brathwaite’s work as one of 
these “oddly fecund, paradoxically productive” sites where the artistic inheritance of 
jazz is inexorably tied up in (and linked through internal rhyme to) the pain associated 
with the sea.  In “Word Making Man” Brathwaite depicts both the creative import of 
trauma in which “the sea between us yields its secrets / silver into pellables into sheets 
of sound / that bear our pain & spume & salt & Coltrane.”131  This opening poem of 
Middle Passages invokes a sense of community based in a shared “history of ghosts” 
which, in a sense, enables the voice to speak in the first place as an individual and 
collective subject: 
 
owners herein of what we must believe 
of what our hands encompass as we dream  
 
so that together we say wind  
& understand its history of ghosts  
together we say fire  
 
& again there is a future in those sparks 
together, comrade, friend 
we say this is our land & know at last it is our home132  
 
As Butler has argued and both Walcott and Brathwaite have illustrated, the formation 
of a community held together by the common experience of a traumatic event might 
be impetus enough for valorizing a melancholic attachment to the past.  If 
Brathwaite’s earlier work lingers on the Middle Passage as a site of foundational 
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importance, however, it does so somewhat paradoxically to counter the notion of 
complete, totalizing decimation.  Accordingly, inheriting catastrophe’s echo means 
inheriting not simply what was lost, but what remains.  
 Not unlike Walcott, Brathwaite imagines a sense of unity for the region based 
on its shared knowledge of colonial and indigenous influences.  More than Walcott, 
however, Brathwaite privileges the Caribbean’s connection with Africa as a strong 
point of coherence.  As Marueen Warner-Lewis has pointed out, the “consciousness of 
the Atlantic, not as ‘a divider,’ but as a bridge, is one of Brathwaite’s reiterated 
visions.”133  At the same time, we might read Brathwaite’s understanding of cultural 
influence as positioning Africa not as a site of melancholic fixation, but as a site of 
continual re-discovery that takes place in Caribbean art forms.  Against “a persistent, 
established theory which contends that the Middle Passage destroyed the culture of 
these people, that it was such a catastrophic, definitive experience that one of those 
transported during the period from 1540 to 1840 escaped trauma,”134 Brathwaite puts 
forth a model of survival and creative adaptation; throughout his work he discusses the 
presence of Africa as submerged and in need of recuperation to counter the 
obliviousness toward an otherwise obvious “African connection and aesthetic.135  
While the “return” to Africa is a kind of psychical journey meant to repair the 
fractures of regional consciousness, at the same time, it is also one based on accessing 
latent echoes of that progenitor culture as they exist in present time and space, not as 
“authentic” elements of African culture available in the Caribbean today, but as traces 
that have been transplanted and changed over time.  So, as another critic has noted, 
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Brathwaite’s poems “create cycles of allusive patterning which reconnect West Africa 
with the rituals and spiritual traditions on the ‘other shore,’ lending new significance 
to old gestures, revitalizing through metaphor, dramatisation, and especially 
rhythm.”136  The figure of “sunken memory” in his dialogue with Glissant further 
emphasizes the understanding of historical trauma that does not happen in stages, but 
in tides and surges.  Even the irreparable or the seemingly absent leaves a trace of its 
presence while the later surges of historical trauma in the Caribbean echo this sense of 
a memory that is submerged, even as the catastrophe it marks is long past and 
inaccessible. 
The opening poem of Islands, part of Brathwaite’s Arrivants trilogy, and its 
evocation of latent cultural memory, provides a useful illustration of this phenomenon, 
particularly since it is almost reminiscent of the exchange that takes place between 
Afolabe and Achille in Walcott’s Omeros, which I discussed in the previous chapter: 
 
For the land has lost the memory of the most secret places 
 
we see the moon but cannot remember its meaning 
a dark skin is a chain but it cannot recall the name 
 
of its tribe.  There are no chiefs in the village 
 
the gods have been forgotten or hidden.137                   
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the Hebrew Jehovah… nor the Rastafarian Jah Jah” but rather, “the white Anglo-
Saxon Protestant perversion of the Christian message.” (See Gordon Rohlehr, 
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This poem registers the paradox of an irreparable loss that is also somehow retrievable 
inasmuch as parts are fragmented and dormant, but nonetheless preserved, in 
contemporary cultural forms, waiting to be revitalized.  The centrality of traces, 
surges, and wakes of the past explains how things might be “formed from unknown 
but not forgotten African fingers,”138 to borrow a phrase from Brathwaite’s 
“Guanahani” in Born to Slow Horses, without privileging a sense of originary purity 
or a state of complete wholeness to which a full return is impossible. 
It is precisely this sense of revitalization, which I have already explored in 
Walcott’s work, that begins to complicate the notion of simple return to the originary 
loss occasioned by the Middle Passage and other traumatic ruptures in Caribbean 
history.  With its focus on the aspects of West African artistic culture – cultural 
references, rhythms, and spiritual traditions that survived (even as they changed) – 
Brathwaite’s poems fixate on that originary loss if only to advocate an awareness of 
the way its traces have been central to Caribbean artistic production, but have not 
entirely determined it.  Still, the sense of the productive possibility of tending to 
foundational loss raises questions about what we might call Brathwaite’s anti-elegiac 
                                                                                                                                       
Pathfinder: Black awakening in The Arrivants of Edward Kamau Brathwaite 
(Tunapuna, Trinidad: G. Rohlehr, 1981), 166.)  The later version, “Bread,” in Born to 
Slow Horses, omits any mention of God or Jah, aside from two references to “this 
scarifice / of isaac”[sic] and to the “warm dead… flesh of the god you break.”  That 
bread or flesh is linked to the land, to “the dream of the soil itself” which is 
unavailable to “the multitudes who howl all day for ijs saviour”[sic](BTSH, 60), but 
these multitudes are never specifically identified nor positioned in space or time.  
While the vague sense of injustice and dispossession is central to this poem, the 
addition of the second group of stanzas from “Jah” regarding the land that “has lost the 
memory of the most secret places” seems somewhat out of place.  In the earlier poem, 
jazz and other cultural forms come to represent the “gods [that] have been forgotten 
and hidden.”  In the later version the centrality of the a specifically Caribbean 
traumatic history is completely abandoned in another instance that replaces a 
historically specific context with a vague sense of absence.  
138 Brathwaite, Born to Slow Horses (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), 
10. Hereafter referred to in text as BTSH. 
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elegies for colonial loss, particularly when those losses proliferate and branch out in 
his new phase of poetry.   
At the end of Born to Slow Horses, Brathwaite explicitly defines this new 
phase as a continuation of his “post-catastrophe” poetry, referring to the work he 
completed in the years following three major traumatic events in his personal life – his 
wife’s death from cancer, Hurricane Gilbert’s destruction, and the experience of being 
assaulted and robbed in his own home –  all of which he documents in Shar (1990), 
The Zea Mexican Diary (1993), and Trench Town Rock (1999).  Brathwaite names this 
period of intense personal traumatization his “Time of Salt,” which he clarifies as  
 
the years 1986-1900 which see in rapid catastrophic 
succession, the death of his wife Zea Mexican (1986), 
the destruction by hurricane of their home & archives at 
Irish Town in the high hills outside Kingston (1988) and 
his own death at the hands of brigand gunmen in his 
Kingston apartment in 1990, all chronicled in his largely 
new & strangely unknown groundbreaking ‘post-
catastrophe’ work  (BTSH, 142) 
 
“1986-1900” is not a typographical error here; it appears that way in the collection, 
possibly testifying to the way Brathwaite manipulates time and causation in these 
recent poems.  At the same time, in this short third-person autobiographical passage, 
Brathwaite gives the reader the impression that his body of work has progressed in a 
somewhat linear sense, explaining that his “post-catastrophe” work here has given 
way to a new phase which, he explains, “should be read in the context of KB’s post-
Arrivants, postAncestors, postSalt work”(BTSH, 142).  While the emphasis on the 
centrality of catastrophe or loss suggests some sense of continued, unresolved loss, the 
admitted transition from his “post-catastrophe” work to his “postSalt” phase itself 
indicates some process of working through those events which shaped and continue to 
shape his poetics.  If this is the case, however, it takes place through an expansion into 
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what Brathwaite calls “a significant transboundary development” that draws even the 
regionally focused poems out of their regional boundaries.  As he explains, 
 
Born to Slow Horses is the first major appearance in this 
country of this new (?4th phase) of Brathwait(e)’s poetry; 
a  work which in a sense, surveys or makes natural 
reference to the entire  tidalectics, but at the same time 
marking, even with the most remarkable of his 
‘Caribbean’ poems here, a significant transboundary 
development  (BTSH, 143) 
 
By examining this ostensibly “new (?4th phase)” I want to trace what I see as a 
shift in Brathwaite’s own recent work into a more transhistorical poetics of 
melancholia.  In his earlier work we can understand the melancholic attachment to a 
colonial “history of ghosts” as at least a specific locus of postcolonial traumatization, 
even if it reaches beyond the Caribbean to address certain parallels with the rest of the 
global South.  Take for instance two versions of a short poem, “Irae” set against the 
later “Dies Irie” from Ancestors.  A play on the liturgical “Dies Irae” of a Roman 
Catholic requiem Mass,  the second of the two versions certainly becomes more 
transhistorical as it invokes a series of specific instances of colonial violence and 
resistance.  Also important is the change of the title from Irae – translated from the 
Latin as “wrath” – to Dies Irie.  While Brathwaite’s substitution of the Rastafarian 
word for “excellence” or “total peace with one’s state of being” for wrath might 
signify a shift from days of wrath to days of peace, the vast expansion of the poem’s 
scope suggests otherwise, particularly since the latter is more rhythmically complex 
(the first often conforms to the medieval poem on which it is based), and metrically 
frantic.  The original rhymes have been interrupted and spread out over different 
stanzas.  The handful of place and proper names from the shorter Middle Passages 
version (my lai sharpville wounded knee, nanny cuffee cudjoe, and a few others) have 
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exploded to include important figures of colonial resistance such as Toussant 
L’Overture, Frantz Fanon, Marcus Garvey, Jose Martí, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, 
Steven Biko, Nelson Mandela, Malcom X, next to Adolf Hitler, Hermann Göring, and 
Hernán Cortez, and Apartheid perpetrators – D.F. Malan, P.W. Botha, and Hendrik 
Verwoerd.  What this version lacks, however, is the concise rhyme and rhythm of 
“Irae” which is tightly held together at the level of meter.  Unfettered, the new poem 
gives the impression that the old one was exploded all over the page, seeming to 
suggest there is no limit to its portrayal of colonial violence and neocolonial 
hypocrisy.  While Brathwaite seems to bring together history’s perpetrators with 
history’s victims here in an almost undifferentiated way, his extension of the original 
poem still registers models of differentiation that are necessary, both in relation to the 
past and in relation to present ways of engaging it.  Hitler, Göing, Cortez, Malan, 
Botha, and Verwoerd stand out as part of the same historical process that engenders 
the need for creative affirmation.  Accordingly, the gesture to the interconnectivity of 
these figures with those of colonial resistance motivates the impulse and necessity of 
continual acknowledgement and engagement with history. 
While it is true that Brathwaite maintains a focus on the global postcolonial 
here, we can no longer suggest that his poem is distinctly “Caribbean.”  Rather, if we 
do we must keep in mind Antonio Benítez-Rojo’s designation of the Caribbean as a 
“meta-archipelago without center and without limits.”139  In Born to Slow Horses, 
Brathwaite participates in such a centerless, limitless expansion into an apocalyptic 
world of “seething old sores / of no longer verbs / that can heal.  of no longer baptisms 
/ that will bawl out yr name / from the top of disaster / adjectives already gone a- / way 
clattering.  lounging in shame.  the silence of rot / of the hot of unheavens”(BTSH, 
                                                
139 Antonio Benítez-Rojo, The Repeating Island: The Caribbean and the Postmodern 
Perspective, trans. James Maraniss (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 9 
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101-2).  The poems register a kind of interconnectedness, not just between instances of 
colonial violence but all events, and posits existence itself as “wound & 
absence”(BTSH, 64).  While we still encounter the characteristic Middle Passage 
iconography so prevalent in Ancestors in the form of “the slaves graves rocking 
underwater,” the historical references expand to include the first human colonization 
of the ancient archipelago to the early 1960s: “over moncada & the white marl of the 
arawaks / over the bay of pigs & the isle of pines / over the fountains of youth & the 
ever.  glades  / over the drowned gardens of atlantis / over the slaves graves rocking 
underwater.”140   
Born to Slow Horses enacts the concept of the “transboundary” by crossing 
both temporal and regional borders to highlight comparisons between distant 
atrocities.  Crucially, the earlier comparisons between with Caribbean and other 
regions of the global South has given way to unexpected analogies, even if they are 
accessed through the distinct poetics Brathwaite developed early in his career.  There 
are notable passages of the Brathwaite we recognize from earlier works – his phonetic 
spellings, emphasis on orality, the tones of “nation language.”  However, as in the 
reworked version of “Dies Irie,” we encounter a “cosmology of sudden unXpecting 
disaster / & its unutterable grief unvomiting the world”(BTSH 73).   Crammed 
together in the lines of Born to Slow Horses we find “Birminham that ku / klux 
Christian tabernacle night in Sodom & Herero”(102), “the corn / husk terror of 
Rwanda”(102), the shooting of JFK in Dallas, “the curling Black Death mushroom 
gloam / of God in Nagasaki”(102), Pol Pot, King Leopold and the Belgian Congo.  
Not only does one catastrophe beget another, but each catastrophe played back in 
memory compounds the memory of all others and haunts the poems as an nonlinear 
amalgam of disaster.  
                                                
140 Brathwaite, Ancestors (New York: New Directions, 2001), 460-1 
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This sense of disjointedness is intensified by the fact that, unlike Ancestors, 
Born to Slow Horses is not a unified narrative but a collection of poems, many of 
which have been revised from earlier collections and compiled here.  Though 
Brathwaite himself has explained that “There is no ‘large theme’ here since Born to 
Slow Horses is not a long-poem like Masks or Mother Poem, but a collection of poems 
w/ various themes…arranged more or less chronologically,”141 I would  argue that the 
collection’s very overt theme is the negotiation of the “post-catastrophe” in memory.  
This process takes place in different forms throughout the book – in a single voiced 
narrative of the poet flying over the Bahamas in “Guanahani;” in dialogue, as it does 
in “Mmassaccourraamann,” a reworked correspondence between Brathwaite and 
writer Cyril Dabydeen, or in “Namesatoura,” an exchange between the ghost of the 
slave and the poet who has just disturbed her grave in Cowpastor, Barbados by taking 
photographs of a spiderweb on the ground above it; and finally in the multiple, 
overlapping voices of mourners in “Kumina,” which recounts a deeply personal loss of 
a family member.     
In this new transboundary phase, analogous wounds do not just transcend 
national boundaries, but time as well, in a gesture that might be interpreted as a 
mimetic attempt to grasp the disjointedness of traumatic temporality in which events, 
cognitively missed at the time of their infliction, are paradoxically “experienced” only 
in later repetitions.142  This collapse of chronological time comes to a climax in “9/11 
Hawk” where a Jazz saxophonist’s London performance in 1967 foresees the collapse 
of the twin towers.  Tellingly, “Hawk” is not numbered as a section in the 
introduction; in the table of contents, 9/11 appears instead as a ghost numeral between 
                                                
141 Opal Palmer Adisa, personal correspondence with Kamau Brathwaite cited in a 
book review of Born to Slow Horses, The Black Scholar 37.1 (Spring 2007): 55. 
142 See Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History 
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
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sections V and VII.  Central to the poem is a disordering of time where the earlier 
performance actually gives the speaker a position in both past and future.  This is not a 
speaker “recollecting” with the advantage of hindsight; to him the performance of this 
piece of music decades earlier is paradoxically haunted by the images he conjures of 
the twin towers – “haunted by twins”(BTSH, 92), “voices of falling wires. crumbol /-
ing towers long before his time here flare.  ing future”(BTSH, 92).  At its height, the 
snare-drum sounding “ashes ashes ashes” of the poem lend a eerie prophetic element 
to its images of falling towers which form a “smouldering wound” on the cityscape: 
 
the body body body bodies pour-  
ing from this dark Manhattan strom-  
boli into dim catacoombs of dis-  
 




altho we know it coming even while we count  
the deed the dead the cruel lame the gnash the cost  
the small the blind the debris falling from the air of shar  
 
& lashes lashes lashes.  such lash.  erations of the hurt  
& herd.  the blunted flash & flint of oriole  
& warp & timbrel flesh upon the manacle 
 
flesh become salt.  salt be- 
come char & ruell achar ashes ashes ashes ashes 
upn the lips upon my lids until this now curl- 
 
in cowl of howl & tears.  (BTSH 97-8) 
 
As we can see from this excerpt, Hawk is a poem that seems “possessed” by trauma; 
its language seems to flow along based on free associations based on the sounds of 
words that evoke words for other disasters – for instance, later in the poem when we 
are shifted along by “o hero scream .  Hiroshima  .  au quelle dommage / which Agent 
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Ornage kora”(BTSH, 98).  Here, the “hero scream” of the fireman in one of the towers 
sonically prompts the invocation of Hiroshima; the found phrase “au quelle dommage” 
[sic] is then linked to a deliberately misspelled Agent Orange, whose “Or-“ syllable 
flows into the kora, a West African string instrument made from a calabash which, in 
turn, brings the reader’s focus back to the musical riffs and tropes of the poem.  This 
one line, which through sonic associations links the events of September 11, 2001 
with World War II and the Vietnam War also problematically strings together the 
“hero” victim of 9/11 with two events in which the United States perpetrated massive 
human and environmental damage – the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the 
dispensing of herbicides over rural Vietnam.   
 Later in the poem, the image of “so so so so so many” people fleeing lower 
Manhattan over the Brooklyn Bridge evokes countless other disasters on which the 
speaker “looks back”: 
 
our souls sometimes far out ahead already of our surfaces 
and our life looking back 
salt.  as in Bhuj. in Grenada. Guernica.  Amritsar.  Tajikistan 
 
the suplur-stricken cities of the plains of Aetna 
the young window-widow baby-mothers of the prostitutes  . 
looking back looking back as in Bosnia.  the Sudan.  Chernobyl 
 
Oaxaca terremoto incomprehende.  al’fata el Jenin.  the Bhopal 
babies sucking toxic milk.   (BTSH, 100-1) 
 
Listed like this, natural disasters like the volcanic eruptions of Martinique’s Mount 
Pelée in 1902 and Indonesia’s Krakatoa in 1883 are undifferentiated from colonial 
violence like the Jallianwala Bagh massagre in Amritsar, which is in turn 
undifferentiated from the civil wars in Bosnia and the Sudan.  The post-apocalyptic 
volcanic landscapes of “the sulphur-stricken cities of the plains of Aetna.  Pelée.  ab 
Napoli & Krakatoa” are made equivalent to the landscapes of industrial disasters like 
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those in Chernobyl and Bhopal, and other massacres and conflicts that have 
punctuated recent history.  Significantly, the speaker’s comment, “i had not thought 
death / had undone so many”(100) produces a tone of depressive recognition; if these 
events are all brought together it is not to diminish the horror of the September 11th 
attacks by suggesting that such trauma is ordinary, but to register the overwhelming 
presence of historical trauma which is equally debilitating all over the world and 
through time. 
 This assimilation of one loss into another occurs again in the poem when 
Brathwaite transcribes and renders in verse a memorial speech given by one of the 
widows of the firemen killed in the towers’ collapse.  Out of trauma that Brathwaite 
references here, one specific voice emerges in a changed typeface – the voice of a 
woman recounting the moment she “saw the building come down” and “knew [her 
husband inside] had no chance”(104).  From a note we learn that this is “Beth Petrone 
speaking in the HBO/TV Memorial Tribute to the Heroes of 9/11 (26 May 2002) … 
for her own beautiful self . and for all the women of this poem’s world in New York 
Rwanda Kingston Iraq Afghanistan…”143  That the places listed here are not separated 
by commas indicates in the most simple way the kind of transboundary, transhistorical 
connections Brathwaite makes throughout the poem.  Significantly, Brathwaite’s 
juxtaposition of verse, prose, and the “found object” of Beth Petrone’s own speech 
pushes the limits of elegiac convention in poetry, opening up the work of 
commemoration to any and all speech that might stage the move from sorrow to 
consolation in the most provisional of ways. 
While Brathwaite’s elegiac poems continually return and reopen the wounds of 
loss, rendering them constitutive of contemporary existence, it would be problematic 
                                                
143 BTSH, 105.  The ellipses here are present in the original text, even though that is 
where the note ends. 
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to suggest that they are straightforward anti-elegies; they seem to exist in a flux of 
mourning and melancholia, wounding and healing, and suggest the inalienable 
interconnectedness of public and private.  While in their repeated return to sites of 
foundational violence and rupture they certainly steer clear of the conventional 
“compensatory” mourning that Peter Sacks locates as elegy’s prime goal, neither do 
they explicitly attack conventions of mourning.  On the contrary, the prevalence of 
possession and the performance of ritual – both in content and in the formal use of 
chant and reiteration – suggests that Brathwaite is not at all opposed to mourning 
convention as such.  At the same time, his lingering attention to the wounds of 
Caribbean history makes his work exemplary of the kind of anti-elegiac impulse I 
have described so far.  We might recall here Ramazani’s argument in Poetry of 
Mourning that modern poetry has launched an attack on the compensatory elegy, 
rejecting the possibility of achieving consolation after loss.  Modern elegy, in 
Ramazani’s view, turns on itself, combating any anachronistic consolatory gesture in 
an age where global losses seem insurmountable. Against Sacks’s understanding of 
the elegiac as consolatory and conciliatory Ramazani puts forth “the psychology of 
melancholia or melancholic mourning” and argues “that the modern elegist tends not 
to achieve but to resist consolation, not to override but to sustain anger, not to heal but 
to reopen the wounds of loss.”144  Like parallel arguments in trauma studies, the turn to 
the “melancholic mourning” of modernist “anti-elegy” privileges both the uncertainty 
of “memorable puzzlings” and a traumatized “fractured speech”145 – quasi-mimetic in 
its fragmentation and refusal of narrative closure or psychic wholeness.   
Significantly, later scholarship on the anti-elegy has focused on the way that 
                                                
144 Ramazani, Poetry of Mourning, xi.  Also See Peter Sacks, The English Elegy: 
Studies in the Genre from Spenser to Yeats.  Sacks understands the traditional elegy as 
an instance of working through. 
145 Ibid., ix. 
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the same resistance at work in the turn to melancholia might also oppose a kind of 
nationalized appropriation of loss.  Along these lines, as R. Clifton Spargo has 
suggested, “the ethical posture of anti-elegy unfolds, if only implicitly, a politics of 
mourning to be associated with the politics of dissent, as mourning refers us to a 
meaning of loss not already accommodated by the extant political order.”146  Part of 
this resistance to assimilation by the “extant political order” is drawn from the notion 
that mourning never “stops at national boundaries,”147 but cuts across them in terms of 
both genre and affect.  One aspect of elegy’s ability to “travel,” says Ramazani, is the 
fact that the study of any genre is inherently transnationally oriented: “[when] you in 
interpret a work as an elegy…you understand it differentially in relation to other 
elegies of other times and places.”148  The other part of elegy’s mobility has to do with 
the centrality of the feelings it portrays and communicates: “we recognize the affective 
universe of elegy across boundaries of place and culture: grief, love, and anger; the 
search for, and thwarting of, consolation; commemorative and anti-commemorative 
impulses.”149  While both scholars read a politics of dissent inherent in anti-elegy’s 
protest against mournful completion and compensation, Ramazani’s work on the 
modern elegy has focused more recently on the implications of “transnational” poetic 
responses to mourning, which would resist assimilation into a nationalist narrative in 
which loss is too easily appropriated for unguarded patriotism and exclusionary 
politics.  While he argues that genre is inherently prone to “travel,” Ramazani 
highlights how the modernist period in particular “witnesses the vigorous 
                                                
146 R. Clifton Spargo, “The Contemporary Anti-Elegy,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Elegy, ed. Karen Weisman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 417. 
147 Ramazani, “Afterword,” 291. 
148 Ramazani, “Nationalism, Transnationalism, and the Poetry of Mourning,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Elegy, ed. Karen Weisman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 601. 
149 Ibid., 602. 
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transnationalization of elegy as a form” which carries over to “the still more vividly 
transnational mourning”150 in contemporary postcolonial writing.  The questions he 
raises in the face of this move are especially relevant to my discussion of Brathwaite’s 
work: 
 
What is the significance of such translocational grief, of 
the construction of a transnational cultural space of 
mourning, at a time when modern nationalisms were 
ravaging the face of the earth?  If mourning is usually 
conceived as culturally delimited, what alternative 
structures of feeling emerge when grief spills across the 
boundaries of race, ethnicity, and nation?151 
 
Arguably, if the process of mourning remains incomplete and open to fluctuating 
interpretations, the loss can never become a clearly defined monument that contributes 
to fixed national identities. Accordingly, with its broad focus on a sometimes 
undifferentiated “affective universe” of grief, Brathwaite’s “transboundary” phase 
opens up questions about mourning onto Ramazani’s call to think in terms of a 
transnational poetics that would render those losses somehow impossible to complete 
and impossible for one specific group to claim. 
Here we might recall here one central argument of Eng and Kazanjian’s work 
regarding the resistance to digesting the apparent alterity of grief and traumatic 
experience.  Toward the conclusion of Born to Slow Horses, in “Mountain,” 
Brathwaite acknowledges the incompleteness of the poem (and perhaps the collection 
as a whole), highlighting “too many fault-lines marking where I sorrow / craft & 
hurting heart & diligence of art”(BTSH, 132).  His claim that “the poem ‘finish’ but 
not yet complete”(BTSH, 132) testifies to the presence of those sorrow-driven “fault-
lines” which the “diligence of art” or craft can never fully seal, registering the same 
                                                
150 Ramazani, “Afterword,” 292. 
151 Ibid. 
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reliance on incompleteness and openness to a dialogic relation to past events that Eng 
and Kazanjian locate in a melancholic stance.  In its incompletion and dissolution of 
the boundaries between specific traumas, I have asked so far whether Brathwaite’s 
poem  “situate[s] loss on a transhistorical level,”152 pitching his work into a 
generalized world of absence from which recovery is impossible, or whether it makes 
room for provisional, plausible modes of working through loss and, to borrow 
Ramazani’s phrase, whether it articulates “alternative structures of feeling.” 
 With its plethora of wounds and tears, we might also ask whether Brathwaite’s 
new poems merely enact, or act out a state of injury, or if they participate in some sort 
of compensatory process.  Crucially, we should note that this new “transboundary” 
aesthetic that Brathwaite discusses at the very end of the collection is troubled at the 
outset by the speaker’s apparent subject position in “Guanahani,” the third poem of the 
collection, set as the speaker is “flying over the Bahamas 12 Oct 1492 on AJ 016 over 
the US Easter Seaboard of Gaugin of Afghanistan 11:19am/w/the pilot beaming us the 
news that the cold front from the North we are leaving is following us South bringing 
this kind of history”(7).  Despite his lingering concern regarding what kind of history 
– here figured as a cold front – the North forces upon the global south, the speaker 
dictates from the privileged “transboundary” medium of an airplane.  Since the poem 
reads at times like a travelogue, Brathwaite’s designation of it as transboundary 
appears very much tongue-in-cheek.  While an airplane might invoke a certain ease of 
passage between the boundaries of land and sky or make minimal any intercontinental 
boundaries by shortening the time it takes to get between two points, it also 
foregrounds the boundaries between inside and outside, rich and poor, first and third 
world.  The speaker of this poem, not unlike Walcott’s narrator in The Prodigal is 
distant from the things he is observing and, alone with his thoughts, meditates on the 
                                                
152 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, p. 49 
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Now we are somewhere over Central Turkey 
thinking of the Dardanelles.  some musician 
 
whose name I can’t remember playin vibes on a 78 I have lost 
thinking of Central Asia.  Ozzajistan.  Tajikstan.  Afghanistan.  the mos  
 
beautiful cruel landscape in the world.  the most 
beautiful starving people.  the most 
 
beautiful women veiled in pale blue burkhas of dust.  the most 
bomb.  bombarded .  the most  
 
spectacular ruins . rubble like a Beethoven symphony 
stigmata 
 
the strings of their voiolence & their one multiple continua 
voices.  mantras of tabla music.  darker  
 
than the Hindu Kush more Arabian more Red Sea more African more Nile 
w/out the verdure & the fertile water 
 
and now their bearded warriors.  drugged.  handcuffed.  shaved.  blind- 
folded over the Caspian over Mt Blanc over the while cell blocks of the Alps 
 
the Atlantic where we are now flying & be landed at Guantánamo Américano of all places 
 
unplacated in cages 
their heads & faces.  their full souls & bodies.  xpose to the weather.  not 
 
even like horses or cattle w/out rights against torture 
& the soft hiss of injustice & patience & poultice 
 
(9) 
And i realize that i have been thinking of them all morning from this high 
freeling air.  watching the clouds changing shade into the fate 
of their future  . into landscape & memory 
 
into the bleak beautiful meaning of reality 
plummeting towards my own horse of ruins 
& dreams.  of how they too will be forgotten in time 
         (BTSH 10-12) 
 
Inasmuch as this poem constitutes a general meditation on time and memory, it is part 
of an elegiac tradition punctuated with the conventional elegiac markers: a permeating 
sense of loss, a speaker deep in thoughtful meditation, the ephemerality of dust, the 
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melancholic presence of ruins and rubble, the dissipation of loss into “landscape and 
memory.”  The awareness of “how they too will be forgotten in time” evokes the 
anxiety implicit the elegiac substitution of poem for lost object, a substitution that 
never fully comes to pass. 
Significantly, Brathwaite’s uncharacteristic use of capital-I in section 8, and a 
confessional “i realize” in section 9 highlights a potential tension in his transboundary 
aesthetic, or at least how it is deployed in this poem; the “i realize” and “i have been 
thinking” situate the poem as less of a boundary-crossing act and more of a series of 
thoughts which anyone can have anywhere.  We might recall Ramazani’s hesitation in 
A Transnational Poetics regarding an unguarded valorization of transnationalism; after 
all, the same critical emphasis on “dialogic energies and interstitial identities” that can 
“evoke non-coercive and nonatavistic forms of transnational imaginative belonging” 
might also function as “a synonym for neoliberal globalism or corporate jet-setting.”153  
Is the poem merely plucking at the strings of “voiolence” and giving itself over to a 
universalizing melancholia in which everything wounds and nothing heals, and in 
which everything might be a symptom of a speaker who thinks ceaselessly about the 
bleakness of “reality”?  
 Does Brathwaite’s apparent shift towards the transhistorical undermine his 
earlier dedication to a distinctly Caribbean aesthetic?  Does repetition of something 
like the Middle Passage (which makes a subtle appearance as the Atlantic in the poem 
above) as a site of wounding stand in for a broader, more transhistorical feeling of 
absence, or a universalizing condition of traumatization?  And what happens, finally, 
when every city and every name has the capacity to evoke a wound?  As Ramazani 
implies, forming the theoretical models for a transnational, unhindered mourning 
might establish new grounds for comparison in global English poetry, not to mention 
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literature and criticism in general.  But the question remains whether or not it can do 
so without effacing the specificity of individual losses.  By considering Ramazani’s 
argument about the way in which “the long-acknowledged equalizing and leveling 
force of death functions for many elegists as a useful counterforce to the differential 
impositions of the nation,”154 we can begin to see how Brathwaite’s recent work is 
refiguring the boundaries of a community, not as one situated around and determined 
by loss, but one in which national, ethnic, or religious boundaries might be permeated 
by the knowledge that loss (in varied, specific iterations) is commonly experienced.  
Accordingly, Ramazani offers a suggestive alternative to the view that Brathwaite’s 
transboundary phase – exemplified in “9/11 Hawk” – collapses the world into an abyss 
of absence from which recovery is neither possible nor desirable: 
 
Invoking Coleman Hawkins’s jazz saxophone, heard in 
London in the 1960s, as an upwelling of wordless grief, 
Brathwaite draws no lines between his grief and Beth 
Petrone’s, between black and white mourning, between 
First and Third World loss, catastrophe, and 
desolation.155 
 
While this claim does risk slipping into a valorization of an indistinct conflation of 
“First and Third World loss, catastrophe, and desolation,” I want to emphasize the 
potential of the first part of the statement – the part regarding the absence of lines 
between two mourners and two modes of mourning.  As this claim also implies, the 
boundaries that are being transgressed are the boundaries between one person’s grief 
and another’s, not the specificity of their losses, nor the boundaries between those 
catastrophes that they mourn.   
                                                
154 Ibid., 92. 
155 Ramazani, “Nationalism, Transnationalism, and the Poetry of Mourning,” 613.  
This essay in the Oxford Handbook of Elegy (2010) is an updated version of a chapter 
of the same name from Ramazani’s A Transnational Poetics.  Where there are slight 
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 In Born to Slow Horses, a deeply elegiac collection that addresses both 
personal and broad cultural losses, the poem “Kumina” stands out as an overt type of 
elegy, linked to Afro-Caribbean mourning rites by Brathwaite’s explanatory preface 
on the African-derived religion, which explains that “Kumina ceremonies are usually 
associated with wakes, entombments or memorial services but can be performed for a 
whole range of human experiences”(BTSH, 70). The poem itself staggers between 
introspected diary and apostrophe to the dead, though we have no assurance of a 
singular speaker as it switches back and forth between second and third person, and 
pronoun and proper  name.  The biographical beginning explains that the poem is “for 
DreamChad” and the death of her son, though it later switches to DreamChad’s 
narrative in a pathos-driven section that features DreamChad’s (Brathwaite’s wife) 
meditation on her husband’s reaction to his “time of salt”: “ah well…he had his 10 
years time of salt already an he went thru hell / and now he marred me the poor man 
like he have to wear my bell / he nevva ty to rush me.  dough…e mean me mean me 
well”(BTSH, 84).  At the end, the poem returns to the first speaker’s voice in its more 
detached contemplation of  “the uttar lamentation of this broken blank” and “this strip 
& vivid unconstructed verb.  constricted”(BTSH, 86).  The poem – both an account of 
the wake and the wake itself – features two speakers attempting to depict each other’s 
grief, and in this sense testifies to a site of public or comparative mourning in which 
grief is no longer “shut in” but shared.  Brathwaite’s poetics opens onto a politics in a 
sense, because he demands that we de-privatize grief in favor of establishing 
“relational ties.”    
 I borrow this expression from Judith Butler’s Precarious Life, where she 
argues that contrary to being privatizing, grief “furnishes a sense of political 
community of a complex order, and it does this first of all by bringing to the fore the 
relational ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and 
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ethical responsibility.”156  While Butler’s reference to grief and ethical responsibility 
echoes the valorization of melancholia she performs earlier, I wonder if we might 
salvage her notion of “relational ties” in a way that does not assume that those ties 
form solely out of loss, but can begin to cohere in the inauguration and performance of 
the very process of working through that loss.  I began this chapter by asking how the 
ubiquity of woundedness in Brathwaite’s recent work might help us rethink both the 
viability of an anti-historicist ethics of remembrance and the imaginative rendering of 
traumatic experience.  In the sense that he brings together different wounds and 
different mourners, the transboundary phase of his poetry potentially allows for a 
collective and communicative process of working through different historical traumas.   
In the Caribbean context Butler’s notion of “relational ties” cannot help but 
invoke Édouard Glissant’s concept of Relation as an innovative means of comparison 
for the cross cultural and the transhistorical, something which is clearly at work in 
Brathwaite’s poems.  Though he opens his Poetics of Relation with the image of the 
slave ship as a kind of originary trauma, Glissant eschews a simplistic model of 
cultural inheritance.   Taking up the concepts of errantry and exile to formulate a more 
mutable, less exclusionary theory of cultural identity, Glissant advocates the poetics of 
relation as a space in which “each and every identity is extended through a 
relationship with the Other,”157  Cultural identity in this worldview is not rooted but 
rhizomatic, “an enmeshed root system, a network spreading either in the ground or in 
the air, with no predatory rootstock taking over permanently.”158   
By exchanging a narrow concept of rootedness for a rhizomatic model of 
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relational distinctions, we can rethink conventional oppositions between mourning and 
melancholia, and reposition foundational myths.  Here we might recall Eng and 
Kazanjian’s claim that in mourning the past is declared “resolved, finished, and dead” 
but in melancholia “the past is neither fixed nor complete” and allows us to have an 
“ongoing relationship with the [it].”159  Historicism, according to Eng and Kazanjian, 
tries to locate the “root causes” of sadness and only results in hopelessly fixing the 
past.  But we might address the possibility of exchanging ideas of rootedness for 
notions of the rhizomatic. Indeed, the ambivalence of “root causes” in both Brathwaite 
and Walcott forces us to question whether the Middle Passage functions as a root or a 
rhizome.  As I suggested earlier, Brathwaite’s Born to Slow Horses depicts a more 
fluid network of cultural influences and renders productive and endless dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting; in testifying to the “forgetting/the-beginning-the-
forgetting-and-the-always-always-remembering”(BTSH, 135) it instead relies on the 
mutability of a poetics of relation, implicitly questioning earlier theories of cross-
cultural interaction, especially those concerned with potential for homogenization of 
the world.   
While Glissant’s concept of Relation helps problematize the originary thinking 
associated with a melancholic agency, I want to focus instead on another potential 
aspect of Brathwaite’s “relational ties,” that is, the way that the performative element 
of his elegies also enable a shared process of mourning loss.  Brathwaite’s fragmented, 
typographically diverse “video style” of writing visually accounts for the sonic 
variations of his phrasing, lending to the written text a lively sense of dialogic 
performance.  Furthermore, as one reviewer of the collection points out, “[m]any 
sections of the book require reading aloud.  In some cases, vocalization of the 
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vernacular is necessary for comprehension.”160  For example, the multiple typefaces 
and voices in “Kumina,” a poem which iterates the very act of lamentation it portrays, 
extend to involve the reader who must, because of the way the words are often spelled 
phonetically, actually vocalize those words while reading them.  In a way, the reader 
who reiterates the work of mourning participates momentarily in the process of 
grieving and the articulation of lament.  Since it takes place in a context where the 
reader is always conscious that he or she is vocalizing another’s words and wounds, 
however, this temporary participation in an act of mourning does not lead to an 
unguarded identification in which self is conflated with other and witness confused 
with victim.161  As a result, this type of performance and engagement might provide a 
way of relating to loss that preserves the specificity of individual experience while still 
providing a communal stage for vocalizing it. 
The discussion of performance would be incomplete without a reference to the 
way Brathwaite’s “9/11 Hawk,” an exemplary model of his transboundary phase, is 
organized around a jazz performance.  In all of Brathwaite’s work, in fact, it is 
important to consider how the resurgence of the wounds of history is often intertwined 
with the repeated phrasing of a jazz performance as we saw in the poem, “Word 
Making Man” from Middle Passages.  Crucially, the performance in “9/11 Hawk,” 
rather than enacting the loss or acting it out in isolation, is central to the process of 
communicating traumatic experience and thus working through it in unexpected ways.  
In his essay on “Brathwaite and Jazz,” Louis James outlines several important 
elements of jazz that are relevant to the way the poem gestures toward the shared 
performance of mourning rites I am discussing here.  Jazz is “dependant on 
performance” and “continually creative;” as James explains, “it is not the score that 
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creates the jazz experience, but the actual moment of playing,”162 evoking a kind of 
immediate present-oriented sensibility.  Also suggestive is the way that jazz 
“improvisation operates both individually and within the ensemble”163 and therefore 
works as a metaphor for the specific, separate kinds of creative work done by different 
performers in the group.  Finally, referring in particular to Brathwaite’s performances 
of his own work in which he “characteristically goes beyond the conventional ‘oral’ 
verse in evoking a ritual enactment,” James highlights how “jazz grows out of the ‘jam 
session’, where the musicians interact with the audience, building up to a climax of 
shared emotion.”164  This shared emotion registers the shared language of a mutable 
community engaged in a continuous, improvised process of representing the wounds 
of history, a process that has been central to my argument about rethinking a model of 
valorizing a melancholic attachment to the past in which mourning is deemed as 
cutting oneself off from history.   
 In The Hybrid Muse, Ramazani addresses certain critics of Walcott who 
suggest that the omnipresent wound is too open, and therefore too universally 
applicable.  In response to this Ramazani suggests the following:  “To write about pain 
and mortality as transcultural experiences may seem to risk an easy humanism or 
discredited universalism.  Walcott keeps this tendency in check by reserving for the 
wound an interpretive opacity.”165  If we take into account the dominant tendency to 
read Brathwaite as Barbadian poet, a Caliban figure, politically engaged Caribbeanist, 
perhaps the interpretive opacity we encounter in his work – in both its seemingly 
incommensurable subject matter and highly original form – might tune us into new 
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modes of reading.  While Brathwaite’s turn to the transhistorical risks conflating 
absence and loss, it also permits the poet to resist the essentializing identity politics 
that motivates a model of “competitive memory.”  While I do not wish to fall into the 
same melancholic valorization with which I take issue in this dissertation, I want to 
suggest that Brathwaite’s recent treatment of transhistorical trauma engenders a new 
potentiality for the study of postcolonial poetry.  Resisting the kind of dubious identity 
politics which, in LaCapra’s words, “[repeats] and further [legitimates] or [acts] out 
the subject positions with which one begins without subjecting them to critical testing 
that may either change or in certain ways validate them,”166 Brathwaite’s cross section 
of different wounds aren’t readily reducible to a symptom of Caribbeanness or 
postcolonial oppression.   
 Inasmuch as Brathwaite’s poems register the paradoxes and inherent problems 
in any consideration of melancholia and loss, they reveal the flaws in any theoretical 
model which advocates a simple solution like rendering the pathological productive.  
While the current popular reasons for valorizing a melancholic attachment to the past 
– community, creativity, ethics – are somewhat appealing, they are undermined by the 
kinds of pitfalls LaCapra has outlined, in particular the conflation of absence and loss.  
Brathwaite, however, recognizes and reconfigures what’s at stake in this perceived 
distinction, providing us with a more fluid non-boundary between the “m/we”, the 
distinction between the individual and the collective, the specific and the 
transhistorical.   
 As Ramazani and others have shown, the suppurating wounds of postcolonial 
poetry are integrally linked to the “open wound” of modern elegy itself; or, rather to 
the way in which modern elegy openly foregrounds its woundedness.  If Brathwaite 
enacts a distinctly melancholic poetics, he does not do so in order to react against the 
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conventional notion of compensatory mourning but to enable a different kind of elegy 
– one which concerns not just the individual mourner but the world collective.  The 
most important socio-political import of these poems, therefore, is that they force us to 
rethink the analytical distinction between individual and collective, psychic and social.  
To a certain extent, they might also allow us to rethink the elegizing of the global and 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MOURNING AS IMPROVISATION IN ZAKES MDA’S WAYS OF DYING 
 
 
 In the preceding chapters I have focused on two writers whose work deals with 
a long history of trauma in the Caribbean.  The memories that their poetry invokes – 
the decimation of the indigenous populations, the trauma of the Middle Passage, and 
the experience of plantation slavery – are arguably part of a collective historical 
memory in the Caribbean, but present only inasmuch as their aftershocks are palpable 
in today’s economic, socio-political, and creative practice.  Because they are events 
which have no living survivors, the discussion of how to properly “mourn” them is 
restricted to a discussion of how to negotiate their legacy in contemporary culture.  
While both Walcott and Brathwaite testify to a centuries-long, intergenerational 
cultural memory that ebbs and flows from the past into the present, they are what we 
might call secondary witnesses to most of the violence of the region’s history, 
particularly the ostensibly foundational trauma of the Middle Passage which figures so 
prominently in their work.  In the next two chapters, I turn to a historical context that 
has formed an important legacy in a region’s collective memory, but which differs 
from the Caribbean context because it marks a series of events to which living 
survivors are continuing to testify today.  Obviously, South Africa’s long history of 
colonialism created the conditions under which apartheid came into being; the history 
of early colonial racism and dispossession is the very root of the legally enforced 
racial segregation of 1948 to 1994.  But by looking at apartheid as South Africa’s 
foundational cultural trauma of recent history (as opposed to, say, the earlier colonial 
history which eventually created the conditions under which apartheid was instated), 
we can address pertinent questions about the role of collective mourning with regard 
to contemporary events that are still being worked through in living memory.   
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The South African context provides such a rich ground for exploring these 
questions because of the way that the perceived ethical potential of resistant mourning 
is opposed to a nationally pragmatic need to assuage the wounds of the past.  Part of 
my interest in South Africa is the way in which the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) initiated a state-managed mourning process which contemporary 
literature has attempted to address alongside its own unrelenting attention to the 
traumatic past.  But the commission is especially relevant because its model of social 
healing is based on the same stereotypical model of closure opposed by the 
scholarship I have been discussing.  In one of the most overt examples, Desmond Tutu 
invokes a powerful trope of the return of the repressed in his Chairperson’s Forward to 
the report, describing how “the past refuses to lie down quietly.  It has an uncanny 
habit of returning to haunt one.”167  Because of the threat that the unresolved past 
poses to the present and future, Tutu puts forth a model of healing based on 
administered relief – an opening and cleansing of the wound so it might then close: 
 
However painful the experience, the wounds of the past 
must not be allowed to fester. They must be opened. 
They must be cleansed. And balm must be poured on 
them so they can heal. This is not to be obsessed with 
the past. It is to take care that the past is properly dealt 
with for the sake of the future.168  
 
The act of returning to and reopening the wound here is based on something like the 
remembering-to-forget model rigorously disputed by those who advocate an ethics of 
melancholia – an approach to the past that would keep the wound open, ostensibly 
countering the possibility of “political and ethical misappropriations of loss.”169 
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Central to the valorization of melancholia in recent theory is a concern with the 
potential codification of traumatic memory.  Critics like Eng and Kazanjian claim that 
an endlessly melancholic response to loss contravenes a fixed historicist understanding 
of the past, leading to a continuously revisable understanding of past events and their 
relationship to present ones.  As I have discussed in previous chapters, scholars who 
valorize a melancholic attachment to the past repudiate a stereotypical idea of 
mourning-as-closure as a totalizing overcoming of history, suggesting instead that the 
“sustained” melancholic attention to loss engenders continually new understandings in 
the world of the present.  These continually (re)produced understandings make it 
difficult for the state, the archive, or any other regulative body to resolutely pin down 
the nature of that loss.  In this particular sense, the urgency of rendering loss 
ungraspable has to do with assumption that mourning codifies and fixes the past, 
creating unchangeable collective narratives that are either inauthentic, or belies the 
acts of resistant mourners for whom those events register different meanings.   
In the case of the South African TRC, this resistance to closure is further 
motivated by an intense suspicion of “political motivations to forget the past.”170  
Accordingly, contemporary literature and criticism recognizes a tension between the 
need to definitively mark the arrival of a new social and political regime – one which 
needed to emphasize that the atrocities of the past regime were definitively over – and 
the need to memorialize that traumatic past in a way that prevents its easy assimilation 
into a triumphant national narrative.  This desire to resist assimilation is based on a 
more sinister understanding of the healing process as less concerned with the 
psychological welfare of individual victims than it is with the economic future of the 
country.  So, as Shane Graham suggests, by “appropriating the stories of trauma and 
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loss in the service of a nation-building agenda aimed at reassuring international 
investors, the TRC threatens to consign those memories to the ‘archive’ of a safely 
contained history.”171   
While it is predominantly focused on national appropriations of apartheid 
memory (as opposed to a general sense of mourning as a foreclosure of the past), 
Graham’s analysis of the potential “petrification of memory”172 in certain memorial 
efforts neatly coincides with the critique of mourning I have so far outlined.  Eng and 
Kazanjian’s sense that mourning fixes the past is echoed in Graham’s analysis of 
monuments and museum spaces in South Africa which risk rendering the memory in 
such a way as to make it forgettable.  For Graham, the advertising campaign for the 
Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg exemplifies this petrification with its suggestion 
that “Apartheid is where it belongs - in a museum.”  He argues that 
 
while condemning apartheid, the slogan also implies that 
it is safely tucked away in the confines of a museum and 
can thus be largely forgotten in day-to-day life.  In this 
sense, the museum and the archive - and, perhaps, the 
Truth Commission - are sites of relegation and 
consignment: official remembrances that enable a 
general forgetting”173 
 
In this formulation, the paradox of this forgetfulness is that it takes place through the 
very process of remembering; “ostensibly a mechanism for registering and preserving 
a record of the past, the Commission might instead serve as a mechanism for 
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obscuring and forgetting it.”174  Against this model of a memory that declares these 
events safely condemned and confined to the past, Graham advocates a rejection of 
monumentalism in favor of a palimpsestic arrangement of contemporary memorial 
sites and objects, where the past is visible just below the writing of the present.  Post-
apartheid literature performs exactly this type of memory work, according to Graham, 
“[exploring] the psychological challenges of trying to memorialize and preserve the 
traumatic past without freezing it into ossified formulae that may be easily forgotten 
precisely because they become so familiar.”175  While in this instance, the preservation 
of the past renders it into something “familiar,” either desensitizing its audience, or 
rendering the event unexceptional, Ingrid de Kok has identified two other important 
senses in which this potential for amnesia might be manifest:  one involves a 
repression of the apartheid past in the agreement to “forgive and forget;” the other 
involves a model of remembering for the sake of catharsis, after which “some version 
of ‘reliving’…will purge the perpetrators and restore the dignity of the victims.”176  
While this kind of critique is no doubt important for countering the possibility that 
individual stories will be translated into nationalist myths, or repudiating the very idea 
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that one story might somehow account for the heterogeneity of different experiences 
and communities, the problem with obsessing over the potential for fixity and 
stereotypical closure is that the alternative becomes an equally problematic radical 
open-endedness.  In other words, when the concern over the ossification of memory 
becomes paralyzing, it arguably leads to an unguarded valorization of melancholia in 
the name of a somehow unossifying remembrance.   
 Zakes Mda has approached this problem in his fictional and critical writing 
from a slightly different position, articulating the way in which the nation-building 
agenda of closure has similar manifestations in the publishing world.  The continued 
need to testify to the events that took place during apartheid is thwarted by an anxiety 
about the potential “trauma fatigue” produced by excessive public attention.  
Commenting on the recent lack of newly published fiction "that narrates reconciliation 
in general and that draws its inspiration from the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in particular,”177 Mda suggests that "[p]ublishers wrongly believe 
that stories about apartheid don't sell; people don't want to read about the past.  This is 
part of the collective amnesia that is demanded of South Africans in all areas of South 
African life.”178  His appropriation of the term “collective amnesia” highlights the 
ways in which the nationally prescribed work of collective mourning can 
paradoxically fail to work through loss precisely by subscribing to a model of 
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complete closure; people do not want to read about the past because it has been 
declared over and done with.  Repudiating the closure-based model of remembering-
to-forget, Mda argues elsewhere that South Africans living in the post-apartheid 
aftermath “must never forget,” but, crucially, must also resist the urge to slip into 
melancholic acting out.  For Mda, the decision to never forget “does not mean that we 
must cling to the past, and wrap it around us, and live for it, and be perpetual victims 
wallowing in masochistic memory of our national humiliation.  We only look back to 
the past in order to have a better understanding of our present.”179 
It is with this theoretical discussion in mind that I focus on Mda’s novel, Ways 
of Dying (1995), situating it against the proliferation of theoretical arguments that 
suggest that a continual, melancholic preoccupation with the past might lead to a 
continually revisable understanding of history in a way that resists hegemony in 
various guises.  Fundamentally, Mda’s novel problematizes this idea of superficial 
closure while at the same time showing the darker undercurrents of valorizing a 
refusal or inability to mourn.  Though it was published in the same year in which the 
TRC was set up, and thus before the main public broadcasting of the hearings, the 
novel raises pertinent questions about the ways in which catastrophic loss might be 
mourned by portraying a world where all known modes of mourning have been 
exhausted and the unresolved losses of the past beget more losses.  Where the 
prevalence of death renders the living world absurd, Mda’s characters exist in 
prolonged states of numbness. 
By focusing on the ways in which the shattered, traumatized community of 
Mda’s novel is plagued by the loss that would ostensibly unite it, this chapter 
addresses the question of mourning rites with regard to collective remembrance.  One 
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question that remains to be addressed is the role of funerary rites in contemporary 
mourning practice, something that is a culturally specific matter but has nonetheless 
been figured in universal terms.  Ramazani’s claim that modern mourning is 
characterized by the “abbreviation, objectification, and bureaucratic regulation of 
mortuary rites,”180 grounded in the large-scale violence of twentieth century war, 
genocide, and other instances of mass death, represents a common attitude about the 
perceived inadequacy of modern mourning rituals.  Coupled with the exhaustion of 
rites is the sense that death itself has been stripped of meaning; as Peter Sacks 
explains, “sociologists and psychologists, as well as literary and cultural historians, 
consistently demonstrate the ways in which death has tended to become obscene, 
meaningless, impersonal.”181  The threat of ossification, forgetting, and complete 
closure has prompted the anti-elegiac turn that critics like Ramazani have located the 
modernist writing of Eliot, Stevens, and Langston Hughes, among others, a trend 
which forms a part of the broad tendency to valorize melancholia across trauma 
studies and cultural studies. 
The fundamental problem with these accounts is the way that they unwittingly 
assume the existence of some lost plentitude of mourning, a time where mourning 
succeeded in a way that is now nonviable due to some definitive break that occurs as a 
result of the particular atrociousness or irreconcilability of modern death.  The claim 
that only in recent history have mourners been faced with a certain deficiency of all 
established rites and conventional responses to death presupposes some break that 
occurs in the early twentieth century and, most importantly, opposes modern 
“impossible” mourning with a pre-modern instance in which now inadequate modes of 
mourning worked.  In this way, the turn to the anti-elegiac as an attack on the now 
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exhausted, unworkable modes of mourning conceals an implied desire for this 
impossible time of mourning’s perceived success.  Furthermore, the accompanying 
tendency to derive a strict opposition between mourning-as-closure and melancholia-
as-openness problematically assumes that mourning ever accomplishes something like 
the impossible “closure” for which current practices are implicitly nostalgic. 
Rather than fruitlessly yearning for the possibility of recuperating rites that 
once worked – rites which never actually “worked” in the stereotypical idealization 
that anti-elegy bestows upon mourning – new responses to loss must instead attempt 
to articulate innovative modes of mourning that challenge this problematic opposition.  
Mda’s novel is relevant to this task because it proposes an alternative model of 
responding to traumatic experience – improvisation.  These improvised rites 
suggestively highlight the possibility of creating new modes of grief work rather than 
attempting to recuperate ones that are ostensibly lost.  Most importantly, perhaps, they 
gesture toward a theory of mourning as a process related to collective models in the 
sense that something is communicated to another, but not through a privileging of the 
wound’s autonomy to “speak” to witnesses who refuse to foreclose its otherness 
through mourning.  Bringing critical attention back to rites is important for a critique 
of the turn to melancholia because it emphasizes something very specific that even the 
stereotypical concept of mourning can offer that melancholia can not.  The refusal to 
mourn, after all, leaves no provision for mourning rites.  While one might perversely 
understand melancholic acting out as a kind of ritual, or never-ending rite for the dead, 
its involuntary nature makes it incompatible with notions of rites that are consciously 
enacted as response to loss.  It is through an analysis of the improvised performance of 
rites in Mda’s novel that I want to emphasize again the importance of articulating loss 
in a controlled space so that it might be communicated to others in a way that is not 
entirely about acting out and, instead, allow for a more provisional process of working 
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through. 
At the same time, I am interested in the way in which Mda has chosen to 
articulate these improvised mourning rites, which emerge not in a theatrical 
performance or a dialogue, but in the controlled space of a (magical) realist novel.  
With all of its magical elements, Ways of Dying follows a conventional plot in which 
two dispossessed characters living in isolation meet after some time and, together, 
proceed through an ostensible resolution of their past problems.  However, as I will 
argue, the novel ultimately fails to fully offer this resolution, calling into question the 
possibilities for complete closure, both in terms of grief and the novel’s own formal 
strategies.  One central question I will attempt to answer is how the problem of 
articulating trauma is raised by Mda’s choice of novelistic form.  How does a novel 
that is, in a sense, about the performance of grief-work, articulate the pain of the 
experiences it describes?  The centrality of funerary ritual to the 1995 novel has 
already been linked to Mda’s earlier work in theater.182  Reading Mda’s first novel as 
related to his theatre for development allows us to trace an important “shift from a 
dominant, binary discourse determined by apartheid to a much more problematical 
                                                
182 See David Bell and J. U. Jacobs, “Zakes Mda: Ways of Writing” in Ways of 
Writing: Critical Essays on Zakes Mda, ed. David Bell and J.U. Jacobs (Scottsville: 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), 4. Bell and Jacobs have noted that much of 
Mda’s prose fiction dramatizes moments of performance and therefore draws on his 
experience as a playwright.  Also see David Bell, “A Theatre for Democracy,” in the 
same collection.  Bell classifies Mda’s work according to three major phases: “from a 
theatre of protest via a theatre of resistance to a theatre of reconciliation”(21).  
According to Bell, the theatre of protest (the dramatic mode that characterized much 
of the 1960s) was “based on western models” and “designed to appeal to the 
consciences of the oppressor”(22).   The theatre of resistance, which coincided with 
Black Consciousness in the 1970s, was geared toward mobilizing black South 
Africans to protest apartheid rule.  Finally, the theatre for reconciliation is “once 
again, it is a theatre of Western modes with priorities chosen by the elite”(22).  Mda 
has also described a post-apartheid phase as the “theatre for development,” a “theatre 
of the many”(22) similarly aimed at reconciliation, but using “indigenous modes of 
performance”(23). 
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discourse that concerns itself with the uncertain interactions of history and memory, 
and with present and future aspirations.”183  Accordingly, it also prompts the question, 
how do modes of articulation standard in theater emerge in new ways in his prose 
fiction? 
Set in an unspecified time and place (with obvious parallels to South Africa 
during the final stages of Apartheid), Ways of Dying follows Toloki, a self-appointed 
Professional Mourner, as he navigates his way throughout the impoverished settlement 
communities of an unnamed city.  Narrated in part by an individual and in part by a 
collective narrator, the novel constantly sways back and forth between flashbacks to 
the protagonist’s youth and a brief, violence-laden present-day period between 
Christmas and New Year in which Noria, a childhood acquaintance from Toloki’s 
village, is coming to terms with the recent death of her five-year-old son, whose 
funeral opens the novel.  When Toloki and Noria finally meet again, they take turns 
exchanging stories about the horrific events in their lives which led up to the present 
day, which include accounts of unimaginable violence and personal loss, the climax of 
which describes Noria’s son’s murder at the hands of other young children who are 
imitating a “necklacing” – a common act of retribution against political informants in 
which the victim is restrained with a gasoline-filled tire and burned alive.  As the 
narrative progresses, Noria begins to bring the outcast Toloki into the community 
while Toloki introduces her to his mourning practices and, as Noria believes, 
ultimately teaches her “how to live” in a narrative world where life and death are 
conflated, where, as Noria explains to Toloki, “Our ways of dying are our ways of 
living.  Or… our ways of living are our ways of dying.”184  Where the unending 
presence of death infiltrates and contaminates the world of the living, the novel’s 
                                                
183 David Bell, “A Theatre for Democracy,” in Ways of Writing, 15-6. 
184 Zakes Mda, Ways of Dying (New York: Picador, 1995), 98. Hereafter referred to in 
text. 
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characters are caught in a grief-stricken state where funerals seem to produce more 
funerals, and the conventional modes of mourning have been disassembled within the 
same community that would otherwise enact them.  Potentially a model of Butler’s 
quasi-utopian community united by a foundational traumatic history, the novel’s 
characters are so haunted, dejected, and overcome by loss that all actions seem only to 
perpetuate cycles of violence.  Toloki’s task, then, is to attempt to articulate rites of 
mourning in a world where all modes of coping with loss have been cut off. 
Toloki is a liminal figure situated on the cusp of comedy and horror, 
ridiculousness and profundity, life and death.  Described as “something that has come 
to fetch us to the next world”(72), he embodies a quasi-ghostly existence: as a 
homeless man he fails to exist for the “beautiful” inhabitants of a the city, some of 
whom were once Toloki’s “homeboys and homegirls” from the village but have now 
become part of a national bourgeoisie, as Toloki’s friend Nefolovhodwe has by 
manufacturing coffins for the novel’s countless victims of violence.  Though he first 
envisions his profession merely as a mode of material gain – a way to “profit from 
death like his homeboy Nefolovhodwe” – Toloki comes to view mourning the dead as 
“a spiritual vocation”(134).  Desperate to formulate rituals which would legitimate 
him and cultivate his “aura of austerity”(15), he models himself on a vague 
understanding of “Eastern religions” he hears about from sailors.  He invents rituals to 
cement his self-perception as a meditative figure – for instance, he concocts a bitter 
mixture of old cake and green onions, explaining to Noria, “I had to invent a diet of 
my own that would mark me as an austere and ascetic votary of my own order of 
Professional Mourners”(114).  His improvisational mourning consists of creating new 
wailing sounds which he thinks are apt for certain ways of dying:  “At the cemetery 
Toloki sits on one of the five mounds, and groans, and wails and produces other new 
sounds that he has recently invented especially for mass funerals with political 
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overtones”(109). 
In this way, Toloki cultivates a reverence for death which he sees as lacking 
from current funerary rites.  The settlement community of the novel, which would 
ostensibly function as the main collective body offering consolation to its grieving 
individuals, is depicted from the beginning as divided from within, particularly 
regarding the treatment of the dead.  The opening funeral especially testifies to a sense 
of discontinuity between the community of mourners who are portrayed as a “feuding 
crowd”(9) that turns the funerary ceremony into chaos.  As the Nurse – the funeral 
orator – attempts to state the true story of the child’s death, the community suppresses 
it.  One gets the sense that there are certain customs to be followed, but those customs 
are quickly dismantled by the crowd, which hopes to cover up “the sorry fact that 
[Noria’s] son was killed by his own people”(9).  The eulogy is rendered inaudible 
because some of the crowd is “heckling the Nurse” – an act which Toloki thinks “is a 
sacrilege that has never been heard of before”(8) – while others, opposed to the 
suppression of the story, are “hecking the hecklers”(8).  The sacrilege here occurs 
against a well-known history of politicized funerals which took place during the final 
years of apartheid when other forms of public meetings were forbidden by the 
government.  Margaret Mervis, writing on Mda’s novel, relates how “[they] took the 
form of spectacles with rousing speeches by political leaders alternating with hymns 
and freedom songs and were attended by thousands of people, some of whom were 
bussed in from outside the community.”185  But as portrayed here, the sense of 
organized ritual has been traded for in-fighting and repression: 
 
The Nurse cannot go on to tell us the story of the death 
of the deceased, this our little brother.  The din is too 
                                                
185 Margaret Mervis, “Fiction for Development: Zakes Mda’s Ways of Dying,” Current 
Writing 10.1 (1998): 44. 
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loud.  The church minister says a quick prayer.  Spades 
and shovels eat into the mound of earth next to the 
grave, and soon the hole that will be the resting place of 
this our little brother forever more amen is filled up. (9)   
 
This rushed burial is followed by a procession back to the settlement where, 
aside from brief mention of the ritual of hand-washing and feasting on food the 
community prepared, the rites are similarly attenuated and the bereaved Noria is 
further isolated, even as she is “surrounded by women who try to comfort her”(8).  
The other members of the community refuse to let Toloki talk to Noria in an 
ostensibly protective gesture that seems to insinuate the presence of a community-
based support system whose members “are determined to protect her from all those 
who want to harass her with questions about the death of her son”(9). But the image of 
the protective community, “vigilant” in its care for the grieving mother gives way in 
the end to a dysfunctional image of a community attempting to stifle the truth about 
her son’s death for fear that it “would give ammunition to the enemy”(178).  Finally, 
the funeral is further debased by a clash between the residents of the settlement (or 
squatter camp, as Toloki first calls it before Noria corrects him) and the middle class 
citizens of the nearby city.  When the funeral procession collides with a wedding 
party, the latter refuses to give way.  Far from being a social equalizer, death here is 
unrecognizable to the other party, whose unsympathetic participants “[enjoy] the 
stalemate” while “they sing at the top of their voices”(10).   
 In his imperfect mimicry of “eastern rituals,” and improvisation of “pure 
sound” which never affects him, Toloki aims to create a space of total transcendence 
amid immanent political atrocity.  That the novel never identifies its exact location or 
time-frame pivots it into a generalized conflict zone where instances of apocalyptic 
violence are unremarkable,186 and where stories of excessive violence defer the actual 
                                                
186 Readers of the novel have pointed out the obvious parallels between the events 
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narrativization of the child’s death – the story the Nurse was prohibited from 
vocalizing – to the novel’s concluding pages.  Throughout the novel, there is the sense 
that the members of the settlement community have been pushed into total abjection: 
 
All these people are casualties of the war that is raging 
in the land… They silently curse the war-lords, the 
police and the army, or even the various political 
organizations, depending on whom they view as 
responsible for their fate.  The smell of infection and 
methylated spirits chokes them, and leaves much of their 
anger unarticulated. (140) 
 
The sense of unarticulated anger that “chokes” them never translates into the political 
potentiality that recent criticism has attributed to unresolved grief.  In response to 
these atrocities, Toloki’s response to loss represents a turn to pure expression that 
might in turn invoke an expression of grief in others.  For Toloki, who is put off by the 
mixture of politics and mourning, “the work of the Professional Mourner was to 
mourn, and not to intervene in any of the proceedings of the funeral.  It would lower 
the dignity of the profession to be involved in human quarrels”(24).  Toloki’s 
eschewal of politics, his complaint that “this politicking was interfering with [his] 
inspired mourning”(23) is for Grant Farred a symptom of the novel’s surrender, in 
which “the self-styled artist can be blithely oblivious to or retreat from politics even 
when he is in its midst.”187  Farred claims the novel, which really makes no 
                                                                                                                                       
depicted in the novel and those during the early 1990s in South Africa.  In particular, 
the novel’s quasi-mythic “tribal chief” is a well-known allegorical rendering of real-
life leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Mangosuthu Buthelezi.  David Bell explains 
that the novel is specifically “based on reports of violence Mda found in South African 
newspapers available at Yale University – the City Press and The Sunday Times – in 
the first few months of 1993 and supplemented by other first-hand accounts.”  See 
David Bell, “The Teller of Tales: Zakes Mda and the Storifying of Post-Apartheid 
South Africa”, lwu: Literatur in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 39.2/3 (2006): 161. 
187 Grant Farred, “Mourning the Postapartheid State Already? The Poetics of Loss in 
Zakes Mda’s Ways of Dying,” Modern Fiction Studies 46.2 (Spring 2000): 195. 
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differentiation between the crimes of Apartheid and the internecine violence in victim 
communities, implies that “the postapartheid moment…signals the end of a need for a 
radical politics.”188   I would argue in response to this claim that the novel doesn’t 
enact a simple repudiation of politics (radical, or otherwise) in favor of totally 
aestheticized approach, but a resistance to a politically-motivated or politically 
appropriated mourning –  mourning which prescribes, or has a political agenda.189  
Ultimately, I suggest that the novel neither simply embodies Farred’s political 
dismissal, nor what Barnard describes as a  “post-anti-Apartheid” “turn to gaity and 
laughter,”190 both of which understand the ending as a projection about the “new” 
South Africa (the latter more optimistically).  In the novel’s final pages, Noria and 
Toloki enter into a “creative partnership”(201) after an old acquaintance from the city 
who is being haunted by the ghost of Toloki’s emotionally abusive father, gives to 
Toloki countless boxes of his father’s hand-made iron figurines – figures which haunt 
Toloki in his dreams – but not before showing them to an art dealer who declares them 
                                                
188 Ibid.  Farred’s claim is historically relevant given the thematic shifts Mda himself 
locates in his earlier and later plays.  Also worth mentioning is Bell’s and Jacob’s 
suggestion that Mda’s turn to prose fiction was enabled precisely by the end of 
apartheid, after which he was “[no] longer under pressure to produce theatre to 
mobilise against an oppressive regime” and “found the time to work on long pieces of 
prose and moved from being a political playwright to a critical novelist”(Bell and 
Jacobs, 4).  However, while Bell and Jacobs clearly reiterate the idea that the need for 
radical politics in art was less pressing after the end of apartheid, I do not agree that 
Mda’s novel rejects political engagement.  Even if one agrees that Toloki’s ostensible 
turn to empty aesthetics takes place, one must remember that the narrative is not 
always sympathetic to Toloki’s endeavors and often undermines his seriousness. 
189 Sam Durrant, “The Invention of Mourning in Post-Apartheid Literature,” Third 
World Quarterly 2.3 (2005): 441-450.  Durrant has similarly criticized Farred along 
these lines for failing to note that “it is precisely the politicisation of funerals during 
apartheid that creates the need for a non-instrumental mode of post-apartheid 
mourning”(443).  He also suggests that Toloki’s “improvisations are designed to 
recover a space for grieving that has too often been usurped by political exigencies, 
violent protests and yet more death.” 
190 Rita Barnard, “On Laughter, the Grotesque, and the South African Transition: 
Zakes Mda’s Ways of Dying,” Novel 37.3 (Summer 2004): 280. 
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valuable commodities because they “[look] quite kitschy,” and “kitsch [is] the “in” 
thing for collectors with taste this season”(209).  Neither critic takes into account the 
ironic undercurrent of the novel’s ending, which most readers of the text seem to take 
at face value as the optimistic look to the future, if not the initiation of restored 
humanity.191  For instance, Margarent Mervis suggests that “[the] figurines are a 
metaphor for the reconciliation between father and son, and for the inclusion of what 
is usable from the past in the creative reconstruction of the present and the rebuilding 
of the future.”192  Sten Moslund similarly reads the ending as having “promise of 
restored placidity, symbolised in the township children’s laughter, by cultivating a 
                                                
191 In their analysis of funeral rites and community memory in Ways of Dying, Rogier 
Courau and Sally-Ann Murphy adopt this optimistic position, suggesting that the 
funerals become “ritual enactments of the memory and loss of relatives, a source of 
continuity and a form of relation for the larger black urban community”(91).  While 
their interest in the way that the process of mourning might become the very basis for 
relational ties between the community overlaps with mine, I think their reading 
simplifies the complicated nature of the novel’s settlement community, which never 
fully integrates or accepts Toloki.  More importantly, their reading seems to 
misinterpret the effects of Toloki’s improvised rites which, the narrative tells us, are 
really more about Toloki than the deceased (Toloki explains again and again that he 
feels a physical need to mourn which transcends his interest or engagements in any 
particular funeral).  In line with this, the following claim seems completely to miss 
this ambivalence: “In Toloki’s publicly claiming and affirming the substance of an 
individual’s life, the reader is given access to a form of composite discourse.  It is 
confessional in expressing the feelings of those who are attending the event, be they 
shared or individually felt, about the deceased, but is also faithful to the memory of the 
individual who is being memorialised”(106).  Because Toloki is often more or less 
unfamiliar with the deceased, one can only assume that Courau and Murphy refer here 
to the ways in which his hollowed-out, nonspecific wailing might form a space for the 
“composite discourse” of the funeral’s other mourners who are otherwise at a loss for 
a reaction.  But the sense that Toloki might, in a direct way, be faithful to the memory 
of the individual misunderstands or erases his general dissociation from the 
community.  See Rogier Courau and Sally-Ann Murphy, “Of Funeral Rites and 
Community Memory: Ways of Living in Ways of Dying” in Ways of Writing: Critical 
Essays on Zakes Mda, ed. David Bell and J.U. Jacobs (Scottsville: University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009): 91-114. 
192 Mervis, 45. 
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creative link between the traditions of the past and the present.”193  These and other 
interpretations affirm what Barnard calls “the generative power of African popular 
creativity”194 or the “healing power of art.”195  Some discuss how the main characters 
“manage to humanise the most inhuman conditions”196 and privilege Toloki’s entrance 
into political consciousness.  Others read the return of the figurines as a return to 
traditional, or a repudiation of the city in favor of rural life and customs, or generally 
understand the ending as participating in “a vision which reconciles enmity and heals 
psychic wounds, thus liberating the protagonists from the past and opening up a new 
future.”197 
However, taking into account the novel’s moments of biting self-reflexivity 
where it identifies even instances of laughter as manifestations of grief (such as the 
narrative comment about the New Years’ revelers, that “their jubilation belies the 
sadness of their message”(170)), one might be more inclined to read it as the ultimate 
self-consciously manufactured – even gimmicky – finale.  Take for instance the fact 
that as a child, Toloki is unable to draw pictures of human figures, but in the final 
pages of the book, after Noria has, in a sense, “restored humanity,” he is suddenly 
“possessed by this new ability to create human figures”(199).  Or the final lines: 
 
We look at the mountain of boxes that dwarfs the shack.  
We do not touch. We just look and marvel. Our children 
                                                
193 Sten Pultz Moslund, Making Use of History in New South African Fiction: 
Historical Perspectives in Three Post-Apartheid Novels (Copenhagen: Museum 
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have told us about the monsters that make people happy.  
Maybe it is the drink, but it seems that we can see them 
through the boxes, shimmering like fool’s gold… Tyres 
are still burning. Tyres can burn for a very long time.  
The smell of burning rubber fills the air.  But this time it 
is not mingled with the sickly stench of roasting human 
flesh.  Just pure wholesome rubber. (212)   
 
Barnard reads this ending as a redemption in which “[the] violence of the past…has 
been eliminated” as the “meaning of the novel’s recurrent image of fire is thus 
redeemed”198 in an image of renewal and reanimation. But part of the ambivalence of 
this final paragraph comes not just from the fact that the novel wraps up so quickly 
and with the sense that nothing has really been worked through, but from the fact that 
the figurines which will ostensibly bring some kind of financial salvation to the 
settlement shimmer “like food’s gold” to drunken onlookers.  How can we interpret 
Mda’s retreat into this totally unsatisfying “happy ending” which takes place in a New 
Year’s Carnival, which the narrator explains is the day “when we are all carefree and 
forget about the problems that live with us the whole year round”(195), mere 
days/pages after the unimaginably violent death of Noria’s son, who is murdered by a 
group of adolescents for “selling-out” to rival hostel dwellers for candy?   
Finally, the moment which many of the above readers interpret as the apotheosis of a 
community effort to rebuild is punctuated by the troubling reminder of Noria’s loss 
and the perpetuated “silence that everyone is demanding from her”(178) regarding 
Vutha’s death. 
 The superficial lightheartedness with which the novel concludes is, in some 
sense, based on the continued pain and repression of the truth about the death that 
frames the narrative on both ends, a point which deeply problematizes any critical 
attempt to recuperate a sense of complete wholeness or perfectly cohesive community.  
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In a similar attempt to derive some kind of consolation from the novel’s ending, 
Mervis alludes to a moment when children are singing offensive songs about Toloki;  
when Noria attempt to stop them, Toloki tells her, “Never stifle the creativity of 
children”(62).  While Mervis reads this as a suggestion that “the emotional 
reconstruction and imaginative reawakening of children who have suffered in the 
cross-fire of the ethnic and political warfare…are the requisites for the future 
development and prosperity of this country,”199 she neglects the ominous way in which 
the childrens’ creativity comes at the expense of Toloki and, in a sense, perpetuates 
the same kind of exclusionary practices that caused him and Noria to suffer in the first 
place.  When Mervis claims, then, that Ways of Dying “ends in an apt, if rather 
contrived, ‘grand finale’ which represents a new beginning,”200 she overlooks the way 
the novel hints at a perpetuated irresolution based on the resilient structures of 
exclusion and repression.  Is the novel’s final gesture of consolation fundamentally 
anti-consolatory or melancholic if it posits only a fanciful “aestheticized” resolution to 
the violence that takes place just a few pages earlier, where the burning rubber is 
restraining Noria’s burning child?  What if the laughter at the end is manic laughter, 
melancholy’s double?  And is the infatuation with the “pure wholesome rubber,” and 
the negation of the previous week’s events, in the emphasis that the smell is “not 
mingled with the sickly stench of roasting human flesh”(212), a kind of repression?  In 
this instance, the community which cannot mourn loss is a dysfunctional one that is 
trapped in a repression and repetition compulsion.   
The novel’s precarious conclusion illustrates one of the most problematic 
aspects of the critical valorization of melancholia: its uncomfortably close link with a 
rapture over the traumatic symptom which ostensibly registers the alterity of loss and 
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refuses to subsume it into a restitutive narrative.  I have already discussed the ways in 
which this refusal might be desirably, particularly as a resistance to the assimilation of 
stories of loss into nationalist narratives.  At the same time, I have argued that Toloki’s 
improvisational mourning enacts a similar resistance while still initiating a process of 
working through loss in more provisional ways.  This process asks us to understand 
mourning as something which recognizes alterity too; or doesn’t simply enact an easy 
closure; or as LaCapra has suggested, something that might “counteract 
compulsiveness – especially the compulsive repetition of traumatic scenes of violence 
– by re-petitioning in ways that allow for a measure of critical distance, change, 
resumption of social life, ethical responsibility, and renewal.”201  It may seem here that 
in arguing that Ways of Dying’s unusually abrupt, consolatory ending stages a critique 
of the potential erasure of the past initiated by mourning, that I am aligning my own 
argument with these theorists of melancholia who see an inability to mourn as staging 
an open interrogation of the past, and issuing a demand that the memory of atrocities 
be an open wound.  It would therefore seem contradictory to also suggest that the 
novel’s portrayal of a dysfunctional community caught in a repetition compulsion 
problematizes the valorization of traumatic repetition.  But fundamentally, there is 
something very important in the novel’s suggestion of the possibility of improvisation 
– an improvisation which does bring a kind of resolution to Toloki and Noria, if not 
the community as a whole, a resolution in which mourning means neither forgetting 
nor ceaseless acting out. 
Current work that addresses the function of improvisation in Ways of Dying 
focuses on the ostensibly didactic message the novel offers about the need for poor, 
urban communities to invent constantly evolving ways of coping with 
disenfranchisement and poverty.  For instance, Barnard has linked the presence of 
                                                
201 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, 66. 
  125 
improvisation in the novel to the innovation necessitated by total lack of resources and 
support, so that it becomes another valence of the types of ingenuity we see 
throughout the text, such as the capacity of the urban poor to continually rebuild the 
settlements after they are bulldozed by the government.  For Barnard, the novel 
illustrates how “[in] situations where the usual benefits of urban life such as 
employment, legality, and shelter cannot be relied on, a capacity for continual self-
invention becomes an essential skill.”202  I want to extend a similar argument to the 
way that the novel suggests the possibility of working through traumatic experience 
through the spontaneous and continuous invention of ways of coping.  If trauma 
constitutes a radical break in the psyche, we might ask whether it precludes the 
possibility of complete innovation or whether it necessitates it.  Durrant makes the 
argument for the latter when he suggests that post-apartheid literature has invented 
new forms of mourning that might offer a way for individual stories to resist 
incorporation into nationalized narratives of healing and reconciliation.  In his 
account,  
 
[it] is precisely because colonialism often involves both 
the destruction of traditional communities and the 
traditions by which those communities are remembered 
that literature becomes a crucial site not simply for the 
recovery of communal traditions of remembrance but for 
the reinvention of memorial practices and thus the 
reinvention of community.203 
 
The suggestion here that the novel reinvents memorial practices rather than recovering 
them speaks to my broader argument about the futility of a recovery-based approach, 
particularly the nostalgic yearning for a time of successful mourning.   
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The critique of the implicitly recuperative gesture of an anti-elegiac impulse in 
Euromodernism is also relevant when thinking about the critical attempt to recuperate 
‘African’ rituals of mourning – something that several of the novel’s readers attempt 
to do.204  One of the reasons that it is important in the first place “to speak of the 
constant reinvention of traditions of mourning” in South Africa is because “it is almost 
impossible to speak of authentic, indigenous African mourning rites.”205  Durrant 
highlights the futility of this kind of recuperation, pointing out how these indigenous 
mourning rites have been lost or subsumed throughout the history of colonization in 
South Africa by the “spread of Christianity in its many European and Africanised 
forms, and more specifically, the creation during the apartheid era of the artificial 
homelands and the resultant informal and multiethnic urban settlements.”206 
                                                
204 See in particular Moslund, 98-9. Moslund suggests the novel’s emphasis on 
productive “ways of living” is “often intricately associated with an attempt to 
reconnect themselves with a humanist value system that, to a large extent, is rooted in 
the African tradition they were born into,” and suggests that the settlement community 
embodies “a version of the Ubuntu philosophy” in the way it “is surviving history on 
mutual caring and assistance, generosity and selflessness.”  While this is a useful point 
which productively highlights the importance of “traditional” philosophy and form 
(particularly the novel’s use of a collective voice that invokes the importance of oral 
storytelling), it runs the risk of situating a homogeneous “African” tradition 
(exemplified by Ubuntu) against a Europeanized one, which Moslund implies is the 
selfish, individualistic death-dealing attitudes of the settlement community that the 
return to “African” traditions and ways of relating to people compassionately 
overcomes. 
205 Durrant, “The Invention of Mourning,” 442. 
206 Ibid.  Also see Rogier Courau and Sally-Ann Murphy, “Of Funeral Rites and 
Community Memory: Ways of Living in Ways of Dying”, Ways of Writing, 91-114.  
Focusing on an analysis of the urban environment, Courau and Murphy address the 
“split location of the country and the city”(92) in the novel, highlighting the 
importance of the city as an ambiguous space, a locus of collective remembrance, as 
well as a source of spiraling inhumanity, where despair, death and moral decay have 
intensified”(92).  For Couray and Murphy, Mda’s decision to leave the city unnamed 
and the time unspecified relates to his deliberate emphasis on a particular “urban 
milieu”(93) rather than a historically specific event.  Their argument for a similar 
reinvention of community comes across in their analysis of the way new geographies 
of the urban environment both separate characters from traditional modes of working 
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I want to pause here to consider the ways in which Mda’s novel appeals to the 
continued existence of indigenous modes of understanding and responding to death, 
while at the same time problematizing readings that see the novel as revival of 
indigenous African rites.  Mda has commented on his reticence to use the word 
“revival” with regard to the recuperation of indigenous philosophy and art precisely 
because “[it] implies ‘going back’ to the archive to reinvent culture and reclaim a pre-
colonial authenticity that is lost.”207  While the total recovery of this cultural past is 
impossible, Mda suggests instead that they can be “rediscovered.”  This rediscovery 
might take place in the appeal to the formal history of African oral literature which 
Mda invokes in Ways of Dying.  In an interview, Mda elaborates on his interest in the 
work of Ghanaian writer, Ayi Kweyi Armah, “who said that African oral literature has 
always been a conversation between the living and the fourth dimension and by fourth 
dimension, of course, we are not only talking about the dead, but we are also talking 
about the unborn.”208  In the appeal to “that other world of those who have left us and 
those who have not joined us yet,”209 Mda hints to a coevality of the dead, the living, 
and the unborn in a way that would challenge the return of the dead as a pathological 
                                                                                                                                       
through loss and enable types of community to form.  In Ways of Dying the patterns of 
mourning are themselves part of tradition, yet… they take on a new life within the 
urban context, with its apparently dehistoricised subject, and provide a sense of 
continuity and potential for the characters and the community as a whole”(95).  While 
this argument dovetails with my own, I disagree with Courau and Murphy’s 
suggestion that, ultimately, “Toloki represents the sense of belonging, or even 
imagined community that is created through sorrow; he carries and conveys the weight 
of collective grief”(102-3).  They only cursorily mention that for most of the novel, 
particularly when he is performing the rituals they describe, Toloki is a total outsider 
to the community who effectively dupes the bereaved and “mooches” off of their food.  
Their reading is also problematic given my understanding of the novel as a self-
consciously stylized moment of closure that belies the irresolution of the plot.   
207 Sarah Nuttall, ed., Senses of Culture: South African Culture Studies (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 117. 
208 John B. Kachuba, “An interview with Zakes Mda,” Tin House 20 (2005), 
http://www.tinhouse.com/mag/back_issues/archive/issues/issue_20/interview.html. 
209 Ibid. 
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return of the repressed.  Then again, while Ways of Dying does break into this “fourth 
dimension” when it brings back to ghost of Jwara, it is important to note that this 
haunting is framed within the novel in a way that is immediately recognizable to 
readers of European literature as a ghost who figures some kind of unfinished 
business; Jwara returns because “he could not rest in peace in his grave, or join the 
world of the ancestors, unless the figurines were given to Toloki”(206).  In reading 
Jwara’s return as something of a hybrid ghosts who, on one hand, appears as an 
anomaly in the world of the living as a testimony to unresolved things, and on the 
other hand, as a normative instance of magic in a text where other “supernatural” 
occurrences are rendered unremarkable (such as the reincarnation of Noria’s son, who 
dies for the first time from starvation when his father kidnaps and then abandons him), 
we can begin to theorize how Ways of Dying participates in the process of 
“rediscovery” without nostalgia for a pure revival.  It is important to consider how the 
novel sits somewhere between these two readings, a claim which applies equally to the 
appeal to African-based understandings of community to which readers like Moslund 
refer.  On one hand, the novel seems to embrace an Ubuntu philosophy and turn to 
tradition that involves some kind of rehumanization of its characters and recovery 
from past wrongs.  This ostensible turn to traditional modes departs from the 
psychoanalytically-derived sense of closure and plays up to the fact that, as Wole 
Soyinka points out, “most African traditional societies have established modalities that 
guarantee the restoration of harmony after serious infractions.”210  On the other hand, 
                                                
210 Wole Soyinka, The Burden of Memory, The Muse of Forgiveness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 13.  This is worth mentioning precisely because I am arguing 
that the novel wraps up in an overly simplistic way in which closure is miraculously 
achieved.  It is worth considering how my reading might be rendered problematic if 
the book is playing into a predefined traditional mode of storytelling in which a 
seemingly contrived restoration is part of the very formula of addressing “serious 
infractions” in creative renderings. 
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this reading doesn’t quite fit in either of those senses because of the way the 
mechanisms for exclusion are still in place at the end of the novel. 
While it is important to think about the ways in which mourning in Mda’s 
novel is inflected with African narrative forms, or understandings of death, I am 
concerned about the way that the impulse to recover “traditional” modes of mourning 
is implicated in the same fantasy of successful mourning I have taken issue with 
throughout this project.  In this sense, the anti-elegiac impulse might also underlie the 
idea that ritual has been exhausted or at least attenuated in secularized “Western” 
funeral ceremony, the assumption that religious or spiritual people work through loss 
more “successfully,” and finally, the potential fetishization of “non-western” cultures 
and their relationships with the dead.  Rather than falling into this trap, I want to take 
Durrant’s discussion about “invention” and “improvisation,” and amplify the 
importance of improvisation with regard to thinking about how one might re-envision 
possible responses to trauma.  Improvisation is suggestive because it is not pure 
creation ex nihilo but, rather, plays off existing forms or traditions.  Arguably, in its 
basis in spontaneity, it evinces a suggestive model of grief work that is not based in 
narrative memory, but in the present expression of the feelings that memory has 
produced.    
Kimberly Wedeven Segall’s work on “collective mourning performances,” 
based on her experiences directing a theater workshop for Xhosa victims of human 
rights violations in 2000 and 2001, offers a model for improvisational memory-work.  
Segall argues that staging performances for other members of a group allows 
traumatized individuals to assuage feelings of helplessness and alienation.  These 
victims she worked with had all testified in front of the Commission but felt somewhat 
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limited by the context of the TRC and wanted to “perform their memories”211 in a 
small workshop organized by the Trauma Center in Cape Town.  Segall relates how 
this altered context played a significant part in recuperating a sense of agency for the 
victims by allowing them to reframe their stories in a way that emphasized other facets 
than victimhood: 
 
After having attended many of the TRC hearings, I 
observed how the testimonies of victims of human rights 
violation offered a catharsis, a healing release of 
emotion, as a response to the public acknowledgement 
of their suffering by the commissioners and audience.  
Yet the stories solicited by the TRC focused only on the 
moment of victimization, and the survivors in the play 
also told how they survived, how they had political 
purpose, how they acted in a heroic, not just a 
victimized, fashion.  These extended narratives along 
with the inclusion of song and improvisation created a 
very different context and form than the TRC.212 
 
Using Paul Connerton’s distinction between habitual and cognitive remembering 
Segall argues that improvisational performances, which are adapted from popular 
forms and therefore based on habitual memory, tap into modes of memory different 
from the one responsible for traumatic repetition.  Accordingly, 
 
the physical processing of remembrances through 
specific songs and dances – varying from the cognitive 
processing, or more accurately, varying from the 
inability to process traumatic memories in the case of 
traumatic stress disorders – adds a new dimension to 
recollection.  The well-known patterning of a song may 
interrupt, replace, or impede the traumatic images; thus 
these traumatic images are rendered less invasive, less 
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likely to deaden other incoming senses.213 
 
In figuring performance as a way to overcome grief, Segall still uses the stereotypical 
language of mourning-as-closure, suggesting that “once told, these presented 
memories allow the group to share grief, and the process of sharing grief offers a 
measure of closure because of the group’s acceptance of these narratives of 
mourning.”214  But at the same time, her reference to a measure of closure registers a 
more complex process by which grief might be negotiated.  As the above passage 
explains, the same cognitive processes one would use to work through trauma are 
often the processes that have been rendered unable to process those memories.  
According to Segall, “[the] embodied memory of well-known verses shifts out of the 
cognitive mode… to a physical, rhythmic release of tension, and the improvisation and 
spontaneity accompanying storytelling and singing – in juxtaposition to the helpless 
state of torture and terror – offers a measure of artistic choice and control.”215   
The key to this process is the “measure of control” of narrative in a way that 
isn’t totalizing, but is still secure enough to counteract the process of ceaseless acting 
out.  This control is important because it “helps reveal that the historical context of the 
past has changed or shifted;”216 in other words, the trauma victim is able to recognize 
that he or she is neither in the past nor faced with the danger it presented.  But perhaps 
more importantly, this performance of loss moves the victim “from individual trauma 
to collective mourning, and redefine[s] the present context through the embodied 
control of these cultural forms.”217  Restaging traumatic memory through a medium 
that might access it through a different process simultaneously allows victims to plot 
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the narrative of the past differently, and establish “bonds with witnessing 
audiences.”218  At first glance, this process might evoke certain aspects of the talking 
cure, particularly in the way it involves an almost free-associational narrative of events 
that ultimately leads to catharsis.  However, the crucial differences involve the 
narrative template of traditional songs, and the fact that the process takes place in a 
group instead of between individuals.  For Segall, reclaiming the event is all about re-
staging it in a way that reinserts the victim into some kind of community based not 
simply on the articulation of similar or shared experiences of suffering, but the shared 
process of “witnessing each other’s acts of mourning” that “defines the performing 
group’s identity and reaffirms its members’ common social bonds of witnessed 
suffering.”219  The centrality of the fact that the shared experience is the retelling 
rather than the past trauma means that a connection is made to the past that places loss 
firmly in the past and therefore allows for a present and future oriented critical and 
emotional process of working through.   
The improvisation of these “rites” functions at the level of individual and 
collective.  For the individual it enables a kind of vocalization of a subjective 
experience of grief (in unscripted ways, but mapped onto the medium of traditional 
song) and therefore forms part of an individual process for narrating and working 
through trauma.  But the fact that it involves an audience who engages with the 
performance in ways that do not seem extensively scripted lends to the process an 
element of collective engagement with the past.  Finally, it transfers the sense of 
performative replication of the past from one of an isolating, melancholic acting out – 
in which “the past is performatively regenerated or relived as if it were fully present 
rather than represented in memory and inscription, and it hauntingly returns as the 
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repressed” – to a more provisional concept of collective mourning that exemplifies 
what LaCapra calls “a different inflection of performativity: a relation to the past 
which involves recognizing its difference from the present – simultaneously 
remembering and taking leave of or actively forgetting it, thereby allowing for critical 
judgment and a reinvestment in life.220 
Throughout this dissertation I have taken issue with a critical tendency to 
frame melancholia as a deliberate, politically powerful response to the ossifying, 
normalizing, or normative movements of mourning.  Successful mourning, these 
scholars argue, subsumes difference and renders the meaning of past events frozen in 
some kind of permanent archival fixity in which they are resolutely declared over and 
done with.  Recuperating melancholia, recent criticism has affirmed endless grieving 
as something that has the capacity to produce inventive new modes of expression, to 
produce opportunities for an ethical interaction with otherness and, finally, to become 
a condition for contemporary life inasmuch as it solidifies a community that around a 
common experience of foundational trauma or loss.  It is this particular facet of the 
trend of valorizing melancholia that I have also taken issue with in this chapter – that 
is, the suggestion that loss should never be overcome on the grounds that its 
foundational violence solidifies community bonds that would ostensibly dissolve were 
that loss ever fully worked through.  Recalling Judith Butler’s revision of loss as an 
“oddly fecund, paradoxically productive” locus for group identification, this chapter 
further explores the implications of valorizing a melancholic attachment to the past by 
looking at Mda’s portrayal of a community living the aftermath of unspeakable 
personal loss and historical trauma.  Butler argues that in a “paradoxically productive” 
sense, loss “becomes the condition and necessity for a certain sense of community… 
where community cannot overcome the loss without losing the very sense of itself as a 
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community.”221  Accordingly, a common-sense loss might succeed in cohering a 
disenfranchised, disposed community which otherwise belongs nowhere.  But as 
Graham’s reservations about the workings of national memory and myth-making 
imply, similar arguments for the productive possibility of foundational violence have 
been made within national contexts with the explicit result of more strictly delineating 
those national boundaries.  My concern here is to question this potential productivity 
of foundational violence based on two undesirable possibilities: the first has addressed 
the dangerous ways it might end up functioning to exclude others; the second has 
highlighted the pitfalls of a model of endless melancholia, particularly the trouble with 
privileging a traumatized community which can only act out the traumas of the past.   
Ways of Dying portrays one possible iteration of such a community, one that is 
unable to break out of the traumatic repetition of past losses.  At the same time, its 
suggestion of the possibility of a community based on the shared process of 
improvising rites – processes which are continually mutable and therefore enable the 
past to be continually reconfigured – points to the potential for non-totalizing modes 
of working through loss that might define a community in similarly non-totalizing 
ways.  This collective engagement is something that comes from Toloki and Noria’s 
present-day attempts to listen to each other’s stories of grief, communicating trauma in 
terms of inviting a shared participation in mourning rites that opens up the boundaries 
of community in unexpected ways.222  The emphasis on improvisational modes of 
                                                
221 Butler, “Afterword,” 468. 
222 We might recall here both Charles S. Maier’s and LaCapra’s critique of a 
melancholic fixation on foundational trauma – trauma which potentially serves as a 
locus for group identification: Maier’s critique of how the “surfeit of memory” in the 
social domain produces a “new focus on narrow ethnicity”(Maier, 150), instead of 
inclusive modes of community, and LaCapra’s emphasis on the troubling way that 
traumas “become the valorized or intensely cathected basis of identity for an 
individual or a group rather than events that pose the problematic question of 
identity”(LaCapra, WHWT, 23).    Both arguments refute a notion of group 
melancholia as a community building force and figure its exclusionary possibilities for 
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working through raises further questions about the possibility of conventional 
narrative responses to traumatic histories and their role in mediating the experience of 
groups whose members are provisionally oriented around them.  If the fundamental 
problem of the post-traumatic is trauma’s status as a complete rupture or shattering, 
working through loss arguably necessitates a kind of improvisational imagination of 
ways to deal with the past.  We might ask, however, if the novel suggests radical 
improvisation is necessary for dealing with historical trauma, whether or not it delivers 
this improvisation at the level of its own form, or whether the structure of the plot 
forces more than just a “measure” of control.   
Significantly, the question of form and its relationship to an anti-elegiac stance 
is steeped in an valorization of modernist fragmentation.  With regard to poetry, 
Ramazani’s suggestion that only the melancholic mourning of the modern elegist’s 
anti-elegy can “[give] utterance to the wayward and contradictory impulses of grief” 
celebrates melancholia as a force which can account for the particular difficulties we 
face when expressing and representing loss.  His avowal of the anti-elegiac is based on 
his contention that its “fractured speech” and “memorably puzzlings”223 are more 
appropriate than the consolatory maxims of the traditional, pre-modernist, elegy.  This 
claim tangentially evokes a reoccurring argument amongst devotees of modernist form 
that modernism as a form is somehow more capable than other forms of accounting 
for the fragmented modern experience.  Here we might recall similar arguments that 
claim that nineteenth century realist narratives participate in a kind of fetishization of 
                                                                                                                                       
shutting down other categories of belonging.  For LaCapra, “Maier’s critique serves as 
a reminder that another kind of memory is more desirable, memory requiring the kind 
of memory-work Freud related to working through the past”(History and Memory 
After Auschzwitz, 16), but according to a non-totalizing understanding of working 
through that I have also attempted to describe here.  See Charles S. Maier, “A Surfeit 
of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholia and Denial,” History and Memory 
5.2 (Fall/Winter 1993) 
223 Ramazani, Poetry of Mourning, ix. 
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closure and organize sometimes traumatically fragmented stories into linear narratives 
with a clear-cut beginning, middle, and end.  This type of narrative theoretically stands 
opposed to the modernist kind – particularly narrative which is fragmented, or portrays 
the speaker’s stream of consciousness in real time, with all its interruptions and 
diversions, which is somehow truer to experience.224  Such arguments seem to be the 
basis for the idea of enactment, that is, the notion that the text is performative and 
enacts – or perhaps “acts out” – the disjointedness of its content.  However, according 
to this train of thought, modernist aesthetics are arguably seen as a remedy for the 
problems historiographers encounter in trying to recount traumatic events that seem to 
surpass the limits of our understanding. The argument that modernist aesthetics 
account for the fragmented experience of modernity seems to be an unsatisfying 
justification as to why “conventional” critical prose or realist description cannot 
account for ostensibly unaccountable events, and problematically excludes novels that 
do not look like Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway or in some other way employ a 
mimetic aesthetic that “mimics” the disjointedness of traumatic experience.225  
An analysis of the narrative structure of Mda’s novel would be easily 
privileged by proponents of a mimetic understanding of traumatic narrative.  The 
                                                
224 See Hayden White, “The Modernist Event” in The Holocaust: Theoretical 
Readings, ed. Neil Levi and Michael Rothberg (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2003), 39-345. 
225 Also see Anne Whitehead, Trauma Fiction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2004).  Whitehead’s classification and analysis of the genre of “trauma novels” 
suggests that trauma fiction simultaneously registers the need to represent specific 
traumas as fully as possible, and the need to convey the shock and dislocation of 
traumatic experience.  Her designation of the former as “theme” and the latter as 
“style” is complicated precisely because it implicitly prescribes certain stylistic 
techniques as apt for conveying the “theme” of trauma.  I have tried to avoid this 
distinction here, but given that trauma has largely been conceived as a thematic arena 
of literary study (inasmuch as attention to the form or “style” of trauma reinforces 
certain stereotypical ideas about what form is “appropriate” for conveying a disjointed 
theme), this might be unavoidable.  Questioning whether or not is an important task 
for future work in trauma studies, but is beyond the scope of this current project. 
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novel begins in the aftermath of violence at the funeral of Noria’s son, and works 
backwards (with occasional fragmented jumps between the very distant and very 
recent pasts) as the characters piece together the events leading up to Vutha’s 
traumatic death.  Immediately after his death is narrated, the novel wraps up; in this 
way, it easily, albeit superficially, conforms to the form of the “talking cure” as the 
characters must narrate past events in order to overcome them.  I have suggested, 
however, that Mda’s apparent subscription to this format is decidedly tongue-in-cheek 
and, ultimately, toys with our perceptions regarding the ways that “trauma novels” are 
seemingly obliged to narrate the violent events at their core. 
Problematizing both a model of cathartic closure and idea that narrative can 
and should secondarily traumatize its readers by mimicking the shock and dislocation 
of traumatic experience, Mda’s novel lends itself to the improvised creation of new 
spaces and modes of grieving by ironizing the issue of traumatic articulation through 
Toloki’s ostensibly meaningless noises.  Positioned within the novel’s formal strategy 
of superficial, stylized closure, Toloki stands out as a figure who most clearly ironizes 
the relationship between narrative and nonsensical sound.  I have suggested, on the 
one hand, that Toloki’s improvised wails constitute an attempt to respond to loss in a 
new way, one that is not circumscribed by the ostensibly exhausted rituals of the past.  
But Toloki’s noises are also suggestive because, as nonsensical wails of grief, they are 
arguably situated between acting out and working through.  As part of a funerary rite, 
they are geared toward mourning and commemorating the loss, but as senseless sound 
they evoke, in particular, Kristeva’s melancholic who has refused the inevitable break 
from the semiotic and acceptance of the symbolic and, as a result, has descended into 
psychosis or aphasia. 
 Toloki’s repetition of sound might helpfully be analogized in the repeated “o-
o-o-o” sound elicited by Freud’s grandson, the child from Beyond the Pleasure 
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Principle who “[stages] the disappearance and return of objects within his reach”226 in 
order to come to terms with his mother’s daily departures.  The child’s “cultural 
achievement,” for Freud, is the way he stages a temporary absence (the loss of the 
wooden reel, which he throws over the side of his cot) in order to gain something more 
permanent, the game itself.  Staging the loss and return of the object leads not only to 
a sense of mastery over loss, but also to the creation of a substitute in the form of the 
“fort-da” game.  Not unlike the poetic substitute for loss occasioned by elegy, the 
child’s game seems to stand in as a consolation for his inability to control the 
temporary loss of his mother.  Just as the conventional elegy recuperates and supplants 
the loss of the mourned object, the game seems to evince a recuperation of the object 
that it comes to represent (the child’s mother).  In Toloki’s case, the sounds become 
acts of creation and creativity, and might similarly be construed as the “cultural 
achievement” of creative mastery. 
However, Freud problematizes this reading when he mentions that “the first 
act, that of departure, was staged as a game in itself and far more frequently than the 
episode in its entirety, with its pleasurable ending.”227  Offering two possible 
justifications for the way the first part of the game occurs with such frequency, one 
having to do with an attempt to master the unpleasant sensation of loss, and one 
having to do with seeking revenge on the object that comes to represent his mother, 
punishing her for leaving, Freud comes to the indefinite conclusion that something 
“beyond the pleasure principle” governs this repetition of unpleasurable experience.  
What emerges unresolved from this analysis is the precise role of the sound.  The 
child, of course, never says, fort; instead, he “[gives] vent to a loud, long-drawn-out 
                                                
226 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 
1961), 14. 
227 Ibid., 15. 
  139 
‘o-o-o-o’”228 that Freud only confirms as the German word for “gone” after the child 
adapts the game with the wooden reel and starts saying, “da” – “there.”  The child’s 
sound emerges, then, not as a simple tool of mastery, but as a figure for a 
simultaneously inarticulable grief that characterizes Freud’s language of traumatic 
experience.  Crucially, it is the “o-o-o-o” sound that gets picked up in Freud’s own 
footnote explaining that a few years later the child’s mother (Freud’s own daughter) 
died and “[now] that she was really ‘gone’ (‘o-o-o’) the little boy showed no signs of 
grief.”229  This analogy is relevant because it also involves the performance of a 
provisional process of mourning, a process that similarly comes across in Toloki’s 
attempt to articulate grief and to articulate mutable processes by which that grief might 
be provisionally expressed.   
Toloki’s attempt to articulate new mourning rituals counters the fixation on the 
modern “abbreviation, objectification, and bureaucratic regulation of mortuary 
rites,”230 as well as the sense that “a range of cataclysmic social events, including the 
slaughter of war, modernization of culture, and the disappearance of God and 
tradition”231 which have ostensibly made mourning impossible and “utterly 
outmoded.”232 As I have suggested, this argument is unwittingly caught up in a fantasy 
about a lost moment of plenitude for mourning rites, when mourning somehow 
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succeeded in ways that are not viable today.  Mda’s novel stages a compelling 
counter-possibility – that is, the potential for the articulation of new rites in the present 
that would both destabilize the opposition between mourning as totalizing and 
melancholia as radically open, and avoid slipping into an impossible recuperation of 
lost myths and modes of grief work.233  I reiterate this point in closing, because 
inasmuch as Mda’s novel constitutes something of an elegiac narrative – a text which 
stages what it means to mourn the dead, a text which is anti-elegiac in its mockery of 
simplistic or artistic closure, its embrace of improvisation, of improvised modes of 
working through individual and historical trauma – it neither perpetuates a myth of a 
golden age of mourning nor completely mitigates or assimilates the otherness of the 
dead.  Parodic, cynical, cutting though it may be, the novel ultimately brings our focus 
back to rites and suggests that mourning rites might also be a site of relation, of 
creativity, of a real ethics of otherness which recognizes the living other of another 
community as an empathetic neighbor who may have experienced a different loss, or 
experienced loss differently, but experienced it nonetheless; of a community which 
might to some viable extent overcome loss and still maintain its sense of community 
because it has ultimately created something future-driven, a working-through of 
trauma that forges community bonds based on the shared inauguration and 
performance of rites (as well as other forms of social and political action) rather than 
simply a common experience of loss. 
                                                
233 Shane Graham’s reading of Mda’s play, The Bells of Amersfoot, is relevant to this 
discussion because Graham understands the play as similarly rejecting “attempts at 
totalizing closure”(68) through its attempt at “forging new modes of constructing and 
interacting with social space”(70).  I came across Graham’s essay as I was in the 
process of completing this dissertation, and found a number of overlaps in the way 
Graham talks about Mda’s plays.  In particular, he argues that Mda refuses the 
“totalizing narratives of the past” while simultaneously “[rejecting] a naïve faith in the 
ability of art and narrative to restore people and the land to some harmonious pre-
lapsarian wholeness”(70).  See Graham, “Mapping Memory, Healing the Land: The 
Bells of Amersfoort” in Ways of Writing, 57-72. 








J. M. Coetzee’s most recent novel, Summertime: Scenes from Provincial Life 
(2009), ends with a moment of forestalled care in which the character, John, of the 
novel’s final “untitled fragment,” reacts ambivalently to the prospect of caring for his 
father after a laryngectomy: 
 
One of the ambulancemen hands him a 
cyclostyled sheet of instructions titled Laryngectomy – 
Care of Patients, and a card with a schedule of time 
when the clinic is open.  He glances over the sheet.  
There is an outline sketch of a human head with a dark 
circle low in the throat.  Care of Wound, it says. 
He draws back. ‘I can’t do this,’ he says.  The 
ambulancemen exchange glances, shrug.  It is not their 
business, taking care of the wound, taking care of the 
patient.  Their business is to convey the patient to his or 
her place of residence.  After that it is the patient’s 
business, or the patient’s family’s business, or else no 
one’s business. 
It used to be that he, John, had too little 
employment.  Now that is about to change.  Now he will 
have as much employment as he can handle, as much 
and more.  He is going to have to abandon some of his 
personal projects and be a nurse.  Alternatively, if he 
will not be a nurse, he must announce to his father: I 
cannot face the prospect of ministering to you day and 
night, I am going to abandon you.  Goodbye. One or the 
other: there is no third way.234 
 
John’s choice – to care for or “minister to” his father, or to abandon him to his 
voiceless suffering – frames my analysis of the work of mourning in Coetzee’s writing 
                                                
234 Coetzee, Summertime (London: Harvill Secker, 2009), 265-266. 
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and, in particular, my suggestion that Coetzee’s novels problematize the rigid 
opposition between mourning and melancholia that sees mourning as radically 
totalizing.  As evidenced by this final passage in Summertime, however, Coetzee does 
this by staging an indeterminable choice between complete faithfulness and total 
neglect, between the ostensible polarities of care and abandonment that loosely align 
with the decision to keep possession of a potential loss, or to completely release it.  
While, in this sense, Summertime might be seen to solidify the same opposition 
between mourning and melancholia that I have attempted to destabilize, I will examine 
how the very possibility of a “third way” emerges in the novel precisely through its 
apparent exclusion. 
While this chapter primarily addresses what I call the suspension of mourning 
in Summertime (2009), it challenges the fourth and final facet of the recent critical 
valorization of melancholia: an interest in the preservation of “otherness” which 
motivates what Sam Durrant in Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning has 
called a “a deconstructive, anti-historicist ethics of remembrance.”235  Durrant’s 
project, like mine, attempts to trace the links between colonial loss or trauma, and 
postcolonial remembrance; in many ways his work has provided a jumping off point 
for my own, particularly in the way it brings together Anglophone texts from different 
regions of the world to explore the common ways they address the history of 
colonialism.  However, Durrant problematically embraces the same idealized notion of 
mourning as totalizing closure that I have resisted throughout this project, propping up 
an opposition between history (as totalizing narrative, and thus related to completed 
mourning) and a certain excess (one might say, a melancholic excess) that is beyond 
representation or at least resists the easy translation into memorialization.  Taking into 
account Durrant’s reading of Coetzee’s early novels as texts that manifest this form of 
                                                
235 Sam Durrant, Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning, 7.  
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melancholic remembrance in order to remain “inconsolable before history,”236 this 
chapter examines whether or not Coetzee’s work really allows for a generalizing, 
prescriptive theory of melancholic resistance.  In other words, does Coetzee advocate 
a generalized ethics of remembrance in which consolation over loss is revealed as the 
wrong way to respond to it?   
In particular, I am interested in how the ostensibly unmournable suffering that 
Durrant locates at the heart of Coetzee’s refusal to fully represent history has 
manifested in the author’s later novels, like Summertime, where the objects cared for, 
or “mourned," become more and more disembodied until, ultimately, they include 
those objects that will be lost one day, and, accordingly, invite a kind of preemptive 
melancholia.  If we embrace Durrant’s notion of mourning – less as a grieving process 
of responding to loss and more of task of historical recuperation and reconciliation – 
how have acts of care, which necessarily involve an attempt to prolong the life that 
may be lost, enabled a suspension of mourning in the later Coetzee novels?  
Ultimately, I want to suggest that thinking about care as suspended mourning might 
allow us to tread a more provisional route between a rigid binary opposition of 
mourning as closure and melancholia as openness.  It is my contention that mourning 
emerges precisely (and preemptively) in Coetzee’s novels in the form of acts of care, 
in which one individual physically cares for another or appears on the verge of a 
decision to care or not to care.  As Coetzee is undoubtedly aware, “to care” is an 
outmoded use of the word, “to mourn.”237  It seems odd, then, that Durrant, the scholar 
who has written the most extensively about Coetzee’s writing as a work of mourning, 
                                                
236 Ibid., 24. 
237 To date I have not located any interview or essay in which Coetzee discusses this 
etymological link between care and mourning, but given his perennial fascination with 
etymologies (which often manifests in the novels as a protagonist’s preoccupation 
with wordplay and word origins), I do not think it is misguided to suggest that the he 
is surely aware of the connection.   
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has chosen to apply a metaphorical idea of mourning as “coming to terms with 
history” as opposed to analyzing the barely concealed mournfulness of Coetzee’s 
focus on care – a focus which might be construed as putting “mourning” under 
erasure, or at least suspending it in a way that makes it impossible to complete.  
Taking this into account, I want to ask the following:  does care as suspended 
mourning constitute a refusal to work through loss, or does it transcend a stereotypical 
notion of working through?   
While generally overlooked in scholarship, the concept of care has always 
been a concern in Coetzee’s novels, but one that has traditionally been understood in 
terms of charity, hospitality, or responsibility to an other.238  In the early novels, 
conventional scenes of administering care take place between humans, typically in a 
dynamic in which the powerful administer to the powerless – the Magistrate and the 
Barbarian girl, the doctor and Michael K, Susan Barton and Cruso, and later, Susan 
Barton and Friday.  In the later novels, however, I would argue that the objects of care 
                                                
238 Mike Marais briefly identifies the etymological link between care and mourning in 
his Secretary of the Invisible: The Idea of Hospitality in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee, 
acknowledging that “[to] care, as the root of the word ‘care’, kaera, signifies, is 
precisely to lament,” however his work is concerned with a Derridean understanding 
of hospitality in Coetzee’s work, not mourning.  See Mike Marais, Secretary of the 
Invisible: The Idea of Hospitality in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2009), pp. 61-2.  For a reading of care and charity, see Carrol Clarkson’s essay, which 
partially focuses on the etymology of the word “care” in Age of Iron and Slow Man.  
See Carrol Clarkson, “Responses to Space and Spaces of Response in J. M. Coetzee” 
in J. M. Coetzee’s Austerities, ed. Graham Bradshaw and Michael Neill (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2010), pp. 43-55.  In it, she focuses on both novels’ repeated use of the 
phrase, “take care of,” and the ways in which the main characters, Elizabeth Curren 
and Rayment, fixate over the meanings of the word, “care.” Clarkson ultimately 
argues that these “etymological forays” continually miss the mark regarding what 
they’re actually trying to describe, and that the connotations certain words have for 
people (for instance, Elizabeth Curren’s misguided link between the word, “care,” and 
the word, “charity”) testify to the fact that “the characters’ relation to the English 
language, rather than to a physical geographic location…dictates the boundary 
between the native and the foreign”(Clarkson, 53).  However, nowhere does she 
identify the etymological links between caring and mourning.   
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have recently expanded, pushing the limits of the earlier novels’ conventional 
interactions.  We might recall David Lurie’s care for the dead dogs in Disgrace, in 
which “he is prepared to take care of them once they are unable, utterly unable, to take 
care of themselves,”239 or Marijana’s care of Paul Rayment’s amputated leg in Slow 
Man, which Rayment believes was carelessly discarded without his consent, and 
without, in a sense, being mourned.  (His repeated grievance is not only that the leg 
was amputated without his permission, but that it was carelessly disposed of; 
throughout the novel he regards the hypocrisy of his doctor’s attempt to teach him 
how to care for the “stump,” as Rayment later calls it: “You anaesthetized me and 
hacked off my leg and dropped it in the refuse for someone to collect and toss into the 
fire. How can you stand there talking about care of my leg?”240  Arguably, the fact that 
in these later novels “the other” becomes a dead non-human animal and a severed 
body part puts pressure on the idea of what constitutes a grievable life (to borrow 
Judith Butler’s term) or object.  If the early novels suggest that some kind of 
acknowledgement of woundedness might take place through an empathic 
identification with the suffering other, Coetzee’s later books certainly problematize 
this potential for identification by rendering the objects of care more abstract or 
elusive, particularly in Summertime where one of the predominant “objects” that is 
mourned is the very threat of future loss or suffering. 
This speaks to a related question regarding the critical appropriation of loss as 
a locus for identification (particularly a melancholic relationship with loss).  In what 
ways does care gesture to a mode of empathizing with another’s suffering in a way 
that does not involve subsuming his or her place?  Durrant’s analysis links empathy to 
a totalizing mourning by claiming that “the act of empathy is the attempt to imagine 
                                                
239 Coetzee, Disgrace (New York: Viking, 1999), 146. 
240 Coetzee, Slow Man (London: Secker and Warburg, 2005), 10. 
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the other as the same, as another version of the self.”241  However, I take issue with his 
claim that, as a result, “Coetzee’s novels implicitly argue that to transcend the other’s 
alterity is to efface that alterity,”242 and that in general, the act of empathy is always 
tantamount to imagining oneself in the other’s place.  Ultimately, the fact that 
Coetzee’s narrators cannot relate to the Other for whom they care is for Durrant a 
testimony to the impossibility of mourning.  In line with Durrant’s reading, 
incomprehension relates to the impossibility of testimony, to the impossibility of 
mourning (which would only codify loss in a fixed history and assimilate the other and 
his/her loss to the self-same), and finally, to the ethical necessity of not mourning and 
therefore refusing to assimilate alterity.  But what if we interpret the failure of 
empathy, instead, as relating to the way the texts stage this particular conflation of 
empathy and identification?  I suggest that what Durrant interprets as a refusal to 
mourn might be understood instead as a refusal to permit the troubling conflation of 
identification and empathy.  I do not disagree that Coetzee’s novels always slip 
empathy into identification, which necessarily leads to the failure of empathetic 
relation.  However, I would argue that this move does not implicitly make an 
“argument” that this slippage is always the case; rather, the novels stage the failure of 
relation on these particular grounds. While Durrant interprets the resulting inability to 
ever fully access the other as the novels’ refusal to mourn, I suggest that we might 
understand it as their commentary on the problem of conflating empathy and 
identification.  Ultimately, the novels do not generally “refuse to mourn” as much as 
they frame a particular type of relation to the other as problematic.   
While this analysis of empathy and identification is somewhat tangential to my 
overall discussion of mourning in this chapter, it comes back to care inasmuch as care 
                                                
241 Durrant, 27. 
242 Ibid. 
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might offer a new way of thinking of an empathic relationship without identification.  
If empathy is often based on a fantasy of complete recognition (to the point of 
occupying that position oneself), Coetzee’s focus on care arguably involves a gesture 
to that other that isn’t predicated on the fullness of identification.  Simultaneously, my 
focus on care reveals certain cracks or omissions in the language trauma studies has 
used to describe possible reactions to loss.  Ultimately, the novel’s elevation of care 
over mourning has led me to question care’s omission from both trauma and memory 
studies.  I would argue that theorizing care is an important addition to trauma theory’s 
focus on the belatedness of traumatic experience.   Like the recognition of 
traumatization, care is something that also comes too soon and too late.  It comes too 
soon in that it preempts the final loss of the other, and it comes too late in the sense 
that the need for care is generally predicated on some kind of injury; one is only in 
need of care after one has been hurt or threatened in some way.  In terms of 
temporality, care appeals to the future perfect tense; care is based on sustaining the 
object that will have been.  We care for an object that threatens to be lost.  
Accordingly care seems implicated in mechanisms of repression and denial as it 
involves a refusal of that threat of loss.  Like the first stages of mourning that Freud 
outlines, in which the psyche defies reality by imagining the lost object back into 
existence, care temporarily preserves the object that will have been lost, representing a 
dutiful prolongation of the life of the other.  Care, then, seems intimately bound up 
with the structures of time that trauma studies conventionally appeals to, particularly 
the branch of trauma studies that valorizes silence, aporia, and a refusal to mourn. 
This branch of trauma studies is epitomized in Durrant’s interest in 
melancholia, which joins with numerous discussions of loss that have become bound 
up with questions of faithfulness to an other at constant risk of being elided.  In these 
readings, the urge to valorize melancholia is based on a notion of “the melancholic’s 
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absolute refusal to relinquish the other – to forfeit alterity – at any costs.”243  I have 
already charted how according to the general trend, mourning becomes an act of 
foreclosure, an exercise in positivism, or a symptom of essentializing discourse.  But 
in this particular sense, mourning constitutes an act of betrayal in which both the 
“otherness” of the lost object and the shock of death are deadened or made familiar.  
Resisting this betrayal, Durrant pursues an ethical line of thought in Postcolonial 
Narrative and the Work of Mourning, linking the same attachment to melancholia to 
an ethics of otherness where mourning must never finish, and where, “like mourning, 
the attempt to redraw the boundaries of community must remain incomplete, 
unsuccessful; its success is measured precisely by its failure to complete itself, its 
capacity to remain perpetually open to the difference of the other, to the possibility of 
different others and not yet imagined modes of being.”244  While in earlier chapters I 
have similarly emphasized the constant redrawing of community boundaries in order 
to avoid certain exclusionary practices, I find Durrant’s conflation of radical openness 
with an impossible mourning that somehow transcends all attempts to narrate loss 
problematic because of the reliance on an opposition between language and some 
unverbalizable “beyond” that closes down possibilities for working through loss, 
instead of focusing on the otherness of loss as something that defies all representation.  
This distinction, as Durrant has formulated it, extends to include not just a certain 
structural condition of language but the way that the language one has to address the 
                                                
243 David L. Eng and Shinhee Han, “A Dialogue on Racial Melancholia” in Loss: the 
Politics of Mourning (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 364. 
244 Durrant, 111.  Also see R. Clifton Spargo, The Ethics of Mourning: Grief and 
Responsibility in Elegiac Literature. Spargo acknowledges a debt to Derrida’s 
depiction of mourning as a “most deadly infidelity,” that “would interiorize within us 
the image, idol, or ideal of the other who is dead and lives only in us”(Memoires, 6).  
He also picks up this trend which imbues melancholia with an ethical potential, 
claiming that “a resistant and incomplete mourning stands for an ethical 
acknowledgement of – or perhaps a ceding to – the radical alterity of the other whom 
one mourns”(13). 
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experience of trauma can only do so in a way that codifies, fixes, and assimilates its 
otherness.  As Durrant’s primary concern is not language but history (and also that 
which resists being made into a historical narrative), I am interested here in the way 
that his suggestion that mourning (which he links with the narrativization of history) 
should never achieve completion is also based on an understanding of the alterity of 
loss as something which should not – indeed, something which could not – ever be 
fully subsumed. 
Echoing Durrant’s argument in this regard, R. Clifton Spargo’s The Ethics of 
Mourning is concerned “with an aspect of dissent that is proper to mourning.”245  He 
suggests that endless mourning becomes a locus of giving oneself over to otherness; 
melancholia becomes “an ethical concern for the other elaborated by the mourner’s 
objections to the cultural practices presiding over grief.”246  Most importantly, 
melancholy is understood as “a dedication to the time and realm of the other”: 
 
Even when it seems to emanate from the esoteric 
subjective grievances of a specific mourner, melancholia 
interrogates the symbolic social structures that contain 
and reduce the meaning of the other who is being 
lamented.  Thus it is on the threshold of symbolic 
meaning that every melancholic mourner stands again as 
                                                
245 Spargo, 6. 
246 Ibid., 11.  Admittedly, Spargo is wary about getting too carried away with his 
vision of unchecked grief as an site of ethical meaning.  He acknowledges that “[to] 
mourn ethically would be to mourn in such a way that the survivor’s grief… would 
extend only to the point where grief does not prevent the resumption of normal 
relationships among the living or to the point where the work of mourning can be 
conceived as a useful act of commemoration, putting the memory of the other in 
service of the general good, or morality”(19).  This claim takes into account the 
counterargument that melancholic acting out entails a withdrawal from the present, 
inasmuch as the “present” in which the victim lives is the repeated past.  As in his 
reference to “the consolations of language,” however, Spargo views mourning in terms 
of a return to “normal relationships” and “a useful act of commemoration,” reinforcing 
the conventional idea of mourning central to unqualified affirmations of melancholia 
and foreclosing a relation between mourning and potential social change. 
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for the first time when she refuses the consolations of 
language.247 
 
Here, Spargo’s emphasis on “the consolations of language” evokes a conventional 
notion of the elegiac as something that consoles the reader through and with words, 
while also placing an emphasis on a Kristevan understanding of the entry into 
language as a conciliatory substitution for the originary traumatic loss.248  For both 
Spargo and Durrant, however, it is not simply a question of the inability to represent 
that loss as it is the ethical imperative not to do so. 
Durrant’s argument evokes a Derridean understanding of mourning in which 
the impossibility of mourning becomes an exercise in fidelity to the lost other who 
must remain totally other.  According to this understanding, the process of successful 
mourning can only succeed in its denial of alterity, and the only truly “successful” 
mourning – mourning that does not assimilate the other – must be a failed task.  If 
mourning leaves no space for otherness, “impossible mourning” succeeds in “leaving 
the other his alterity, respecting thus his infinite remove, either refuses to take or is 
                                                
247 Ibid.  
248 See Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989). For Kristeva, all language is based on rupture that takes place 
as part of the subject’s entry into the symbolic order from the semiotic.  This entry 
happens when the subject negates the foundational trauma of that rupture, which 
coincides with the loss of the object (in this case, the maternal other), and accepts 
language and its restorative promise.  In this sense, the other is not lost precisely 
because it can be recuperated in a language that, while it never fully succeeds in 
recovering that loss (the semiotic), continues to bears its traces.  This process is 
arguably a more provisional model for the ‘successful mourning’ I have been 
discussing so far, inasmuch as the mourner accepts that foundational loss by also 
accepting language, but does so in a way that registers that the acceptance of language 
only comes about because the subject has no other choice.  The Kristevan 
melancholic, on the other hand, denies the negation of the foundational loss that would 
bring him/her into language; this denial makes it impossible to recognize or accept the 
loss, which then becomes an object of paralyzing fixation.  In refusing the separation 
from the semiotic (and therefore, refusing to accept language as a replacement for the 
semiotic), the melancholic is bound to the inarticulable Thing, unable to mourn 
because he or she does not accept the need to mourn. 
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incapable of taking the other within oneself, as in the tomb or the vault of some 
narcissism.”249  The process of integration that takes place in successful mourning – 
mourning that works through loss – necessarily fails in its assimilation of alterity.  As 
Derrida explains in “Death Penalties,” 
 
Mourning must be impossible.  Successful mourning is 
failed mourning.  In successful mourning, I incorporate 
the one who has died, I assimilate him to myself, I 
reconcile myself with death, and consequently I deny 
death and the alterity of the dead other and of death as 
other.  I am therefore unfaithful.  Where the introjection 
of mourning succeeds, mourning annuls the other.  I 
take him upon me, and consequently I negate or delimit 
his infinite alterity.250 
Faithfulness to the dead in this case does not involve a moral choice between 
mourning and melancholia but instead involves a simultaneity of two opposites – the 
need to mourn and the impossibility of mourning that constitutes a double bind: 
 
Faithfulness prescribes to me at once the necessity and 
the impossibility of mourning.  It enjoins me to take the 
other within me, to make him live in me, to idealize him, 
to internalize him, but it also enjoins me not to succeed 
                                                
249 Jacques Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man, trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan 
Culler, and Eduardo Cadava (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 6. 
250 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow: A Dialogue 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 159-160.  It is crucial to note that Derrida 
does not offer a clear prescription for mourning here (despite the way in which the fact 
and threat of assimilation has been taken up by recent theorists as what one ought not 
to do); he merely outlines a certain paradox inherent to mourning in which faithfulness 
to the dead means both being faithful through mourning, and being faithful in spite of 
mourning.  Derrida, however, does not produce a clear interdiction on mourning; he 
articulates a paradox in which “[s]peaking is impossible, but so too would be 
silence…or a refusal to share one’s sadness.” (See Derrida, “In Memorium: Of the 
Soul” in The Work of Mourning, ed. Pascalle-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 72.)  While the moral obligation not to 
work through loss is not explicit, however, his argument still seems to remain on a 
quasi-transcendental level in which a grieving individual is entirely cut off from 
society and history. 
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in the work of mourning: the other must remain the 
other.”251   
 
Durrant, in turn, aligns this perceived annulment of otherness with the 
narrative procedures of historical memory which, in aiming to “successfully” work 
through the loss of the other and thus “move beyond” it, ends up assimilating the 
unassimilable and alleviating the otherness of death itself.  For Durrant, this 
“deconstructive” ethics of mourning is related to a cogent, historicist narrative of the 
past which, as Eng and Kazanjian also imply, declares the past closed.  His 
understanding of a community of “not yet imagined modes of being,” then, is based on 
the same problematic notion of a community centered around a past which has not 
and, according to this viewpoint, should not be worked through.252 
                                                
251 Ibid., 160.  Admittedly, Derrida’s reliance on terms that connote the absolute and 
the infinite in relation to alterity have been seen by some as marking a theological 
turn, one which might coincide with a valorization of impossible mourning as well as 
of the aporia that one cannot work through.  See in particular John D. Caputo’s The 
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1997).  For a refutation of Caputo’s argument, see Martin 
Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008).  Hägglund has argued convincingly against this perceived 
theological turn in Derrida’s work, however, it is important to note that his reading of 
Derrida’s work on mourning still offers a structural model in which “actual mourning” 
“is an intensification of the possible mourning that is at work from the first inception 
of desire.”  The experience of mourning, in Hägglund’s reading of Derrida, 
underscores the “double bind of mortal being” which every passing moment is an 
irrecoverable loss.  Hägglund goes on to argue that to “preclude mourning” would be 
to deny the very basis of desire, in which “every slightest movement of desire is 
shadowed by the risk of loss”(109).   
252 It is important to note that Durrant’s opposition between history and that which 
exceeds historical representation or narrative memorializion is mapped onto a 
theoretical opposition he sees between psychoanalysis and deconstruction which he 
understands as a choice between “[coming] to terms with loss and [moving] on” and a 
“commitment to the other, to that which ‘unhinges’ the subject, urges us to learn to 
live with ghosts’”(9).  At times, however, the distinction collapses in ways that 
exceeds Durrant’s oppositional closure and openness, healing and endless grief.  For 
instance, when he argues that “the basic impulse to narrate the past would suggest that 
postcolonial narrative seeks to perform some kind of therapy, even in the absence of 
retrieving history”(8), he signals the potential existence of the more provisional idea of 
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The central question of this chapter is whether or not Coetzee’s work allows 
for the kind of abstracted and prescriptive theory of resistant mourning that Durrant 
endorses, particularly in his account of the ways in which Coetzee’s 1980s novels 
stage a deliberate refusal to narrativize suffering, and thus refuse to represent trauma 
as a cogent historical narrative.   Evoking a more affective relationship between reader 
and text, he suggests that “[r]ather than providing a direct relation of the history of 
apartheid, Coetzee’s narratives instead provide a way of relating to such a history.”253  
According to this model, Coetzee’s novels participate in an “ceaseless labor of 
remembrance”254 in which the completion of representation (which Durrant parallels 
with mourning) would problematically verbalize “an unverbalizable history.”255  This 
“labor of remembrance” takes place in two ways: at the level of the text which enacts 
this resistance to representation stylistically and philosophically, and at the level of its 
characters who “embody” it.256  In the first case, which I briefly described above, the 
                                                                                                                                       
mourning I am working toward, one which might alleviate some of the pain of the past 
without subscribing to the fantasy of absolute recuperation.  Though at one point he 
overtly suggests that postcolonial narrative’s relation to the past is one that struggles 
between psychoanalysis and deconstruction, “caught between these two 
commitments… to summon the dead and to lay them to rest”(8), these distinctions are 
also complicated by his prescriptive claim that the individual “melancholic’s refusal to 
recognize an end to the time of mourning seems to preclude the possibility of the 
future” while the collective “commitment never to forget seems precisely to be a way 
of looking to the future, a way of ensuring that history does not repeat itself”(9).  In 
other words, the valorization of melancholia, which might remain pathological at the 
level of the individual, is rendered unproblematic on the collective scale.  For Durrant, 
the process of writing (and reading) takes place on this collective level where writers 
do not unwittingly repeat the past but deliberately narrate it, and therefore, deliberately 
enact a mode of working through.  Again, this is another instance in which Durrant’s 
distinction between a totalizing historicism and a (melancholic) refusal to subsume 
whatever resists history is rendered more permeable than it does at other times in 
Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning. 
253 Durrant, 5. 
254 Ibid., 1. 
255 Ibid., 26. 
256 Though Durrant tries to differentiate the way this resistance occurs at the level of 
text and at the level of character, he never posits a connection between the two based 
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novels refuse to fully render suffering, trauma, or loss into an ostensibly recuperative 
historical narrative which would also lead to psychological closure; in Durrant’s 
words, “the true work of the novel consists not in the factual recovery of history, nor 
yet in the psychological recovery from history, but rather in the insistence on 
remaining inconsolable before history.”257  In the second case, Durrant positions 
mourning (or rather, melancholia) as central to Coetzee’s project based on the 
construction of characters who “remain radically incommensurable with the narratives 
in which they find themselves.”258  He reads figures like Foe’s rewritten Friday (who 
appears as a tongueless corrective to Defoe’s character), the barbarian girl and 
Michael K from Waiting for the Barbarians and Life and Times of Michael K, 
respectively, as “unhomely figures of and for alterity [who] embody precisely that 
material history of suffering that the narrative is unable to represent.”259  Echoing the 
unmournable suffering at the heart of the novel’s refusal to fully represent history, 
these characters are unrepresentable for Durrant because they “illustrate the 
impossibility of speaking.”260  This claim, however, is complicated by Coetzee’s later 
novels, in which the suffering objects of care or “mourned” have become at first 
dehumanized and, finally in Summertime, completely disembodied.    
Comprised of a excerpts from the notebooks of the recently deceased Nobel 
Prize winning author, J. M. Coetzee, along with transcriptions of interviews conducted 
by a fictional biographer, Mr. Vincent, who is in the process of writing a biography of 
the dead novelist, Summertime portrays a version of the author’s early life in 1970s 
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South Africa through the testimonies of five acquaintances and a compilation of his 
unpublished notebooks.  These fragmentary notes, which most aptly embody the 
titular “Scenes from Provincial Life,” are the place where both the history of the 
author and the political climate in South Africa in the 1970s come closest to being 
represented; they contain, among other things, brief accounts of an Afrikaner vigilante 
attack on a black residential area detailed in an issue of the Sunday Times; a 
description of Pollsmoor prison, a “South African gulag” that “[protrudes] so 
obscenely into white suburbia;”261 an account of a white man sharing a rundown house 
with his infirmed father, making the decision to lay his own concrete in defiance of 
what he sees as a taboo on manual labor enabled by Apartheid.  While Vincent’s 
interviews later confirm these stories as autobiographically based, the testimonies only 
reveal Coetzee as an main object of obsession that constantly defies understanding.  
Inasmuch as the novelist himself emerges as the silent object of other people’s 
interpretive attempts, he is most closely aligned with resiliently uncommunicative 
figures like the Barbarian girl, Michael K, and Friday.   
  In Summertime, the history Coetzee refuses to represent is his own – firstly in 
the sense that each of the five testimonies brings us no closer to the inner thoughts of 
the author but focuses more prominently on each individual’s impressions of him, and 
secondly because of the overt fictionalization of certain well known aspects of his life.  
The ostensibly autobiographical text (the third in a memoir-based trilogy following 
Boyhood and Youth) has notable factual discrepancies, including the omission of 
Coetzee’s real-life wife and children who are left out of the story in favor of an 
unflattering self-portrait of the writer as an unsympathetic loner – “Socially inept. 
Repressed, in the wider sense of the word”262 – and a fictionalized death of the 
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author’s mother, who in actuality died over ten years later than she does in 
Summertime.263  Of course, the most overt form of fictionalization that occurs in the 
story is the omission of Coetzee, himself; in the book, Coetzee has already died 
(sometime in early 2007) and Summertime stages a look back at the life of the 
deceased author through the impressions of seemingly random people chosen by a 
biographer who never met him. 
These testimonies, some of which are direct transcripts of interviews, and some 
of which are rendered into Coetzee’s characteristic third-person present tense free 
indirect style, are bookended by the narrative fragments in which the reader has the 
closest access to the deceased author’s own voice.  The first, dated between 1972 and 
1975, appear as diary entries commenting on events in contemporary South Africa.  
The latter set appear as ideas for unwritten novels; for instance, one of the “undated 
fragments” mentions an idea for a story about a diary of bad days – what in the “real” 
Coetzee’s life would become Diary of a Bad Year (2008), but which the character 
Coetzee ostensibly dies before writing.  This intertextual reference is mirrored in the 
earlier novel, in its protagonist, Señor C’s, diary entry, which posits “[an] intriguing 
idea: to write a novel from the perspective of a man who has died…whose every 
moment is coloured with grief.”264  Indeed, Summertime is colored from beginning to 
end with grief, but less tangible grief for the man who has died than abstracted sadness 
over lost homeland, depleted youth, and unrealized potential.  Described by his cousin, 
Margot, as “a melancholy type,”265 even John, the novel’s primary object of loss – the 
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dead man around whom the testimonies circulate – is the figure through which the 
novel’s most melancholy feelings are projected.  Fresh from his return from graduate 
school in the United States, a job in England, and the publication of his first 
(apparently failed) novel, Dusklands, John cannot reconcile his deep nostalgia for the 
South African Karoo, where his extended family live, with his repudiation of the 
country’s politics.  Described in all five testimonies as a figure who never “fit in” 
South Africa, John recapitulates his own experience of irrecuperable loss of homeland 
when he asks his cousin, “what future do I have in this country, where I have never 
fitted in?”  Alienated from his Afrikaner family by his adoption of the English 
language and cut off from his birthplace by his experiences abroad, John answers his 
own question, suggesting that “[p]erhaps a clean break would have been better after 
all.  Cut yourself free of what you love and hope that the wound heals.”266 
John’s return to South Africa is marked only by a heightened sense of 
alienation, a simultaneous discomfort with and desire for lost origins.  His conclusion 
that it is “best not to haunt old sites and come away from them mourning what is for 
ever gone”267 reverses a traditional ghost story trope in such a way that the living, 
ghostly in their capacity to return, haunt the places of their past and forever mourn the 
things they have lost, unable to ever recuperate depleted time.  This sense of 
unresolvable melancholia also permeates the novel’s stories of more tangible losses.  
Even Adriana, the Brazilian refuge from Angola whose daughter Coetzee tutors in 
English, transposes her grief over her husband’s death onto an abstract loss of 
homeland.  Throughout her testimony she makes brief references to the loss of her 
husband, who was brutally attacked by robbers shortly after emigrating to South 
Africa, but her focus turns to her family’s exile from Brazil:  “Formally I may not 
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have been a widow, yet as far as I was concerned I was already in mourning, for him 
and for all of us, stranded and helpless in this cruel land.”268  Adriana’s comment is 
significant for two reasons.  In the first place, her claim that she is in mourning “for 
him and for all of us” frames her and her daughters as already lost too, already their 
own objects of mourning.  Like the living John who sees himself as the specter 
haunting the meaningful places of his childhood, the living are recast as the very dead 
whom they, themselves, mourn.  In the second place, Adriana’s grief for her husband 
evokes the same preemptive melancholy present in the novel’s final passage.  Her 
husband is kept alive for months on life support, albeit in a vegetative state; 
accordingly, she is not “formally” a widow, but is “already in mourning” for his 
impending loss, a loss that will be fulfilled in the near future.  
The novel’s focus on expected loss culminates in John’s concern with his own 
legacy, one that is obviously refracted through the real Coetzee’s staging of his 
futurely posthumous biography.  Within the novel, the concern with the way an author 
lives on, will live on, has lived on, will be and will have been remembered permeates 
the text.  When John tells his lover, Julia, that a book should be “[a] gesture of refusal 
in the face of time.  A bid for immortality,”269 he classifies his own acts of novel-
writing as refusal of chronological submission.  The novels are substitutions for the 
dead, replacements for their lost bodies and thoughts that might allow the living to 
“speak with the dead.  Who otherwise…are cast out into everlasting silence.”270  
Channeling a grief-stricken anxiety about his potential failure to live on, John explains 
that the knowledge that people might read his work after he is dead  “affords [him] 
some consolation.”271   
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The notion of care as a simultaneous preparation-for and refusal-of the threat 
of future loss is arguably thematized in Summertime’s hyperawareness of legacies and 
the passage of time, something that resonates with my decision to classify it as part of 
an elegiac tradition.  In the elegiac convention, literature is elevated because it 
partially enacts the consolation of “living on” in art.  The mourned object is 
figuratively put to rest and the text stands in as a substitution through which the object 
paradoxically lives on.  Poetry, or prose fiction, in the case of Coetzee, is the very 
medium and mode of preservation, continuation, and endless suspension of a life.  In a 
text where the dead author himself goes formally unmourned, his own posthumously 
available fragments for stories and diary entries become a site for him to meditate on 
his writing as something which will survive him.  For the character-Coetzee, the threat 
of his own death looms large in his desire to leave something that will “outlast” him.  
In one of the early journal-like fragments, as he is reconstructing his father’s rundown 
house, he finds the work pleasurable because “the slabs he is laying will outlast his 
tenancy of the house, may even outlast his spell on earth; in which case he will in a 
certain sense have cheated death.”272  Questioning his own persistence “in inscribing 
marks on paper, in the faint hope that people not yet born will take the trouble to 
decipher them,” he suggests that “[i]mmortality of a kind, a limited immortality, is not 
so hard to achieve after all.”273   
Echoing a simultaneously monumental and anti-monumental model of 
remembrance, literature here is figured as no more than “marks on paper,” equivalent 
in the long term to laying slabs of stone that future witnesses might come across.  The 
interplay of inscriptions in stone vs. marks on paper might be read two ways: as a 
revelation that the monumental medium of stone is nothing more than ephemeral 
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paper in the grand scheme of history, evoking Shelley’s “Ozymandias,” or as an 
elevation of novel-writing as somehow indelible, a tongue-in-cheek reference to the 
fact of the “real” Coetzee’s continued survival, even as he has killed himself off in 
semi-autobiographical fiction.  Later, in one of the undated fragments, this theory of 
writing is revised as a failed poet character determines that prose would just as easily 
suffice to “perform the same cleansing trick as poetry,” and expresses doubts about 
prose-writing because it presupposes and necessitates the author’s extended survival:  
“Prose, in his experience, calls for many more words than poetry.  There is no point on 
embarking on prose if one lacks confidence that one will be alive the next day to carry 
on with the task.”274  The very act of prose-writing, then, is overshadowed by an 
anxiety about death and incompletion.   
Ultimately, Coetzee’s preoccupation with his own death, coupled with the 
continual attempts to work through that future, again registers the anxiety of the future 
perfect – the time when one will have been.  The melancholy the Coetzee character 
experiences is, in a sense, a preemptive melancholy for future loss.  In this case, the 
very process that would “perform the same cleansing trick” of identifying his malaise 
is the thing that produces it.  Here, the narrative challenges the notion of writing as a 
memorializing project that is first and foremost about the recuperation of history and 
suggests instead that it preemptively memorializes its own author’s death, a death that 
the narrative cannot possibly represent because it hasn’t yet occurred.  Summertime 
stages a mourning that, in a sense, does not wait for its object.  
These objects are suspended, waiting to be lost in a future that has yet to arrive, 
just as the novel’s final act of care is stalled or suspended in the final words: “I cannot 
face the prospect of ministering to you day and night, I am going to abandon you.  
Goodbye. One or the other: there is no third way.”  But what does this hesitation over 
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the “Care of Patient” and “Care of Wound” entail with regard to the way Coetzee’s 
fiction has registered traumatic loss, working through, or resistant mourning?  Is 
“care,” a valance of resistant melancholy?  If care is based on sustaining the object 
that threatens to be lost, does it constitute a refusal to “let go” in the way that 
melancholic attachment preserves the object?  The concluding section of Summertime 
offers a poignant point of entry into these kinds of questions if we read care as a term 
that supersedes mourning.  While the plot involves the momentary cessation of the 
work of care (or the work of mourning), the oddly utilitarian focus of the passage’s 
repeated word choices evokes that very work.  The presence of  instructions, 
schedules, business, employment, and projects dominates the last short paragraphs, 
implicitly asking, whose business, whose employment, whose work is the work of 
mourning?   
The passage evokes memorable moments from Coetzee’s other novels in 
which care is administered: John’s revulsion from the wound recalls the Magistrate’s 
reaction to the “caterpillar” of a scar by the barbarian girl’s eye, or Susan Barton’s 
revulsion at the void of Friday’s absent tongue.  Of course, the “outline sketch of a 
human head with a dark circle low in the throat” invokes Friday, as well, referencing 
the “thick stub at the back of the mouth,”275 echoing the aporetic violence in Foe – the 
unarticulated trauma Susan imagines Friday has undergone at the hands of slavers.  
Significantly, the removal of the larynx renders John’s father speechless, like Friday, 
so John’s revulsion is prompted as much by the fact that he’ll have to “minister to” the 
wound, but will ostensibly have to mediate between a speechless figure and the rest of 
the world.  The most overt commonality is arguably with Lurie’s treatment of the dogs 
in Disgrace, in which he adopts the role as “a dog undertaker” because of an 
obligation he feels to “his idea of the world, a world in which men do not use shovels 
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to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for processing.”276  In a way, 
Summertime ends with the suspension of a choice that concludes the earlier novel.  In 
Disgrace, Lurie can keep his favorite dog alive for another week, or he can in that 
moment give him up to be euthanized; the decision is between care and abandonment 
and the decision is made in Lurie’s final line, “Yes, I am giving him up.”277  
Summertime, on the other hand, ends with the stalled choice between care and 
abandonment or, framed another way, perhaps, between holding on and letting go.   
If we are to parallel this ostensible binary of “holding on” vs. “letting go” with 
melancholia vs. mourning, does the novel’s proposal of care constitute a possible third 
way, or just another iteration of “ministering to the other”?  The either/or dynamic of 
Summertime’s final moment of stalled care echoes a choice Durrant sets up between a 
dedication to endless grief which would ostensibly prevent the assimilation of 
traumatic history into something manageable and, therefore forgettable, and a closure 
which would do exactly the opposite.  But does this reading make room for a possible 
“third way” that literary writing might traverse?   
Earlier, I suggested that a theorization of care dovetails with trauma theory’s 
focus on the belatedness of traumatic experience; like trauma, care, too, comes too 
soon and too late.  Care can only be administered too soon as it fails to preserve the 
lost other at the moment of death.  Simultaneously, care is belatedly administered only 
to those who have already been injured in some way.  But care necessitates a temporal 
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model that projects loss into the future.  Much like trauma, which will only be 
cognized in future repetitions and iterations, care protects and projects the work of 
mourning into a future that has not yet happened.  At the same time that it marks a 
state of preparation for loss, care sustains the potentially lost object, thus refusing loss 
in an attempt to postpone it. 
Significantly, the time of care resonates with one of trauma studies’ archetypal 
narratives:  Freud’s reading of the dream of the burning child as wish fulfillment, in 
which the living child of the dream temporarily defies the reality of the father’s loss.  
Caruth has responded to both this and Lacan’s reading of the dream, in which the child 
is paradoxically alive for the first time as the father (for the first time) bears witness to 
his suffering, as a moment when care comes too late:  “Awakening, in Lacan’s reading 
of the dream, is itself the site of trauma, the trauma of the necessity and the 
impossibility of responding to another’s death.”278  Care, like the recognition of trauma 
in Freud’s archetypal story, always comes too late.  Care is belated because the other 
is only in need of care after being somehow victimized, immobilized, or threatened.  
Susan Barton cares for Friday only after he has had his tongue cut out; the Magistrate 
cares for the barbarian girl only after she has been tortured by Colonel Joll (something 
he might have actually stopped from happening); Lurie’s care of the dog corpses 
comes only after he’s failed to prevent the living dogs from being euthanized; the care 
of the “stump” in Slow Man only necessitated by Paul Rayment’s bicycle accident and 
the amputation of his leg.  Coetzee’s postponement of care in Summertime, finally, 
constitutes a clear recognition of the way care intervenes too late.  Building on this 
idea, I would argued that care offers a more provisional model of mourning inasmuch 
as it also contains within it the desire to undo the loss or the trauma, to go both 
backward and forward in time – back to stop the disaster that happened and forward to 
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prevent the one that is impending.  
The refusal of a possible “third way” echoes another opposition in the passage, 
one that has less to do with the time of care and more to do with the space of care.  I 
am referring here to the paragraph that specifies that care “is the patient’s business, or 
the patient’s family’s business, or else no one’s business.”  In this sense, the 
possibility of relating is actually restricted to two options: the victim himself, and 
those who are immediate or local (the family).  The third option is no one.  This 
passage evokes the way in which care is circumscribed or predetermined by space, by 
the spaces in which care can traditionally be administered: hospitals, homes, 
deathbeds, etc.  Furthermore, in this passage, the potential for care is circumscribed by 
blood relations;  John has a duty to care for his father precisely because he is his 
father.  Though Coetzee’s later novels have implicitly questioned what constitutes a 
mournable life by rendering their objects of care into abstraction, they urgently beg the 
question of how one might cope with the spatial and conceptual limits of what 
constitutes a mournable life.  If mourning is necessarily circumscribed by these limits, 
how might acts of mourning enable a space where one might ethically, affectively, or 
otherwise respond to the alterity of another’s loss, or the loss of another?  
If care figures a gesture to that “third way” of responding to loss, a provisional 
space between a totalizing mourning and a radically open melancholia, it also offers a 
new way of thinking about empathy as a potential response to another’s loss or 
trauma, an experience that by definition defies understanding.  It would not be 
misleading to suggest that all of J. M. Coetzee’s novels have in some way dealt with 
the relationship between a subject determined to make meaning out of another’s 
experience and the way that experience resists understanding.279  However, I would 
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argue that the resilient silence that Durrant identifies points to much more than just the 
impossibility of speaking trauma.  The fact that the story of the elision of the other is 
told through a process of eliding otherness brings the very problem of identification to 
the foreground.  These scenes which depicted the forestalled moment of 
comprehension – Susan Barton’s attempt to learn about Friday’s past, the Magistrate’s 
attempt to access the barbarian girl’s experience of torture, and in Coetzee’s later 
novel, Disgrace, David Lurie’s attempts to get his daughter, Lucy, to recount the story 
of her rape – the narrative is always focalized through someone trying to understand 
something that is ostensibly impossible to understand.  Taking into account these 
scenes which feature so prominently in the novels, scenes which in Durrant’s 
argument exemplify a character-based embodiment of unrepresentable material 
history, I would like to briefly examine how they might contribute to a different 
understanding of the possibility of empathic relation. 
In these scenes, Coetzee’s novels dare the reader to identify, but in their refusal 
they are also always challenging the potential conflation of identification and 
empathy.  Durrant also argues that the novels portray empathy as something which 
always involves a questionable identification with the other; in his understanding, 
“Coetzee’s novels implicitly argue that to transcend the other’s alterity is to efface that 
alterity, that the act of empathy is the attempt to imagine the other as the same, as 
another version of the self.”280  The problem with Durrant’s argument, however, is that 
it comes close to valorizing traumatization, or at least abjection, when it claims that in 
Coetzee’s novels,  
 
the possibility of reconciliation lies not in our ability to 
empathize with the other but rather in an experience of 
abjection, which, instead of gaining imaginative access 
to the experience of another subject, one experiences a 
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radical loss of subjectivity, an “experience” (if one can 
speak of experience in the absence of a subject) that 
approximates…the experience of being other.281 
 
Durrant’s characterization of this warped “act of empathy” as an act that propels the 
subject temporarily into an “underworld of suffering” from which “it becomes 
momentarily possible to witness, if not to participate in, the ‘true grief’ of the other”282 
sounds eerily like an advocacy of secondary traumatization that itself involves a 
process of identification.  This is confirmed by Durrant’s claim that the “gap between 
privileged narrator and oppressed other is perhaps at its narrowest in Waiting for the 
Barbarians where “it is the Magistrate who comes closest…to experiencing himself as 
other” during his own experience of torture which, according to Durrant, negates his 
own subjectivity.283  In a similar formulation, silence bears witness to silence, so 
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according to Durrant’s analysis of Foe, “by positioning Friday’s story as a hole in her 
own narrative, Susan allows the emptiness of her own narrative to bear witness to 
Friday’s loss of history – and to the wider history of loss to which the ‘fact’ of his 
mut(e)ilation itself bears witness.”284 
 I have tried throughout this project to move away from a model of silence as a 
mode of testimony and ethical transmission of traumatic experience.  With this in 
mind, I want to focus in particular on the claim that the Magistrate’s loss of 
subjectivity is the closest a character comes “to experiencing himself as other,” and 
ostensibly achieving some kind of sympathetic understanding.  Rather than sum up 
Durrant’s account of how this takes place in Coetzee’s early novels, I will briefly 
examine how Disgrace sets up (and complicates) this problem by staging two 
instances of its protagonist, David Lurie’s, attempt to relate to the suffering of others.  
In the first case, he tries again and again to reconstruct the exact events of his 
daughter’s rape, which he could neither prevent nor witness because the assailants 
locked him in another room.  Faced with her refusal to discuss it, along with her 
unsettling decision to remain on the farm after striking a deal with the same man who 
might have set the attack in motion, Lurie’s task throughout the novel seems to 
involve his development of personal mechanisms for identification that would 
ostensibly allow him to relate.  When Bev Shaw accuses him of not being capable of 
identifying on the grounds that “You don’t understand, you weren’t there,”285 David 
begins a process of attempting to “be the woman,” which culminates in his ability to 
recognize the crime he committed at the beginning of the novel, for which he 
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continually refuses to “repent.”  In this way, it is easy to imagine the novel, which 
opens with Lurie’s own seduction, arguably any ambiguous rape, of one of his 
students proceeds in a way that allows Lurie to hone his potential for identifying with 
the victim by imagining himself in her place.  It seems at first glance to suggest that it 
is only once he has “been there” and been the victim of an attack himself that he can 
begin to identify with others. 
However, if the novel implies that, through identifying with Lucy and Melanie, 
Lurie is able to come to terms with two of the novel’s “disgraces” – his sexual 
relationship with Melanie, and Lucy’s rape – it stops this process of “successful” 
identification short when it structurally parallels Lurie’s ostensible understanding of 
Lucy’s experience with his work in Bev Shaw’s clinic where he attempts to ameliorate 
the disgraceful way in which the dead dogs are cremated.  Lurie adopts the role as “a 
dog undertaker” because of an obligation he feels to “his idea of the world, a world in 
which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for 
processing.”286  When questioning the sense of urgency he feels to perform this role, 
however, he acknowledges overtly that it is not “for the sake of the dogs” because “the 
dogs are dead; and what do dogs know of honour and dishonour anyway?”287 Lurie’s 
important recognition of the difference between his own desire and moral obligation 
and that of the dead dogs (whose feelings about their way of burial he cannot know) 
demonstrates how his own ostensible empathy for the dogs exists at the level of 
identification; he experiences an obligation to handle the bodies “honorably” because 
it is how he would expect to be handled.  Similarly, when he eventually leaves the 
farm, he understands his abandonment of the position of “dog undertaker” as a 
betrayal: “From Monday onward the dogs released from life within the walls of the 
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clinic will be tossed into the fire unmarked, unmourned.”288  The fact that Lurie’s 
empathy for the dog corpses remains at the level of projective identification – in the 
sense that he imagines himself in their place, and relates in that sense to an anxiety 
about being “released from life” and then “unmarked, unmourned” – parallels his 
identification with Lucy and reveals the flaws in the way his act of empathy for her is 
set up as “successful.”   
Inasmuch as this reading reveals the failure of all of the novel’s acts of 
empathy as mere identification, this would presumably be consistent with Durrant’s 
reading of the ways in which, in Coetzee’s novels, “the act of empathy is the attempt 
to imagine the other as the same, as another version of the self.”289  But rather than 
lingering on the undecidabiliy of Ceotzee’s characters who, Durrant argues, bear 
witness to a history that defies understanding, I suggest that Coetzee stages moments 
of potential empathy that always slip into identification as a way to problematize one 
way of relating to otherness.  The way Durrant sets up an opposition between 
preserving alterity and eliding it involves an understanding of empathy as 
identification in which self is conflated with other.  However, other modes of 
empathetic response exist.  For instance, against a dubious model of identification in 
which the secondary witness assumes the subject position of the victim, LaCapra 
posits empathy as “a kind of virtual experience” in which one relates to the other 
without “making oneself a surrogate victim who has a right to the victim’s voice or 
subject position.”290  This virtual surrogacy is something that I have been attempting to 
trace in the texts of the three writers I have so far dealt with in this project, particularly 
as an effect of what Michael Rothberg has termed “multidirectional memory.”  In this 
sense, legitimate empathy would not involve a conflation of self and other but would 
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involve, rather, a process of temporarily “[putting] oneself in the other’s position 
while recognizing the difference of that position and hence not taking the other’s 
place.”291  It would involve recognizing this difference while at the same time 
acknowledging convergences between histories and experiences, allowing the kind of 
analogic thinking that necessarily informs comparative trauma studies in processing 
histories in a way that doesn’t render them equivalent.  Analogic thinking, after all, 
need not involve projective identification or the facile conflation of two different 
events. 
However, I want to suggest that Coetzee’s work is concerned with a conflation 
of identification and empathy, and that the way in which he constantly foregrounds 
this conflation allows his novels to articulate a different kind of resistance to mourning 
than the one that Durrant describes.  As I have already shown, one way Coetzee 
problematizes this conflation of identification and empathy is precisely through the 
staging of unreadability that is so central to Durrant’s reading.  Most acts of potential 
empathy in the novels involve the more powerful figure (the Magistrate, the doctor in 
Michael K, David Lurie, etc.) attempting to imagine himself in the other’s place but 
finding all attempts to do so inadequate.  This trend is consistent in the later novels; in 
Disgrace it comes across in Lurie’s attempt to imagine himself in the place of his 
daughter and the dogs he cremates, and in Summertime it emerges through the 
biographer’s attempt to know something of John Coetzee.  The narratives of 
Summertime, of course, purport to be “about” the late Coetzee, but the testimonies 
shed no light on his inner thoughts.  Each character Vincent interviews merely 
expresses discontent or confusion about a figure that was impervious and difficult to 
relate to.  In this way, Coetzee himself becomes the main object of obsession that the 
narrative resists representing. 
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 While Durrant reads this resistance as part of Coetzee’s interest in staging “the 
impossible task of relating to the other as other,”292 I am also interested in the way this 
resistance to identification – or rather, the continued portrayal of figures that are 
irrecuperable, impenetrable, an affront to understanding – frames the problem of the 
“specificity” of traumatic experience.  Arguably, because there is no possibility for 
finding some sense of commonality, there is no possibility for relation in Coetzee’s 
novels.  But at the same time, the failure of this kind of “empathy” which subsumes 
otherness points to a resistance in the novels against allowing this problematic 
identification to take place.  Building on Durrant’s argument, I would suggest that the 
novels must resist this because the possibility of fully identifying with a suffering 
other problematically promotes a false sense of the possibility for collective mourning 
based on an impossibly complete identification.  Furthermore, if there could be a 
universalizing means of imagining empathy – if the trauma the empathetic witness 
imagines could be rendered somehow equal to the lived experience of that other’s 
trauma – then a “successful” collective mourning could materialize, but only in a way 
that utterly effaced the differences between individuals.  Paradoxically, the latter is 
intimated in Durrant’s own seeming affirmation of secondary traumatization that 
requires identification.  
The resistance to identification in Coetzee’s novels ultimately suggests that 
any universal model of empathy is suspect.  While we might understand Durrant’s 
quasi-deconstructive focus on otherness as a paradoxically abstract dedication to 
specificity, it forms part of a general theory of how one should ethically relate to 
radically heterogeneous other.  I have already explained how in Durrant’s argument, 
the impetus to depathologize melancholia is connected to an acceptance of ghosts, in 
which the subject comes to understand the experience of being haunted as an ethical 
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resistance to closure.  The conflation of melancholia with a historical materialist 
understanding of the past implies that giving up the ghost is an act of totalization, 
historicism, fixing the unfixable, representing the unrepresentable.  At the same time, 
the whole idea of its political and moral efficacy seems centered on a ceaseless, 
“ethical” devotion to undecidability that actually elides all specificity.  It is important 
to mention that Durrant explicitly argues for a need to differentiate between “the 
Other” of radical heterogeneity and “the Other” of racism, sexism, and homophobia, 
what he calls “the material history of othering, the violent negation or foreclosure of 
subjectivity that characterizes the history of racism.”293  However, I would argue that 
his rigid distinction between history and that which resists historical representation 
risks conflating the two.   
One of the problems that arises is how to reconcile an argument against the 
simple identification with the other with my argument against the valorization of 
melancholia, one facet of which is dedicated to the preservation of the alterity of the 
other (and therefore, implicitly, the foreclosure of identification).  I suggested earlier 
that Coetzee’s work constantly foregrounds the problematic conflation of empathy 
with identification and, in doing so, alludes to a different kind of resistance to 
mourning – mourning based on imagining oneself in the other’s place and, in that 
sense, mourning one’s own perceived experience of loss instead of the other’s.  In this 
model, one experience of loss becomes a simple allegory for another.  Taking into 
account the ways in which Coetzee’s novels stage this dilemma, we might ask if they 
also propose the possibility of mourning without identification and without usurping 
the place of the other.  Do the novels suggest an alternative mode of relation instead of 
simply highlighting the pitfalls of this one? 
Summertime offers an answer to this question through its focus on care rather 
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than empathy as a mode of response to another’s suffering.  Coetzee’s work has from 
the beginning been concerned with a conflation of identification and empathy, and that 
the way in which he constantly foregrounds this conflation allows his novels to 
articulate a different kind of resistance to mourning than the one that Durrant 
describes.  This resistance has less to do with resisting assimilating the alterity of 
death or loss than it does with a simple identification with the victim that becomes a 
disembodied wound, one which the witness has not experienced but nonetheless 
identifies with.  But this does not mean that Coetzee’s novels reject mourning flat-out; 
rather, they reject a model of mourning based on identification.  In response to this, I 
suggest that Coetzee offers an alternative mode of relation in place of this foreclosing 
identification, and it takes place through the suspended mourning that occurs through 
the novels’ acts of care.  If empathy is based on a fantasy of recognition, care, as I 
have suggested, involves a gesture to that other that not predicated on the fullness of 
identification. 
The either/or dynamic of Summertime’s final moment of stalled care echoes a 
choice Durrant sets up between a dedication to endless grief which would ostensibly 
prevent the assimilation of traumatic history into something manageable and, therefore 
forgettable, and a closure which would do exactly the opposite: 
 
Should postcolonial novelists follow the example of 
psychoanalysis and seek to transform melancholia in to 
mourning, or should they allow the endlessness of grief 
to overwhelm the literary work?  Should their work offer 
some form of healing or closure or continue to testify to 
the disproportionate memories of racial oppression by 
somehow transgressing the limits of their own 
composition?”294 
 
But does Durrant’s reading make room for a possible “third way” that postcolonial 
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writing might go?  This dissertation has attempted to suggest other ways this 
resistance might take place, while also maintaining an interest in a critique of fixity in 
its urge to destabilize ostensibly stable notions of identity, culture, and nation.  While 
other critics have suggested this destabilization might take place from an excess of 
loss that necessitates a dialogic relationship to the past, I have attempted to do so in a 
way that says mourning, not melancholia might provide the dialogic basis for that 
relationship, but a reimagined process of mourning that would not conflate self with 
other, and while recognizing similarity, would not assimilate difference into 
equivalence. 
The question remains as to whether Durrant’s account articulates a specific 
“postcolonial” work of mourning, or whether his presumed particularity of interest in 
postcolonial questions is not subsumed by a more general theory about the writing of 
any history.  While Durrant implies that these approaches are central to postcolonial 
thought, there is the sense that the anti-historicist remembrance he advocates could 
apply to anything, not just the way (some) postcolonial literature have tended to 
foreground encounters with otherness that cannot be subsumed.  When attempting to 
provisionally represent or rending into narrative a story about colonial trauma, is this 
“anti-historicist, deconstructive ethics of remembrance” the only possible way to resist 
the kind of totalizing representation of the past attributed to the fixity of 
monumentaliziation?  If the broad concern motivating recent critical work on 
melancholia is how to supersede a work of mourning that assimilates and therefore 
subsumes otherness, perhaps the critical decision to replace empathy with care offers a 
way out of the fantasy of full identification and the related concept of full assimilation.  
Mike Marais’s work on hospitality in Coetzee’s fiction is worth mentioning here 
because it aligns with Durrant’s argument in its concerned with the impossibility of 
narrating history without foreclosing it.  Adopting a similar opposition between 
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history and an otherness that is “beyond” or “in excess of” it, Marais contends that, 
 
“[if] the writer is responsible for what is other than 
history, but to which history is refractory, s/he is faced 
with an impossible, because always still to be 
completed, task.  If […] the other cannot be 
accommodated, the writer’s task is never done.  The 
other exceeds and constantly interrupts what has been 
written, thereby signaling the work’s incompletion and 
inadequacy while at the same time requiring, indeed, 
demanding, that more be written.”295 
 
While mourning is not the explicit focus of Marais’s argument, his understanding of 
the way that mastery is interrupted by an always uncompleted attempt to 
accommodate another’s story of pain is relevant.  But Marais’s argument is also of 
interest because of care’s potential relation to and difference from hospitality.  If care 
is necessarily circumscribed by certain spatial and conceptual limits, it differs 
fundamentally from hospitality’s unconditional opening to the absolute stranger.  
Ultimately, Coetzee’s recent fiction forces us to as whether or not care as mourning 
really enables a space where one might ethically, affectively, or otherwise respond to 
radical alterity.    
                                                
295 Marais, xiv.  Marais briefly identifies the etymological link between care and 
mourning; however, mourning does not play an important role in his analysis.  Instead, 
Marais’s book offers a sustained analysis of the reoccurring figure of the “damaged 
child and the theme of betrayal in Coetzee’s writing”(xiv) that is worth mentioning 
here because it dovetails with Durrant’s understanding of Coetzee’s refusal of the 
fullness of historical representation.  Marais argues that Coetzee’s work is fixated on 
an otherness that “is figured as being absolute in its irreducibility”(xiii); the writer’s 
attempt, in turn, to master this otherness and bring it into narrative results in a double 
bind in which the writer is simultaneously bound to what Marais calls, “the invisible” 
– a metaphor he uses to describe an otherness that is “beyond us”(xiii) – and the 
realization that “to render visible the invisible is to destroy the invisible”(xiv).  The 
lost or deformed child stands for this invisibility that can never be made visible, but 
nonetheless makes an ethical demand on the writer; the writer must accommodate the 
otherness of the invisible/the child, but to do so fully would be to deface or betray it.   
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Arguably, the necessity of ongoing interaction is suggested by the very 
definition of care.  In addition to its connection to “utterance of sorrow; lamentation, 
mourning,”296 care etymologically concatenates preservation and rejection, holding on 
and letting go.  It simultaneously means, “[c]harge; oversight with a view to 
protection, preservation, or guidance” and “[t]o look after; to deal with, provide for, 
dispose of.”  The simultaneity of preservation and disposal, maintenance and “laying 
to rest” registers the way Coetzee implicitly complicates a prescription of resistant 
mourning, paradoxically enough, through a prescription of care on a “cyclostyled 
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This project has looked to trauma studies as a potential comparative framework 
that perhaps can lead to a non-instrumental, relational understanding of different 
events, experiences, and identities.  In her introduction to Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory, Cathy Caruth suggests that “in a catastrophic age… trauma itself may 
provide the very link between cultures.”297  This claim has been frequently cited by 
postcolonial scholars attempting to justify the intersection of trauma studies and the 
postcolonial.  As a form of theoretical or thematic “area” studies (in which we study 
“sites” of trauma), trauma as a critical framework arguably invites us to think of 
incommensurable experience as the unlikely basis for commensurability between 
cultures.  However, how do we reconcile the application of trauma studies, which as a 
field is deeply rooted in European intellectual history and events, to postcolonial 
contexts?  If trauma studies purports to theorize individual and collective trauma, does 
it do so in ways that sufficiently account for specific iterations in different scenarios?  
Does its inflection with universalizing scientific accounts of psychological stress make 
it incompatible with accounts of cultural difference?  These are some of the questions 
I attempted to address by working toward a “transnational” reading of postcolonial 
trauma narratives. 
The primary aim of this dissertation has been to show how the intersection of 
trauma theory with postcolonial contexts might help unravel certain problematic 
assumptions within the predominantly Eurocentric discipline of trauma studies, 
particularly an unguarded valorization of melancholia which has formed a recent trend 
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in the field.  I prefaced this project with a description of the kinds of arguments made 
against the simple application of trauma studies to postcolonial contexts, citing the 
way that critics like Anne Whitehead have called for an analysis of alternative 
(postcolonial) notions of selfhood, community, and recovery that might challenge the 
Eurocentric privileging of “the individualist self” central to understanding the effects 
of psychological trauma.  But my analysis has also sought to problematize 
Whitehead’s question about whether or not we can understand “the postcolonial text 
as a site for articulating local, non-western concepts of suffering, loss, and 
bereavement or alternatively of recovery and healing.”298  While it is undoubtedly 
important to account for the ways contemporary understandings of trauma’s aftermath 
might differ across cultures, I want to draw attention to the problem of thinking in 
terms of a European/non-European, or “Western”/”non-Western” binary opposition 
when attempting to articulate a theory of colonial trauma.  While we must resist the 
urge to import any theoretical model onto a context which might resist that model’s 
basic assumptions, I would argue that there is something paradoxical about attempting 
to imagine a completely non-Eurocentric theory of trauma – something which the 
urgent call to challenge trauma theory with “non-western” ideas of subjectivity, 
consciousness, and traumatization fail to account for.  Simply put, the very colonial 
violence that one might call traumatic (in the terms established by European trauma 
theory) results from European and non-European cultural interactions and is therefore 
never entirely homogeneous.  The paradox here is that a thorough approach to 
“postcolonial trauma studies” must strive to articulate a theory of colonial trauma 
which necessarily requires a repudiation of Eurocentric trauma theory at the same time 
that it resists the idea of a purely ‘non-European’ trauma. 
I have tried to navigate this complex approach in two ways: firstly, by 
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recognizing the way that these texts challenge established ideas within trauma studies 
(whether they are “Eurocentric” or not), and secondly, by attempting to show how 
recent postcolonial writing is attempting to articulate new, relational mourning 
practices that extend across racial, national, or regional boundaries.  In this way, my 
project picks up concerns that Michael Rothberg has raised in his recent 
Multidirectional Memory, which proposes the idea of “multidirectional memory” as a 
corrective to models of collective memory that assume “a zero-sum struggle over 
scarce resources”299 in which the act of remembering one event effaces another.  Like 
Rothberg, I am also interested to “rethink the conceptualization of collective memory 
in multicultural and transnational contexts,”300 a task which is especially important in 
the context of colonial trauma because of the complex interrelation between specific 
theories of memory and traditions of mourning which are heterogeneous precisely 
because of colonization and globalization.  This is not to say that we shouldn’t 
challenge trauma theory and its potentially “Eurocentric” ideas – for example the 
emphasis on individualism that underscores the basic assumptions of psychoanalysis –
which render the discipline problematic in certain ways; rather, we must be careful in 
thinking that colonial memory or colonial trauma exists in a ‘purely’ colonial way, just 
as the way trauma operates in the former colonies is not accountable in terms of a 
‘purely’ European mode of theorizing.   
As I briefly explained in my introduction, Rothberg has alluded to the implicit 
interconnectedness of trauma studies and postcolonial studies in his comparative study 
of Holocaust memory and the memory of colonization and slavery in North Africa, 
North America, and the Caribbean; at the level of academic and broader cultural 
examination he explains how “the emergency of collective memory of the Nazi 
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genocide in the 1950s and 1960s takes places in a punctual dialogue with ongoing 
processes of decolonization and civil rights struggle and their modes of coming to 
terms with colonialism, slavery, and racism.”301  The implication, of course, is that 
what we currently know as “Eurocentric” trauma theory, which first proliferated 
around analysis of Holocaust memory, has always been motivated and influenced by 
an intellectually contemporary and politically visible process of the world “working 
through” the history of colonialism.  This is another reason why a rigid distinction 
between the two fields, and between European and “non-European” areas of study is 
problematic.302  
My project is smaller in scope than Rothberg’s as it concentrates solely on 
postcolonial texts from two regions, but it is also concerned with questioning the 
distinction between the universal and the particular, as well as making theoretical 
connections that transcend regional boundaries.  I have suggested that imagining new, 
provisional acts of mourning based not in an ideal recuperation of past rituals, but the 
imagination of new ones (which often involve juxtaposing different contexts and 
bringing them together as what Rothberg has called “singular yet relational 
histories”303) might provide one opportunity to rethinking trauma studies.  I have also 
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particularities of trauma in a colonial context; pointing to the intricacies of modes 
analysis should not collapse the distinction between perpetrator and victim, colonizer 
and colonized. 
303 Rothberg, “Decolonizing Trauma Studies: a response,” Studies in the Novel 40.1&2 
(Spring & Summer 2008): 225.  Here Rothberg has also usefully identified problems 
with conceptualizing “non-western” trauma on the grounds that the very terminology 
substantiates that which it attempts to undo: “Not only is the referent of the “West” 
highly elusive, but the use of the concept ends up confirming the racialized framework 
  181 
claimed that tending to the way these new and heterogeneous modes of mourning 
create provisional ways of working through the past can challenge an unqualified 
valorization of a melancholic attachment to loss which has permeated recent theory.  
This is just one of the ways that bringing together different contexts of historical 
trauma and interpreting them as “singular yet relational histories” might reveal flaws 
in the conventional assumptions of trauma theory, not just in its applications to 
“nonwestern” contexts, but European ones as well.   
Another way conventional models might be challenged is through what 
Rothberg calls an “extended” versus an “event” theory of trauma, something which I 
have implicitly done by focusing on extended histories of violence rather than single 
events.  Taking into account arguments “that the category of trauma, as it has been 
developed by Caruth, Felman, Laub, and others, “cannot illuminate ‘non-Western’ 
trauma because it remains locked in a one-dimensional ‘event theory’ if trauma,”304 
Rothberg suggests that an event-centric theory of trauma based on temporal rupture 
might just as well fail in its application to European objects of study.  After all, as he 
points out, “the ‘extended’ model of trauma and the rethinking of historical trauma are 
as relevant to a ‘western’ trauma such as the Holocaust (hardly a singular event) as 
they are to colonial and racial traumas.”305  Thinking about the status of trauma as an 
event, a singular rupture in time, or a more gradual experience of the continuous 
violence which more aptly characterizes colonial trauma would be one other possible 
way of envisioning a postcolonial trauma studies, but one which has been 
subordinated to my attempts to look closely at the problem of mourning and, in 
                                                                                                                                       
it seems to mark and displace”(227).  Furthermore, the binary opposition of West/non-
West” does not account for certain postcolonial situations.  Rothberg uses South 
Africa as an example of this, as well as “ongoing violence suffered by indigenous 
peoples within the “West””(228, my emphasis). 
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particular, a on literature as a “memorializing project” that presents new options for 
memorializing rather than a resistance to mourning as such.   
I have attempted to chart how these newly articulated modes of mourning, 
which challenge a stereotypical understanding of mourning as something that closes 
down one’s relationship with the past, might also point to new ways of thinking about 
the specificity of losses within a comparative framework which, by definition, 
attempts to articulate a general theory about responses to loss.  Where Rothberg has 
chosen the term “multidirectional” to identify “an in-between space” that separates “a 
homogenizing universalism and nominalist particularism,”306  I have picked up 
Glissant’s term, Relation, to emphasize the importance of delegitimizing “root causes” 
in favor of flow, circulation, and re-iteration.  While Rothberg’s term is useful in 
rebutting the notion of “competitive memory,” thinking about the movement of 
memory in terms of direction still supposes a kind of telos.  Relation, on the other 
hand, moves away from an end-driven narrative and allows for a more flexible 
account for the way responses to loss circulate and change.  Most importantly, the 
repudiation of endpoints and origins, which one can only relate to in terms of a 
melancholic repetition or look back, can lead to new ways of countering ceaseless 
acting out, and new ways of theorizing acts of working through loss as the productive, 
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